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ABSTRACT 
 
South Africa, as the owner of its minerals, introduced the charging of mineral 
royalties targeting economic rents in 2010. The new royalty also promotes further 
mineral processing (refining) by rewarding refiners with a reduced royalty payment. 
Such (fiscal) strategy would stimulate the country’s industrial and economic growth 
and development. This is in line with the main objectives of South Africa’s Mineral 
Policy framework and the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 2002 
(MPRDA), which resulted in the promulgation of the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Royalty Act (MPRRA) in November 2008 for implementation on March 1, 
2010.  
 
The MPRRA stipulates a dual ad valorem, sliding-scale formula method of charging 
royalties.  This dual sliding-scale formula mechanism imposes no specific rate for any 
minerals. It is based on profitability and automatically recognizes downstream 
beneficiation of mineral products as it distinguishes between refined and unrefined 
minerals. The formula provisions for refined minerals allows for a reduction of the 
royalty rate as beneficiation increases in order to compensate for the higher sales 
value of refined products. This aligns with the government’s objective to promote 
local beneficiation of South Africa’s minerals for maximum economic benefit.  
 
The purpose of this research is to assess whether this beneficiation objective of the 
MPRRA would be achieved, thereby ensuring that miners become refiners. To realize 
this, the methodology used involved a review of beneficiation provisions of past and 
current mineral royalty systems of some mineral-rich countries. More specifically, 
applying the lessons from Bradley’s work on the Western Australia royalty system to 
the South African context; extraction of necessary data for a platinum case study; and 
analyses of the results. The study indicated that miners are unlikely to become 
refiners as a result of the MPRRA and that further research is required to achieve this 
national objective. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
 
BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW AND AIMS OF RESEARCH  
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It is widely understood by the general public that mineral resources development can 
lead to creation of wealth, which can deliver benefits to human existence. The 
minerals industry has been the core of growth of many towns and states world-wide. 
Its transport and infrastructure requirements have led to development of requisite 
infrastructure, which has had spin-off benefits to other sectors of the economy 
(UNECA, 2004). Therefore, this sector has indicated potential to contribute to 
increased economic growth and employment as further exploration, mineral 
development and further mineral processing take place within jurisdictions (UNECA, 
2004). 
 
Also, with mining accounting for a significant percentage of foreign exchange 
earnings, significant part of GDP for many mineral-rich countries, their host 
Governments and citizens understand this wealth-generation potential of their 
naturally endowed lands and consider it fair for them to share in this wealth.  The 
wealth captured from mining is needed by host governments to fund their 
responsibilities vis-a-vis - social services and infrastructure, environmental 
protection, economic growth and development, industrialization and improvement of 
well-being of their citizens. Over time, governments have devised various fiscal 
instruments to capture their share of this wealth. However, governments do not only 
use fiscal instruments for revenue-generation but also to facilitate or discourage 
various kinds of private sector decisions, which include but not limited to, using 
increased import duties to discourage foreign outsourcing of equipment and  services, 
introduction of capital allowances to encourage investment (Otto et al, 1997). 
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Wealth cannot be generated from mineral deposits until they are discovered, found to 
be economically viable to exploit, extracted, processed and transformed into products 
that can be used in the markets. These operations cannot be carried out without the 
capital investment into exploration and extraction activities of mining companies. 
Therefore, in the bid to capture rents (wealth) from mineral development, 
governments must take caution and put fiscal policies in place that will satisfy their 
revenue generation objective as well as investors’ objectives by allowing sufficient 
flow of funds in the form of an Net Present Value (NPV) through to investors, so as 
to attract more investment and prevent them from leaving the country for other more 
attractive investment (Cawood, 2010). 
 
With the growing knowledge of sustainable development and the limited life span of 
mineral resources, as well as their susceptibility to price volatility and cyclicality 
from long-term decline in real prices, host governments of mineral-dependent 
jurisdictions have understood that there is need for alternative sources of exports and 
industrialization, in order to ensure sustained and long-term growth and development 
of their jurisdictions. Mineral endowments do not only possess wealth-generating 
abilities but can serve as base for industrial opportunities that will lead to future 
growth and development of mineral-rich regions by “broadening economic linkages 
that arise as a consequence of the primary extraction activities” (Northern Cape 
Province, 2005). Some of these industrial opportunities/linkages include- 
“downstream activities engaged in the further beneficiation or processing of an ore or 
concentrate; side-stream linkages arising from supply of local goods and services to 
operating companies; geographic linkages” (Northern Cape Province, 2005). 
Promoting these industrialization activities provide greater economic benefits for a 
region in terms of diversification and job creation.  
 
Although, theoretically, it is expected that mineral endowments give comparative 
advantage to its possessors, with the advent of knowledge-based societies, it has been 
illustrated that “the availability of natural resources does not automatically confer a 
3 
 
comparative advantage to a country or region rich in resources” (Northern Cape 
Province, 2005). However, as epitomized by some developed countries like Sweden 
and Finland, which were formerly mineral-dependent economies but now knowledge-
based economies, their mineral endowments proved to be a comparative advantage.  
Mineral resources only become comparative advantages when they result in products 
that guarantee sustainable growth of their host region. As the report by the Northern 
Cape Province (2005) puts it, products from mineral assets are  a “more dynamic and 
sustainable source of growth for a region and have the potential for shifting economic 
base away from dependence on primary activities along high-tech growth path”, 
enabling these regions to have competitive advantages. The above-mentioned 
countries used their policies (including fiscal systems for capturing of mineral wealth) 
to manage and utilize the development of mineral resources (comparative advantage) 
in ways that caused them “to gradually become a source of competitive advantage” 
(Northern Cape Province, 2005).  
 
Although as Kumar (1995) opined that one of the emerging themes of the post-World 
War II and independence era, was “a growing trend in providing for economic 
developmental elements in mining agreements through incorporation in taxation 
regimes and investment codes of incentives for increasing the value-added in the host 
country” and this did not necessarily achieve substantial success in some countries. 
However, from the turn of the millennium, it has been observed that many mineral-
rich developing countries have been looking at revisiting this theme and revising 
fiscal systems not only to capture greater share in mineral wealth but as a form of 
development strategy that will encourage beneficiation and establishment of 
economic linkages from mineral development like South Africa, Brazil, Mongolia.  
 
The main focus of this research, therefore, is to assess the use of the new South 
African Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty (MPRR) regime not only for its 
revenue-generation objective but its provision of beneficiation (refining) incentive in 
order to facilitate further mineral development by encouraging mining companies to 
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move-up the Value-chain to become refiners. South Africa seeks to use this royalty 
regime as a way of capitalizing on the economic advantages of its mineral sector to 
facilitate the diversification of her economy by encouraging the existence of more 
refining facilities from extractive ones.  
 
This report starts its literature review by generally looking at the evolution of mining 
fiscal instruments (herein after referred to as Mineral taxation instruments) and the 
different types of mining taxation systems; narrowing mineral taxation down to 
mineral royalty instruments (which is in line with the main focus of this report). It 
then gives definition of mineral royalty and its different types; highlights examples of 
countries which have custodianship of minerals and in line with South Africa’s ad 
valorem/hybrid royalty type; and dealing with South Africa’s MPRR specifically, its 
provisions especially its beneficiation initiative. The methodology used in this report 
will involve the application of Bradley’s recommendations to the new South African 
MPRR regime’s beneficiation provisions so as to check if the financial position of 
mining companies would improve significantly. The report will end by drawing 
conclusions and making recommendations. 
 
However, the scope of this report does not include assessing the technical soundness 
of the parameters of the regime are but only covers assessing if the regime’s 
provision of reduced rate for refined minerals is enough incentive to encourage 
mining companies to add-on establishment of beneficiation facilities. 
 
This study was confronted with limited availability of up-to-date requisite mineral 
royalty information of different countries as well as company data.  
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1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.2.1 Mining Taxation 
 
It is known that “mining normally creates wealth” (Otto et al, 2006).  Different 
stakeholders – mining company, host governments, communities, citizens etc. lay 
claim to the wealth potential.  
 
Extensive literature is available to support the fact that host governments of mineral-
rich economies have rightful claim to benefits from mining activities.  Gonzalez 
(2004), stated that “the countries, regions and localities where mining activity takes 
place, should have direct share in the wealth created by mineral exploitation in their 
jurisdictions, in a way that translates into an improvement in their inhabitants’ quality 
of life and level of well-being”. She further stated that host governments (on behalf of 
their citizens) sharing in the wealth “is an appropriate reciprocity for reduction in 
natural capital resulting from exploitation of non-renewable resources, an exploitation 
that can generate significant negative impacts”. 
 
The paper written by Sunley and Baunsgaard (2001) also highlights that host 
governments should be rewarded for exploitation of their resources which “can only 
be exploited once”.  
 
As mentioned earlier, host governments need the wealth realized from mining to fund 
their socio-economic responsibilities. Generation of wealth from mineral resources is 
only possible through the activities of mining. The wealth potential of these deposits 
drives mining companies to invest capital to fund exploitation and they require that 
sufficient profits are realized on such capital, so as to maximize shareholders’ wealth, 
and sustain their market positions. All through history, the differing objectives of 
government and companies and the optimal distribution of rents (economic 
surpluses/wealth) between both parties, have always raised critical concern and been 
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on the front burner of academic and industry-based discussions (Cawood and Minnitt, 
2001). 
 
It is widely accepted for discriminatory taxation to be applied to mineral sector as 
different from all sectors of the economy, based on the understanding that mineral 
development is unique. According to Otto et al (2006), “for tax purposes, many 
countries consider mining and mineral sector special”. This is supported by Sunley 
and Baunsgaard (2001), who gave a “Yes” answer to the question of whether the 
mineral sector requires a specific taxation regime. The reasons for this ‘specificity 
and uniqueness’ position lie in following: 
 the dominant role that the mining sector plays in some countries, accounting for 
a large share of all government revenues and foreign exchange earnings  (Otto 
et al, 2006); 
 mineral development exploits a non-renewable resource (Otto et al, 2006); 
 risk and uncertainty associated with geological conditions of the resource  
(Kumar, 1995); and 
 its special characteristics in terms of lengthy periods of exploration in which 
there is no revenue; risk of funding uneconomic deposits; large amounts of 
capital investments – human, physical, financial etc. required; capital is captive 
and not transferable once the mine is built; long-lead periods before mining 
operations can commence to extract, process, and produce mineral resources; 
requirements of specialized equipment, which are available from only a few 
manufacturers worldwide so it must be imported; mines can have long lives and 
will be subject to regime changes and political instability; volatility of 
commodity prices resulting in cyclicality of revenues; requirement of large 
reclamation costs when project ends etc. (Otto et al, 2006).  
 
Taxation policies relating to the development of mineral resources have both 
economic and political dimensions, which have changed substantially over the years 
(Cawood and Minnitt, 2001).  Kumar (1995) discussed the evolution of mining 
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taxation and emerging taxation themes from the pre-world war II era. Some of the 
themes include State sovereignty; introduction of new tax forms – income tax, 
Resource Rent Tax (RRT)  in place of/and with royalties; introduction of tax-
exemption provisions such as tax holidays, capital allowances; creation of state-
owned mining enterprises; evolution of royalty systems in relation to price 
movements. 
 
In the pre-World War II era, the colonial authorities gave out mining rights and titles 
over large areas for between 30 – 100 years and required that only Royalties (which 
were mainly computed unit-based on production volume/weight and value-based on 
amount of Ore sold) be paid to government (holders of title) and/or local citizens 
(holders of mining claims and titles to land), income taxation hardly existed then. The 
royalty fiscal instrument was considered to be an easy type of tax to administer and it 
assured governments of certain amount of payment receipts as long as there was 
production or sale of mineral products. The fiscal burden on investors was light at 
that time because of low royalty rates. 
 
More specialized mining taxation regimes began to evolve all over the world 
especially in developing countries, after World War II and independence. During this 
period, economic development increased, resulting in increase in demand for 
minerals and fuels. This allowed investors (from colonial districts, developed 
countries) to reap the benefits from the price boom created by increased demand. 
They began to be viewed as having high advantage over governments of developing 
countries since their royalty payments were low. In order to combat this, from the 
1960 - 1970s, many mineral-rich economies progressively took a socialist approach 
to mineral development. They became hostile to investors because these countries 
viewed mining investors as encroaching on the use of their natural endowments 
without necessarily allowing substantial benefits to accrue to the State. By the 1980s, 
mining investors began to abstain from these socialistic countries (mainly developing 
countries) to invest in those that were more open (developed countries) like the US, 
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Australia and Canada. Upon realization that there was no value received if mineral 
resources are left in the ground because mining investments were moving from their 
countries and with the failure of their state-owned enterprises, national economic 
planners began to soften policies in the 1990s. Fiscal policies became lenient with 
different provisions for tax relief in order to attract investors (Kumar, 1995). 
 
Howbeit, from the mid-nineties to present time, the themes- competitive nature of 
today’s global industry, sustainable development, resource-based industrialization 
coupled with the effects of mineral-rich economies seemingly missing out of 
commodity price boom before the recession of 2008 and 2009, the global economic 
recovery of 2010, and the continued desire by governments to obtain a fair share- 
have indicated the need of mineral-rich economies (especially developing countries) 
to update their mining taxation policies so as to avoid history repeating itself.  
 
As epitomized by developed countries like Sweden and Finland, who used their 
mineral development and mining revenues to provide side-stream and downstream 
linkages, it can be adduced that well-managed primary mining activities can lead to 
diversification of the economy. Incorporation of value-addition incentives in mineral 
legislations of host countries can facilitate such resource-based industrialization. The 
new South African MPRRA is an example of such legislative initiatives that includes 
such incentives in order to encourage diversification of economy and expects this to 
be a success. This paper seeks to verify this notion. 
 
From the foregoing, before governments can seek greater share of revenue from 
mineral development, they must consider that mining companies are not 
philanthropists but are business entities focused on making profits and therefore need 
to survive and succeed especially in recognition of the fact that mining operations “do 
not automatically end with more money in the hands of the mining company” 
(Cawood, 2010). Mining companies view taxes as additional costs and therefore 
assess the content and design of mining taxation regime of their proposed mining 
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jurisdictions, in light of receipt of enough compensation for their investment risks and 
its effect on their business’ profitability (Otto et al, 1997). Before capital investments 
are made into a mining project, risks and uncertainties surrounding the profitability of 
the project are highly considered, because the ability of mining companies to 
successfully contribute to long-term sustainability of any society depends on the 
guaranteed survival and success of their projects. This alludes to the fact that 
governments as well as mining companies require some form of compensation for 
going ahead with mining operations. Likewise, companies involved in mineral 
beneficiation/value-adding require large amounts of capital investments for their 
operations and need compensation to ensure their successful existence. 
 
Therefore, in extending the benefits of mineral extraction and beneficiation sectors to 
support socio-economic and developmental issues, as aforementioned, the major 
concern of the appropriate yardstick for charging of royalty/taxes needs to be 
addressed. 
 
Host Governments use rent (wealth) capturing instruments to accrue sufficient 
revenue from their natural endowments.  However, in the current era, where there is 
increased global demand for scarce capital, it is in the best interest of host 
governments to develop stable taxation instruments that will incentivize the influx of 
capital (investors) to carry-out of efficient exploitation and development of mineral 
resources, as “it is no use having minerals in the ground if they cannot be extracted 
and beneficiated to result in tangible assets” (Otto, 1995). Such optimal investment 
environment will result in generation of greatest possible value for company and 
government’s interests.  
 
The business objectives of mining companies inform their expectations of tax policies 
of proposed jurisdictions. These include taxes that: 
a. are responsive to realized profitability as opposed to conceptual or anticipated 
profitability, in other words, based on ‘ability to pay”; 
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b. permit early payback of invested capital; 
c. are sensitive to volatility of revenues (price cycles); 
d. are stable, predictable and transparent to reduce risks; 
e. are ring-fenced to cash flow generated from a mining project (mining income) 
only, not non-mining income (other corporate income); 
f. do not distort costs and extraction profiles; 
g. encourage exploration risks taking to find new deposits or expand existing 
mines; 
h. do not discourage investment in economically marginal projects; and 
i. preserve incentives for a company to invest in project improvements over time. 
(Otto et al, 1997) 
 
Governments also want taxes that: 
a. maximise the present value (PV) of locally retained earnings consistent with the 
promotion of efficient levels of recovery and minimize disincentives for 
investment in new discoveries; 
b. minimise environmental damage and the ensure that firms will compensate for 
the damages that result from mining; 
c. create economically useful forward and backward linkages to the local 
economy, including employment, value-added investments, local purchasing 
and technology transfer opportunities; 
d. are sensitive to the social and cultural needs of local communities including 
their economic and social viability after the mine closes; 
e. are internationally competitive;  
f. support macroeconomic stability by providing predictable and stable tax 
revenue flows; 
g. permit capturing a greater share of revenues during periods of high profits and 
from extraordinarily low cost, high profit projects; 
h. can be effectively administered and involve low collection costs and 
possibilities for avoidance; and 
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j. are neutral and encourage economic efficiency. (Otto et al, 1997) 
 
According to Otto et al (1997 and 2006), both government and mining company’s 
objectives would be met if a taxation regime is designed with the following 
characteristics taken into consideration, which are: 
a. Neutrality: A neutral tax should minimise incentives that will influence 
favouring more investment decisions towards the mining sector against all other 
sectors of the economy. 
b. Efficiency: An efficient tax should be internationally competitive, yet 
sufficiently facilitating the promotion of macroeconomic stabilization and 
growth. 
c. Equity: An equitable tax should provide fairness in allocation of burdens 
between both government and mining enterprises. 
d. Clarity: This relates to the ease of understanding the regime, its cheap 
administration and “the transparency of the entire regime” (Cawood and 
Minnitt, 2001). 
e. Stability: A good tax regime should be stable over time, in order to reduce the 
perception of high risk in jurisdictions, leading to greater share of wealth from 
mining to government. 
f. Predictability. 
 
There are different types of mining taxation instruments used by government to 
capture rent from mining. These include: 
i. Direct taxes – income tax, property/land tax, capital/wealth tax, royalties; and 
ii. Indirect taxes – VAT/sales tax, excise taxes, special taxes, payroll taxes. 
 
Extensive literature exists on these various types of fiscal instruments, their purpose 
and timeliness of revenue flow to governments. According to Cawood (2010), the 
order of revenue receipts by governments is first from mineral royalties (based on 
production, revenue or profit); middle – income taxes on profits; and last – in the 
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form of instruments such as RRT, dividends tax. However, to avoid going beyond the 
scope of the research, this report will focus on mineral royalties. 
 
1.2.2 Mineral Royalties  
 
Over the years, countries, regions and localities where mining activity takes place, 
have agitated for demands that the exploitation of the mineral resources in their 
jurisdictions should result in more visible benefits. They have insisted that by sharing 
in the mineral wealth generated, they can fund programmes that result in the 
improvement of well-being of their citizenry. Their share in the mineral wealth is 
taken as an “appropriate reciprocity for the reduction in natural capital resulting from 
exploitation of their non-renewable resources, an exploitation that can generate 
significant negative impacts” (Gonzalez,  2004).  It has therefore emerged as an 
indisputable principle that it is just and necessary for the State, as owner of the 
minerals, to impose a charge or compensatory fee for the exploitation of these non-
renewable and scarce resources. 
 
The usual practice of capturing their compensatory share of mineral wealth has been 
primarily through the use of mineral royalties. With the established international law 
of National Sovereignty over Natural Resources (NSONR), this has given further 
effect to States that have custodianship of mineral resources vested in them, to 
impose and charge royalties. These mining royalties represent the minimum 
compensation due to the country (owner of resources) for the depletion of its non-
renewable resources that are extracted from its land and sold in markets (UNECA, 
2004). 
 
With the re-emerging theme of mineral-rich countries striving for the realization of 
greater direct share in wealth produced by mineral development in their jurisdictions 
and  more requirements (by mineral law) to foster other socio-economic linkages 
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from mineral development programmes, this has instigated renewed interests in 
reviewing and redesigning their mineral royalty regimes  (Cawood, 2010). 
 
Mineral royalties are one of the oldest and most effective forms of mining taxation. It 
has been given many definitions, which include:   
 
“…payment due to the sovereign owner in exchange for the right to extract the 
mineral resource…” (Otto et al, 2006) 
 
“Royalties are the sum of cash payments and benefits that owners receive when 
property use and mineral ownership is transferred to another party….and it is a tax 
charged directly against the mineral deposit or inputs used to exploit it which serves 
as a compensation for depleting the resource over time”  (Cawood, 2010) 
 
Any appropriate royalty regime must comply with the principles of a good minerals 
taxation regime, which include but not limited to, neutrality, efficiency, predictability, 
equality, stability. As it also applies to mining taxation in general, it is important to 
note that in charging mineral royalties, it must take into consideration the uniqueness 
of the mineral resource (as reflected in the sales price and cost of delivery), in terms 
of differing location, quality, quantity, type, its mining process, its resultant rewards 
and the appreciation that a mining process does not automatically end with more 
money in the hands of the mining company (UNECA, 2004). 
 
There are five (5) broad categories of royalties: 
1. Production royalties: These are the oldest form of royalty payment used 
internationally (Otto et al, 2006). They are unit-based, levied per either volume 
or weight of production and “expressed in the same unit as the resource i.e. 
amount per tonne” (Cawood, 2010). They are calculated by multiplying the rate 
per unit with the rate of production. Although it is more straightforward to 
apply as compared with other categories of royalties, one of its shortcomings 
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arises when it comes to dealing with the differentiated markets for minerals and 
their products as we have today. Applying unit-based royalties to these 
differentiated markets require unique rates for each mineral product at different 
stages of beneficiation, leading to a comprehensive list of mineral products 
against royalty rates, and must be frequently revised when new minerals 
become useful and others are replaced by new materials (Cawood, 2010). 
2. ad valorem royalties: These are value-based royalties, levied against value of 
mineral contained in the ore at mine mouth, sales value of first product, gross 
revenues derived from sales less certain allowable costs, net smelter return 
(adjusted for smelting and refining costs) etc. (Otto et al, 2006). They are 
calculated by multiplying the percentage rate with the value amount of the 
mineral. The rate can be fixed or determined by formula. Fixed royalties have 
similar problems with unit-based royalties in that these also require a 
comprehensive table stating mineral products at various stages of beneficiation 
against their respective royalty rates (Cawood, 2010). However, value based 
royalties are structured in ways that allow the payment to fluctuate according to 
commodity prices. 
3. Profit-based royalties: These are royalties based on the ability to pay or some 
measure of profitability (Otto et al, 2006). Generally, it takes into account the 
value of mineral produced and certain allowable costs but ignore return on 
capital. It is a complex form of royalty regime and mainly used by countries 
where a well-developed and well-equipped tax administration systems exist.  
4. Hybrid royalties: This involves the combination of profitability with value- or 
unit-based royalties. This type of regime distinguishes between low-profit and 
high-profit mines and ensures that royalties flow into the fiscus at both low and 
high times of profitability (Otto et al, 2006). 
5. Quasi-royalties: These could be any alternative arrangements to mining 
royalties. They can take forms of State partnership or percentage equity 
ownership;  creation of State mining enterprises for establishment of control 
over exploitation and use of minerals especially strategic ones; production 
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sharing arrangements (Sunley and Baunsgaard, 2001), lump sum (fixed fee) 
payments  (Cawood and Minnitt, 2001), Resource Rent taxation (charging taxes 
on excess returns obtained after the threshold of the company has been met); 
service arrangements (management contracts to private companies from 
government in return for a share of mineral production) and auctioning of 
developments rights  (Cawood, 2010). 
 
In the opinion of Gonzalez (2004), countries where a compensatory fee for mineral 
exploitation is still not charged, should address the deficiency. 
 
1.2.3 Mineral royalty systems in different countries 
 
The aim of this section is to take a few examples of countries having custodianship of 
their minerals that use ad valorem or hybrid royalty systems showing the history and 
current structure of their regime and checking if they contain beneficiating incentives. 
In a later chapter, the success or not of their provisions would be assessed to see if 
South Africa’s royalty regime can draw any lessons therefrom. The constraint of this 
section, however, is the lack of access to up-to-date detailed information on the 
royalty regimes of many countries especially as regards provisions to facilitate 
beneficiation, the analysis of the regimes and what the impact of regimes have been 
on investment and operations.  
 
1.2.3.1 Ghana 
 
Ghana is endowed with substantial amount of mineral resources and has a well-
established mining sector which accounts for 5% of the country's GDP. The industry 
has grown considerably in recent years to represent an important pillar of the 
Ghanaian economy (Bermúdez-Lugo, 2009). Between 2000 and 2008, the mining 
sector contributed an average annual 11% of Government Revenues collected in the 
form of corporate tax, PAYE and royalties. The sector continued to be the single 
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largest contributor of royalty, accounting for an average of about 98% of the total 
royalties paid to government over the past 10 years. 
 
The legislative framework for the mining sector in Ghana was initially provided by 
the Minerals and Mining Law of 1986 (PNDC Law 153). It was passed in order to 
offer incentives to the mining industry and it included provisions of generous capital 
allowances, reduced income taxes, external foreign exchange retention accounts and a 
flexible royalty payment system. Under this Law, mining companies were required to 
pay royalties and corporate taxes at standard royalty rates. The royalty rates were 
based on a sliding scale of between 3% - 12% of the total revenue of minerals 
produced, and applicable to the operating profit margin of the company. According to 
Ayi (2010), that regime “provided for flexibility in royalty and corporate income 
payment schedules, and in particular, it empowered the minister responsible for 
mining to use his discretion to grant any request from distressed companies for 
deferment of royalty payments”. 
 
However, the Minerals and Mining Law of 1986 was amended in 1994 and 2005. In 
1994 amendments, the 45% general mining corporate tax rate was reduced to 35%, 
and this rate was the same as that imposed on other industries.  
 
In the light of changes in the international mining scene, from the early 2000s, the 
Law of 1986 needed further revisions. The 2005 amendment was enacted as the 
current Minerals and Mining Act 703 of 2006. It included changes to royalty rates 
and the establishment of the period of duration of a mining lease. One of the main 
objectives of the new Act 703 of 2006 was to provide a royalty regime that will 
counteract market fluctuation, through automatic stabilization. The royalty rates 
specified varied between 3% – 6% of the gross market value of minerals sold. The 
variation was related to the operating margin, taking into account the profitability of 
the mine and designed not to be too onerous for marginal mines or in times of low 
profitability (Fobih, 2007) while reciprocally getting higher rate contribution from 
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other mining projects when times are good, especially when windfall profits were 
made. This was to ensure efficient and equitable mobilization and distribution of the 
benefits of mining (Chen, 2009). 
 
In 2010, the budget statement stated that to a large extent, mining companies were 
settling for the minimum 3% royalty payment or a little more, despite the significant 
gains they were making on the international market. Also, the Chamber of Mines 
commented that “the current 3% is too meagre to allow any meaningful development 
projects by the traditional authorities, and therefore it must be increased” (Business 
Times, 2010). Based on these, the government resolved to change that order and 
maximize revenue from the sector as part of its revenue mobilization programme. The 
royalty payable by the mining sector to the government was increased from 3% to 
5%. The proposed regime for the mining companies apart from increasing the 
minimum mineral royalties, in addition, intended to engage all mining companies to 
address the issue of dividend payment, exemptions, reduction of tax evasion and 
ensuring a fair mining sector fiscal regime that is more efficient and less dependent 
on indirect taxes (Business Times, 2010). 
 
In summary, Ghana has an ad valorem, sliding-scale system that is dependent on 
profitability, which is similar to South Africa’s MPRR regime’s provision of placing 
no specific rate for charging royalties on minerals plus its profitability dependence.  
In a later chapter, it would be examined to observe if this system made Ghana’s 
mining industry more investor-attractive. 
 
1.2.3.2 Mongolia 
 
The Minerals Law of Mongolia previously provided that the holder of a mining 
license must pay: 
a. A standard royalty calculated on the basis of the total sales value of the 
minerals extracted. The standard royalty rates were 2.5% for coal and 
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commonly occurring minerals sold in Mongolia; and 5.0% for all other 
minerals (i.e. coal sold abroad, commonly occurring minerals sold abroad and 
minerals that are not commonly occurring, either sold in Mongolia or abroad); 
and/or  
b. Levied a 68% windfall profits tax on the sales of gold subject to certain 
conditions; on sales of copper ore and copper concentrate in excess of a base 
price set at US$2,600.00 per tonne. For copper concentrate, the windfall tax 
was calculated on the difference between actual copper prices on the London 
Metal Exchange and the sum of the base price and smelting costs. Copper 
products such as copper cathodes were exempt from the windfall profits tax. 
 
On November 25, 2010, the parliament of Mongolia, adopted an amendment to 
Article 47 of the Minerals Law of Mongolia. The amendment introduced a new surtax 
royalty that became applicable from January 1, 2011. The new royalty regime is 
sliding-scale, value-based (price & degree of processing) and per mineral type, in 
other words:  
 it includes a surtax royalty which does not modify the standard royalty regime 
but rates are imposed in addition to the standard flat-rate based on the total 
sales value of 23 types of mineral, varying from 1% to 5% for minerals other 
than copper; and 
 The new surtax royalty replaces a previously applicable windfall profits tax;  
 The rates are significantly higher for copper than for other types of minerals 
with the surtax royalty rates ranging between 22% and 30% for ore, between 
11% and 15% for concentrates, and between 1% and 5% for final products. 
 
The provisions of the new surtax royalty allow the rates: to vary depending on the 
type of minerals, their market prices and their degree of processing and are not 
charged on any minerals below a certain threshold market price per mineral type. 
This new regime also includes provisions to encourage mining companies to engage 
in value-added activities, as the rates are lower for processed materials than for 
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unprocessed minerals. The Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy determines the 
reference price of minerals for export purposes (and possibly for surtax royalty 
purposes) on the basis of prices in the international minerals markets. The new surtax 
royalty rates are imposed only at one stage during the process of mineral production, 
in other words, if a royalty has been charged on mineral ore, no further royalty will be 
charged on its mineral concentrate or on final products (Aldrich et al, 2011). 
 
This royalty ideology is close to South Africa’s MPRR regime but because it is at a 
fledgling state, it would be difficult to test if many mining companies have been 
encouraged to engage in value-addition activities through its provisions. 
 
1.2.3.3 Canada (Northwest Territories) 
 
In Canada, royalties are purely profit-based. Many of its jurisdictions have mineral 
royalty regimes that allow for special processing allowances in order to encourage 
further mineral processing within their provinces or territories. For this country 
example, The Northwest Territories (NWT), would be focused on.  
 
In the NWT, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) 
is responsible for the management of water, hydrocarbon and mineral resources as 
well as under the provisions of the Territorial Lands Act and its regulations, it is 
responsible for the administration of most Crown land.  
 
According to Paget (2001), as directed in the Federal budget in February 1995, the 
DIAND initiated a comprehensive review of the mining royalty regime specified 
under the Canada Mining Regulations. The objective of this review process was to 
ensure that the mining royalty regime in the NWT: 
i. generates a fair return from the extraction of Crown minerals to the Crown as 
well as the private sector developers of minerals;  
ii. maintains a competitive level of income tax/mining royalty on the profits; 
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iii. treats mines of varying levels of profitability equitably; and 
iv. is clear, straightforward and simple to interpret and administer.  
 
In NWT, the mining royalty regime before the review required each mine to pay an 
annual royalty to the Crown levied against the mine-mouth value of minerals 
produced. The mine-mouth value of output was defined as the market value of the 
mine production after allowable deductions for such items as: 
a.  transportation, concentrating, smelting and refining costs; 
b.  mine and mill operating costs; 
c.  exploration and development costs at the mine; 
d.  depreciation of the buildings, plant, equipment and machinery used in 
production at the mine (an allowance of up to 15% of the cost of depreciable 
assets not to exceed 100% of the original cost of the assets); 
e.  amortization of preproduction exploration and development costs (an allowance 
of up to 15% of such costs incurred prior to commercial production not to 
exceed 100% of these costs); 
f.  exploration expenses incurred elsewhere in the NWT up to 10% of market 
value of production; and 
g.  if the production is further processed in the NWT, a processing allowance of 
8% of the cost of processing assets to a maximum of 65% of the value of 
output.  (Paget, 2001) 
 
The Royalty charge was levied on a sliding-scale basis, on value of output as 
following: 
 $10,000 to $1 million: 3%; 
 $1 million to $5 million: 5%; 
 
The rate increases by 1% for each additional $5 million in value of output (profit), up 
to a maximum of 12% at a value of output of $35 million and above (Paget, 2001). 
The sliding-scale royalty rate in the NWT resulted in an effective royalty rate that 
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generally increased with both profitability and size. Other provisions of the regime 
included that no royalties were required to be paid for the first 3 years after the start 
of commercial production. In the NWT, mining royalty is charged by the federal 
government and limits the claims for processing allowance assets within its 
jurisdictions. 
 
The review process looked into the following issues stated below, although not all 
inclusive. There were suggestions for the revised royalty regime to: 
1. apply different royalty rates for different minerals, as in the case of diamonds; 
2. increase the royalty rate on profits between $10,000 and $1 million from 3% to 
5%, which would be the same rate placed on profits between $1 million and $5 
million; and 
3. in order to ensure that the Crown receives a fair return on its mineral resources 
from larger and higher profit operations, the maximum royalty rate should be 
increased from 12% to 14%. At that time, the 12% rate applied to profits of $35 
million and above. Under this proposal, profits from $35 million to $40 million 
would remain subject to the 12% rate, profits between $40 million and $45 
million would be subject to a 13% rate and profits of $45 million and above 
would be subject to a rate of 14%.  (Paget, 2001) 
 
After technical evaluations and comparisons of diamond mines with other mineral-
producing mines, the review committee rejected the suggestions for separate royalty 
regimes for different minerals based on equity criteria. It stated that since diamond 
mining was not so significantly different from a technical perspective from other 
mineral production, there was “no justification to levy a different level of royalty on 
two mines of equal profitability just because they happen to produce different 
minerals” (Paget, 2001).   
 
After the review process, it was concluded that the mining royalty regime would 
continue to apply to all minerals regulated by the Canada Mining Regulations, 
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including diamonds but it was revised slightly in favour of the recommendations to 
increase the initial and maximum royalty rates.  
 
As at 2006, the royalty regime was sliding-scale and profit-based, with rates varying 
on output value from an initial rate of 5%, graduating to a maximum rate of 14% 
(Otto et al, 2006). It had no provisions for application of different rates for different 
minerals. Thereafter, no major changes have been made to the royalty regime, and 
this was echoed by the Natural Resources Canada bulletin (2011), which stated that 
“Canadian royalty regimes had made no major reviews in recent years”. 
 
Therefore, in summary, NWT’s sliding-scale profit-based royalty regime has 
inclusive mineral processing incentives. 
 
1.2.3.4 Western Australia                 
 
Mineral production in Western Australia is very diverse. The range includes some 50 
different minerals in commercial production – far greater than in any other State or 
Territory in Australia (Department of Mines and Petroleum, 2011). In Western 
Australia, two of the major sources of State revenue are mining and petroleum 
royalties.  
 
Mineral royalties were collected under either the Mining Act 1978 (WA) or 
Agreement Acts which were negotiated for individual projects. The Mining Act 1978 
(WA), states that all minerals “existing on or below the surface of any land in the 
State in its natural condition is the property of the Crown”, and provided that 
royalties were payable on all minerals by the holder of, or applicant for, the mining 
tenement where minerals are found. It made provisions for the Minister for Mines to 
exercise discretion and determine by what method a value shall be placed on a 
mineral for the purposes of assessing the rate of royalty and the basis on which a rate 
of royalty shall be applied.  
23 
 
 
After this, royalties became payable either under the Mining Regulations 1981 (WA) 
or various State Agreement Acts. The Regulations stipulated the rates of royalty for 
all minerals except for gold and neither the rates nor the method of calculating them 
were uniform. It specified the use of two systems of mineral royalty collection. Some 
materials were rated as: 
 Specific rate: They are quantity-based royalties, expressed as flat amount per 
tonne and used for low value construction materials. They were calculated on 
tonnes produced at either 30 cents per tonne (aggregate, clays, dolomite, gravel, 
gypsum, construction limestone, rock salt, sand and shale), or 50 cents per 
tonne (building stone, metallurgical limestone, pyrophyllite, silica and talc); 
and 
 ad valorem: They are value-based royalties and expressed as percentage of 
‘royalty value’ of the mineral. The royalty value is defined in the Mining 
Regulations 1981(WA) as gross revenue less smelting, refining and 
transportation costs. 
 
All other minerals apart from construction materials were rated as a percentage of the 
realized value at rates of 7.5% (for bulk material that had been subject to limited 
treatment – bauxite, calcite, diamonds, gems, precious & semi-precious stones, iron 
ore [lump ore], manganese and quartz crystal; 5% for concentrate material with some 
minimum value per tonne - garnet, ilmenite, leucoxene, rutile, nickel and zircon; and 
2.5% for metal (cobalt, mercury, platinoids, silver). 
 
This system took into account price fluctuations and grade of material. The different 
rates were also intended to adjust for the change in the value as mined ore is 
processed and value is added (Department of Mines and Petroleum, 2011). 
 
From 1 July 1998, the Western Australian government removed gold producers from 
being exempted from paying royalties as recommended by Bradley’s Mineral 
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Revenues Inquiry (1986), and introduced for the first time a royalty on gold. 
However, the Regulations allowed special provisions for gold royalties which 
included certain exemptions for smaller producers, lower royalty rates than most 
other minerals and transitional arrangements “that were aimed to placate the 
complaints and concerns of the gold mining sector regarding the potential 
uneconomic nature of many producers if they became subject to royalty payments” 
(Calzada, 2000).  
 
From the year 2000, Western Australia reviewed its mineral royalty rates as regards 
some minerals – coal, copper, cobalt, oil shale. From 1 July 2005, other changes were 
limited to increasing the 30 cent per tonne and 50 cent per tonne flat rates to take into 
account increased commodity prices. Table 1.2-1, shows some of the revisions:  
 
Table 1.2-2: Royalty rates for different mineral commodities in WA 
Mineral  Royalty Rate (as at 2 
May 2010)     
Basis of Calculation Last review/change 
Bauxite 7.5% ad valorem No recent change 
Coal If exported: 7.5% 
 If not exported: 
$1/tonne (adjusted    
each year at 30 June in 
accordance with 
comparative price 
increases)                                                          
ad valorem and 
quantum rate 
2006 – Mineral 
Resources 
Development 
(Amendment) 
Regulations 2006 
Coal Seam Gas Same rate as 
petroleum 
ad valorem No recent change 
Cobalt  If sold as concentrate: 
5% 
If sold in metallic 
ad valorem and 
quantum rate 
 
2000 – Mining 
Amendment 
Regulations (No. 4) 
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form: 2.5% 
If sold as nickel by-
product: 
$/tonne calculated 
using the gross cobalt 
metal price per tonne 
2000 
 
copper If sold as concentrate: 
5% 
If sold in metallic 
form: 2.5% 
If sold as nickel by-
product 
$/tonne calculated 
using the gross copper 
metal price per tonne 
ad valorem and 
quantum rate 
 
2000 – Mining 
Amendment 
Regulations (No. 4) 
2000 
 
IronOre Beneficiated Ore: 5% 
Fine Ore: 5.625% 
Lump Ore: 7.5% 
ad valorem 
 
No recent change 
petroleum Onshore petroleum: 5-
10% of wellhead 
value for primary 
licences. 10-12.5% for 
secondary licences. 
 
Offshore petroleum: 
11-12.5% of wellhead 
value. 
ad valorem 
 
No recent change 
Source: Bowie (2009) 
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From 1 July 2010 up till 30 June 2015, the flat rates on production would be 
calculated with reference to the Non-Metallic Mineral Products Price Index, which 
are: 
 62 cents per tonne (construction use); and  
 100 cents per tonne (used for its metallurgical content) 
 
The rates will be reviewed in 2015.  
 
In summary, Western Australia has both unit-based and ad valorem royalty systems. 
The ad valorem system is profitability dependent and charges lower royalties on 
value-added mineral products so as to encourage local processing.  
  
1.2.3.5 The South African context on mining royalties 
 
The Republic of South Africa is generously endowed with a significant amount of 
high grade mineral resources. Currently, South Africa is one of the world's largest 
producers and exporters of platinum, overtaking gold as her largest foreign exchange 
earner; and a significant producer of gold, manganese, chrome, vanadium, titanium 
and coal. (Bureau of African Affairs, 2010) 
 
With these vast mineral resource endowments of the nation, the positive role that 
these endowments play in the Republic cannot be overemphasized. In the present era 
of open-trade between countries, these mineral resources help to foster the following 
(the list below is not exhaustive): 
i. stable inflow of revenue from mining royalties and taxes into the fiscus;  
ii. international trade for marketing of mineral products;  
iii. Foreign exchange earnings from exportation of goods; 
iv. inflow of foreign direct investments in exploration and exploitation;  
v. training of local citizens/miners; 
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vi. local demand for the promotion of infrastructural development, which increases 
the economic viability of its metals and industrial minerals deposits; and 
vii. beneficiation (value-adding) activities and refining of mineral fuels.  
 
With the mineral sector serving as a pillar of South Africa’s economy, a balance has 
to be reached in order for present and future generations/stakeholders to equitably 
benefit from present day mining operations. The South African Government having 
been vested with requisite authority as the custodian of its mineral resources by 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002 (“MPRDA”), is 
responsible to ensure that the exploitation of its mineral resources makes a beneficial 
contribution to the living standards of every citizen of the Republic. The Government 
is therefore authorized, amongst other things, to: 
i. determine necessary procedures for mineral development;  
ii. grant mineral rights to applicants who demonstrate adequate technical, financial 
and managerial capability to engage in exploitation activities that will benefit 
the state;  
iii. charge royalties and taxes for any transfer of resources; 
iv. provide a stable environment in terms of cost of public services and goods, 
which would be attractive to investors; 
v. provide state support for research exploitation techniques; 
vi. provide effective dissemination of non-confidential, State-held geological 
information; and
 
vii. review of policies and regulations that constrain downstream development 
(Northern Cape Province, 2005). 
 
In order to effectively reap rightful and meaningful benefits from the development of 
the natural resource endowments of the country for sustainability of the well-being of 
the present and future generations of South Africans, as mentioned above, the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act 2008 (“MPRRA”) gives the 
government rights to charge a royalty for any transfer of mineral and petroleum 
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resources. The receipt of royalty from the transfer of mineral resources to an extractor 
is aimed at compensating States for their irreplaceable, non-renewable resources, for 
sustainable investment and development with a view of improving the economic 
well-being of the nation.  
 
According to Cawood and Minnitt (2001), a cash flow analysis was carried out to 
determine the government’s share of rents, and it was found that corporate income 
taxes were by “far the most important contributor to State revenue”, with mineral 
royalties forming the second most important source of income. However, with the 
limited lifespan of its mineral resources, the government understood that relying only 
on mining taxes and royalties was not sustainable. This made diversification and 
strengthening of other sectors of the economy a sine qua non. Currently, the 
promotion of industrialization approaches such as agro-processing, manufacturing 
and mining beneficiation are major areas of government-focus and are viewed as 
necessary to assist in tackling the country’s challenges, ensuring sustainable 
economic growth and development.  
 
The royalties paid to government from mining activities can be used to fund the 
required “shift of the country’s industrial base from its current dependence on natural 
resources along a high-technology growth path” (Northern Cape Province 2005). 
Therefore, it is an accepted economic view that the government should ensure that the 
mining industry should make a “rightful contribution to the country’s tax revenues 
and that the tax system should encourage adding value to raw materials” (Northern 
Cape Province, 2005). 
 
However, the royalty and taxes charged must be such that ensures that the business 
environment remains competitive and most importantly attractive to investors, 
particularly foreign investors.  
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1.2.3.6 The MPRRA Regime 
 
From as far back as 1878, collection of mineral royalties had been used as an 
instrument of obtaining surplus revenues from mineral exploitation (mineral rents). 
The current Royalty Act was to come into force by 2009, as all old mineral rights 
were to have been converted to new rights – properties of state – by then. In actual 
terms, it came into force in March 2010. The main purpose of the MPRRA was to 
impose and “collect royalties from South African mines holding mining rights in 
accordance to MPRDA, in order to compensate the State for its custodianship over 
her non-renewable mineral resources when these are mined and sold by mining 
companies for their own benefit” (Cawood, 2010). Unlike international practice, 
mineral royalties were not payments charged on production at mine mouth but on 
transfer of production i.e. first sale of production (not subsequent transactions). This 
first transfer or sale is “considered the initial disposal of beneficial ownership by an 
extractor”.  
 
The MPRRA stipulates an ad valorem, sliding-scale formula method of charging 
royalties. The sliding-scale formula mechanism imposes no specific rate for any 
minerals, through its definition of value acknowledges profitability and automatically 
recognizes downstream beneficiation of mineral products as it distinguishes between 
refined and unrefined minerals, amongst other things (Cawood and Minnitt, 2001). 
This implies that the royalty system also aligns with the government’s objective to 
promote local beneficiation of South Africa’s minerals (Portfolio Committee on 
Finance, 2008). The formula provisions for refined minerals allows for reduction of 
royalty rate as beneficiation increases in order to compensate for the higher sales 
value of refined products. A refined mineral resource is as listed in Schedule1 of the 
MPRRA.  
 
This dual formula royalty system has a lot of other advantages, some of which 
include provision of automatic relief for marginal mines, small mining business and 
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mines in development stage; allowance of the State to share in both the upside 
(windfall) and downside (risk) of the mining industry; as well as exemption for 
sampling. However, despite these advantages, a number of objections to its 
provisions exist especially as regards its beneficiation objectives. The general 
objection is that “the inclusion of beneficiation in the royalty formula may complicate 
matters without necessarily ensuring beneficiation and that the tax system is not 
necessarily the best way to achieve that” (Resource Investor, 2007). This informs the 
focus of this project. 
 
 
1.3 JUSTIFICATION FOR STUDY 
 
In light of the drive to ensure sustainable development from mineral development, the 
need has arisen for raw-mineral producing countries to evolve to downstream 
processing countries as well, so as to benefit from higher sales value received by 
value-added products. This has led to many countries reviewing or in the process of 
developing and incorporating initiatives that will encourage downstream sectorial 
development in their mining taxation policies. An example is South Africa via its 
MPRRA’s provisions to incentivize refining activities over extraction activities. 
However, these policies need to be assessed to determine if desired success would be 
achieved or not. If assessment proves otherwise, it might suggest that the taxation 
policies should be re-addressed and re-formulated as separate from value-addition 
policies. This informs the justification for carrying out this research project. 
 
The findings of this project will be presented for future consideration, as it is too 
early to reformulate the MPRRA, seeing that it just came into force in March 2010. 
Frequent changes in taxation policies of any jurisdiction, increases the perception of 
risk and instability, which has been observed to be deterrent to investment 
attractiveness (Otto et al, 2006).  
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1.4 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT 
 
Mineral commodities have unique characteristics that make them differ from other 
manufactured products. They require large capital first to discover them and ensure 
that the ores found are economic to exploit, then additional large capital is required to 
extract them. Added to the significant capital requirements is that the prices for raw 
materials are determined in world markets based on current demand for those 
minerals which is not as stable as demand for refined/finished product. These 
commodity prices ultimately determine the amount of returns on invested capital 
received for raw mineral exploitation, and invariably the amount of royalties that are 
chargeable.  
 
This project would be specializing on the platinum industry. Through its application 
to this industry, this project seeks to assess whether the MPRRA’s provision of 
reduced royalty rate for refined minerals as compared with that of unrefined minerals 
is not overcompensation. The findings of this research should indicate whether the 
MPRRA will not just encourage many more mining companies to become more 
profitable extractors but will also motivate them to become refiners or processors of 
minerals, thereby satisfying the South African government’s beneficiation objectives 
as well as its economic objectives. In establishing the above, the following issues will 
be looked into: 
 
 Considering the supply and demand pattern of both refined and unrefined 
minerals, in general, it can be assumed that the demand for refined products is 
usually higher than that of unrefined minerals but their supply pattern is the 
reverse. There are usually more available unrefined minerals than refined, 
which increases the price of refined minerals and lessens that of unrefined 
because of oversupply. It is therefore appears that if the supply and demand 
pattern for refined minerals follows this assumed behaviour, the lower royalty 
rate for refined minerals would always be advantageous. In this light, the 
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question arises as to whether beneficiated products are not over-compensated as 
compared with a higher royalty rate charged for unrefined minerals. However, 
this ‘over-compensation’ would only hold as being valid, if after considering 
the market demand, capital-intensive requirements (expertise, proprietary, 
infrastructural and equipment) for refined production, the refiner’s financial 
position is significantly more valuable than that of the miner; 
 Is it possible for the mining costs of a PGM operation to exceed its refining 
costs? If the former case is largely validated for any commodity, this would 
negate the justification for applying a lower royalty rate for beneficiation 
activities; and 
 Does the royalty regime’s reduced rate provision for refined minerals change 
the financial position of mining-only projects? 
 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF REPORT 
 
Chapter One Background, Literature review and aims of research 
This chapter gives the introduction and general background knowledge to the subject 
matter of this report. Also, a review of past related research work, related country 
examples to the subject matter and the aim of the research would be discussed.  
 
Chapter Two The South African Context Mineral Fiscal Policy Issues 
In this chapter, lessons from the country examples mentioned in chapter one would be 
reviewed for comparison with the South African case. More importantly, in this 
chapter, the South African mineral policy framework and the development of its 
mineral fiscal instruments, specifically, the new royalty regime would be discussed 
quite extensively. The focus of this discussion would be in light of policy objectives 
to further motivate the establishment of value-addition facilities. 
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Chapter Three  Methodology: Application of Bradley’s (Western Australia) model 
to the South African context 
This chapter would specify the methodology that would be used in this research 
project. The royalty system of Western Australia which incorporates beneficiation 
initiatives would be reviewed and analysed to check its success or not, in light of 
Bradley’s study into the mineral revenues in Western Australia. His conclusions and 
recommendations in this regard would be applied to the South African mining 
industry, so as to check its effect on financial positions of Mining-only and Mining 
plus Refining projects. 
 
Chapter Four Impact of MPRRA on the South African mining industry and its 
contribution to South African economy  
This chapter would seek to assess the general effect of the imposition of the MPRRA 
on the South African mining industry and its contribution to the economy. The sub-
sector that would be used as a suitable case study for the analysis required in order to 
answer the fundamental question of this project would also be identified in this 
chapter. 
 
Chapter Five Results and Analysis of Platinum case study 
The data from the case study would be integrated with the model given in chapter 
three and the results would be analysed. Also, the results obtained would be 
compared with the comments on the shortfalls of the new royalty regime, later on in 
this project. These should give an indication as to whether or not the effect of reduced 
royalty rate for refined minerals will prove to be favourable to mining company and 
industry in general and whether more extractive companies would be encouraged to 
add-on beneficiation activities and to make appropriate recommendations for the 
realization of the South African government’s beneficiation objectives. 
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Chapter Six Conclusion and Recommendation 
In this chapter, a summary of all the chapters, the findings of the research and the 
conclusion of the research findings would be stated. Based on the conclusion, 
recommendations for further work on the subject-matter, if any, would also be stated. 
 
 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, this chapter covered the history that governed the evolution of mining 
fiscal systems, the different types of mining taxation systems in existence with main 
emphasis on the use of mineral royalties to target economic rents for the 
compensation for state-owned resources and contribution to increased economic 
growth and development of mineral-rich jurisdictions.  Also, the chapter highlighted 
the albeit pre-existing concept of using mining fiscal policies as development 
strategies that encourage mineral beneficiation. This would facilitate the moving 
away of mineral-rich jurisdictions from being primarily dependent on natural 
resources, along high-tech economic growth paths, to becoming knowledge-based 
industrialized countries, in order to ensure sustained and long-term growth and 
development of their jurisdictions. 
 
With the country examples that were reviewed, it can be concluded that it has 
emerged as an indisputable principle that it is just and necessary for mineral-rich 
States, as owners of the minerals, to use mineral fiscal instruments (especially 
royalties) to target economic rents for compensation for the exploitation of their non-
renewable scarce resources. It is also not unusual for these instruments to be used as 
strategies to promote further mineral processing within their jurisdictions, which in 
line with their industrialization objectives.  
 
In chapter two, the new South African royalty system which seeks to use its fiscal 
policy capacity for both revenue-collection as well as encouragement of the 
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establishment of more refining facilities from extractive ones so as to further 
capitalize on the economic advantages of its mineral sector, will be discussed in more 
detail. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT: MINERAL FISCAL POLICY ISSUES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The advantages and benefits of the existence of mining and mineral processing 
facilities within a country in terms of job creation; provision of opportunities for the 
development of domestic skills; encouragement of the creation of associated 
industries thereby boosting the manufacturing sector; and providing other beneficial 
side effects or linkages for the local economy (Tilton, 1992), cannot be 
overemphasized.  
 
As highlighted in chapter one, it can be stated that the current emphasis on the use of 
fiscal instruments in order to encourage further mineral processing (refining) and 
beneficiation for the stimulation of industrial and economic growth and development 
of mineral-rich countries, South Africa inclusive, is not a new phenomenon. Apart 
from the country examples reviewed in chapter one, other countries like the U.S., 
Canada, Scandinavia, Indonesia, Chile, in recent decades also accomplished 
diversification of their country’s exports away from natural resources and realization 
of  economic growth, by using the development of  industrial or high-technology 
sectors simultaneously with development of natural resource assets. Studies into the 
industrial strategies used by Sweden and Finland which made them evolve from 
primary resource-dependence into knowledge-based economies, point to the role of 
public policy in using natural resource abundance as a basis for economic growth and 
development in the era of globalization (Lederman and Maloney, 2007). The success 
of these resource-based industrial strategies required intelligent public policies and 
company strategies that preserved raw material resources, created the skills and 
competence needed to maintain competitiveness in the face of increasing labour costs 
and changing technologies as well as facilitated the creation of close inter-linkages of 
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various ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ industries and services around natural resources 
investment projects (Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio, 2007). 
 
It can also be drawn from these country examples that in addition to mineral 
occurrence, stable political, social, economic, legal and social conditions are 
important for mining investment decisions to be made by both local and foreign 
investors. These factors combine to enhance overall attractiveness of a country or 
region. For a long time, the Southern African region (South Africa inclusive) due to 
its deficiencies in the above-mentioned factors was characterized as being an 
unattractive investment jurisdiction, which resulted in the poor growth performance 
of its mining sector(s). 
 
It was realized that the unattractiveness of the region could be attributed to the fact 
that many other mineral-rich developing regions and countries in Asia and South 
America, offered more favourable investment environments than its own. Many of 
these developing countries had made urgent revisions to their mineral policies in the 
past so as to attract the limited investment funds. With this, the member countries of 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) decided to harmonize their 
policies, and carry out risk evaluation exercise of these factors as well as geological, 
technical, regulatory and fiscal elements, so as to change the unattractive positions of 
their jurisdictions. They compared their regional framework using these factors and 
parameters to the Competitive Investment Framework (CIF), which was derived from 
the performance of developing countries that had been categorized as being attractive 
to foreign investment. Knowing that mineral royalties are one of the major concerns 
of foreign investors, this was one of the parameters assessed against the CIF. As at 
2004, a comparative was done and it was realized that the average royalty rate in 
SADC was about 6% which was rather high compared to the CIF rate of 1% 
(UNECA, 2004). This supported the view of the region’s investment unattractiveness 
and indicated the need for SADC countries to also revise their mineral policies.  
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, a mineral royalty is charged by the owner of a 
resource as compensation for depletion of the minerals that are mined and removed 
from the land (UNECA, 2004). Royalties are to be used for the benefit of the owner 
of natural resources and in this case, the State(s) is the sovereign owner and these 
royalty ‘benefits’ can only accrue to States if they do not distort investment decisions. 
Each mineral deposit is unique in terms of location, quality, quantity and type, and 
this specifies its value. On this basis, CIF and standard international practices require 
that different royalties are to be applied to different minerals based on their difference 
in value.  This approach was recommended to the SADC for incorporation into its 
framework, and when considered with the need for mineral royalties to provide 
benefits in support of national objectives, this implied that some discretion is needed 
when deciding on the structure and rate of royalties (UNECA, 2004). 
 
With the SADC region adopting the above recommendations and others realized from 
research made into the political, legal, fiscal aspects of the mineral policies of its 
member countries, this further contributed to South Africa’s quest for a mineral 
policy framework  that is acceptable to all the role-players in its minerals industry.  
 
 
2.2 RESEARCH INTO THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINERAL AND MINING 
POLICY FRAMEWORK AND ITS OBJECTIVES 
 
2.2.1 The Mineral Policy 
 
Governments consider the minerals industry as a part of productive assets from which 
revenue can be collected to contribute to overall national development. The Mineral 
policy of the country outlines the national objectives that the country seeks to achieve 
from its mining sector, and it also stipulates among other things, the fiscal means by 
which revenue can be extracted from its mineral sector. Therefore, before investment 
is made into the mining sector of any country, it is important for the investor to assess 
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the laws and policy statements of its proposed investment destination in order to 
consider how the mineral policy of the country will impact on his returns and growth 
in shareholder value as it seeks to contribute successfully to the nation’s objectives.  
 
The Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa was released in October 1998 by 
the Department of Mineral Resources (formerly known as the Department of 
Minerals and Energy). It formed part of South Africa’s policy and institutional 
environment review process, which was needed to strengthen the mining industry to 
make it fit to address the problems and opportunities confronting it especially in the 
light of “increased competition, both in commodity markets and for investment from 
other mineral-rich countries that had liberalized their economic and political systems 
to attract investment” (Department of Minerals and Energy, 1998). Before its release, 
there had been reforms in other aspects legislative and regulatory systems such as 
health and safety, human resource development, labour and employment equity, 
environment, which set a proper stage for mineral policy review. The main themes of 
the policy were: 
 “Business climate and mineral development, which looks at the continuation of 
policy conducive to investment and includes a section on mineral rights and 
prospecting information which presents changes to the system of access to, and 
mobility of, mineral rights;  
 Participation in ownership and management, which examines racial and other 
imbalances in the industry;  
 People Issues, which looks at health and safety, housing needs, migrant labour, 
industrial relations and downscaling;  
 Environmental management;  
 Regional co-operation; and  
 Governance”. (Department of Minerals and Energy, 1998) 
 
The chapter on Business climate and mineral development addressed seven topics 
relevant to the climate for mining business and mineral development which include 
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issues like ownership of mineral rights; mineral fiscal instruments (including 
royalties) and allocations from national revenue; standard terms and conditions for all 
prospecting and mining permissions; mineral beneficiation; small-scale mining; and 
minerals marketing. 
 
For the purpose of this report, the mineral beneficiation intent of this policy 
framework will be focused on. The general purpose of South Africa’s mineral policy 
was and still is to develop South Africa’s mineral wealth to its full potential and to 
the maximum benefit of the entire population. This implied that government would 
promote facilitation of not only primary extraction but the establishment of secondary 
and tertiary mineral-based industries aimed at adding maximum value to raw 
materials.  
 
Mineral beneficiation can be broadly described as the successive processes of adding 
value to raw materials, from extraction through to the sale of finished products to 
consumers. It covers a wide range of very different activities such as large-scale and 
capital intensive operations like smelting, technologically-sophisticated refining as 
well as labour-intensive activities such as craft jewellery (Department of Minerals 
and Energy, 1998).  
 
It is known that value-addition to mineral resources can result in a country realizing 
greater rent from exploitation of its natural resource base and it can serve as a good 
foundation for further industrial development. South Africa has been heavily 
dependent mainly on the primary extraction of its mineral resources. In the context of 
the need for competitive-advantage among other mineral-rich countries and the fact 
that the real prices of numerous minerals have been declining over the past four 
decades due to a combination of factors, which led to a general deterioration in the 
terms of trade for raw material exporting countries, South Africa decided to take 
advantage of her potential such as large mineral reserves and technological skills, in 
order to increase its proportion of mineral output through value-addition. Although, 
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for many decades, the mining industry had invested in mineral beneficiation projects, 
where there have been worthwhile opportunities, it was necessary to expand this 
sector so as to achieve policy objectives of realizing maximum benefits from mineral 
development. However, for the development of mineral beneficiation projects, 
economic and fiscal certainty is required for the long-term planning.  
 
From the extensive consultation process carried out for the preparation of this policy 
framework, the combined view from the mining industry, investment analysts and 
other interest groups was that for government to promote mineral beneficiation, they 
should provide supply-side incentive measures which consider the risks inherent in 
large-scale mineral beneficiation projects and they should not be detrimental to the 
international competitiveness of the mining industry in respect of un-beneficiated 
mineral exports. They also opined that with regards to mining taxation policy, the tax 
system should encourage the adding of value to raw materials. The Government 
responded in the White paper on Minerals and Mining Policy by stating that efficient 
supply-side measures will be introduced such as lower royalty rates for projects that 
include beneficiation. However, in order for interested parties to qualify for such 
incentives, they would be required to present a commitment to promote further local 
downstream beneficiation through, inter alia, export parity pricing of goods. 
 
In pursuit of promoting this sector, government stated that decisions regarding 
beneficiation projects based on sound economic and market principles would be 
monitored by the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR); policies and regulations 
that previously constrained the downstream development would be reviewed by the 
DMR and other departments and institutions involved; and greater cooperation and 
coordination would be established between the DMR and Department of Trade and 
Industry, as regards mineral beneficiation (Department of Minerals and Energy, 
1998). 
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2.2.2 Brief Exposition on South Africa’s Beneficiation Industrial Approach 
 
As mentioned earlier, the value-added processing of minerals has carried on for many 
decades and represents a major industry and an important growth area in South Africa 
(Bureau of African Affairs, 2010). 
 
In the past, it was sufficient for mineral-rich countries just to export raw natural 
resources for use by other mineral-poor countries. However, with advances in 
urbanization and industrialization, terms of trade of raw mineral exports as compared 
with manufactured goods, reduced. This resulted in reduction in purchasing power of 
mineral-rich countries, indicating that countries that are heavily dependent on only 
raw mineral exports are at a significant disadvantage in terms of economic growth 
and sustainability.  
 
In the new trend, in order to improve the well-being of citizens and instigate 
transition from poor to rich economic status, exportation of value-added mineral 
commodities and downstream processing (beneficiation strategy) within mineral-rich 
countries such as South Africa has become the main emphasis in facilitating 
economic growth, development and sustainability. 
 
In light of the attractive benefits of the industrial strategy of value-adding to natural 
resources, South Africa launched a Beneficiation Strategy in 2009. The government 
based on the intentions of the Mineral Policy 1998, through the DMR saw it as a 
favourable and worthy cause to be pursued due to its self-evident and logical potential 
of facilitating economic growth and transiting mineral-dependent countries into 
becoming knowledge-based and labour-intensive industrial giants.  
 
With the increased demand for not only primary raw minerals but also resource-based 
consumer goods and services, against the backdrop of the general economic rule that 
beneficiated products attract higher prices due to their higher sales value as compared 
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to raw, unrefined products, more opportunities are being opened for South African 
minerals industry “to supply products with a significant local value-add” (Department 
of Minerals and Energy, 2009) 
 
Traditionally, raw or near-raw minerals were exported to satisfy the demands of the 
industrialized economies, which have reaped the benefits of value-addition via both 
local and export sales of their products. Since beneficiated products are obtained from 
raw mineral resources, it is only fair for the custodian (South African government) to 
also reap additional economic benefits and compensation from this activity. 
 
Despite criticisms, the South African government opines that companies involved in 
mineral development should also be involved in downstream minerals beneficiation. 
The government posits that mining companies adding on beneficiation processes 
would not be an inappropriate burden since primary mineral inputs which they 
provide serve to attract other tiers of the value-chain or industries that do not 
necessarily have any business with exploration, mining and extraction, but possess 
metallurgical and manufacturing skills and expertise that result in value-addition. 
 
The South African government, through the DMR, seeks to motivate and encourage 
the establishment of more beneficiating (refining) companies by providing incentives 
like lowering royalty rates for projects that include beneficiation as value-addition 
adds to the costs of mineral development; export parity pricing; stability in cost of 
public services and goods; state support for research in beneficiation techniques; 
investing in providing expert training and equipment to small local entrepreneurs to 
encourage and expand local expertise and support local beneficiation; effective 
dissemination of non-confidential, State-held information; and programs to allow for 
the review of policies and regulations that constrain downstream development 
(Northern Cape Province, 2005), as stated in the Minerals and Mining Policy of 1998.  
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The provisions of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act (MPRRA) for 
reduced rate for refined minerals appears to be one of the ways to achieve this 
beneficiation objective of the government and the assessment of its success on 
delivering this objective, and this informs the focus of this project. 
 
 
2.3 EVOLUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA’S CURRENT ROYALTY REGIME 
 
In South Africa, from as far back as 1878, collection of mineral royalties had been 
used as an instrument of obtaining surplus revenues from mineral exploitation 
(mineral rents). In formulation of the current MPRR regime, some points were taken 
from recommendations of different of commissions of inquiry set up (in South 
Africa’s mining history) to look into South Africa’s mineral policy and mining 
investment policies. The detailed history of the different royalty systems and lease 
instruments applied to the gold mining industry that existed before that of the 
MPRRA was given by Scott (1979) and Cawood (1999). Cawood and Minnitt (2001) 
stated that the current royalty regime’s formula-based design was facilitated mainly 
by the principles of the gold lease and Mr. I. J. Haarhoff’s recommendations to the 
Frames Commission of Inquiry in 1917. 
 
In 1917 and 1918, there existed a Frames Commission of Inquiry, to which amongst 
other things, a certain Mr. I. J. Haarhoff made some contributions which influenced 
the current royalty regime. For optimization (not maximizing) of government 
revenues, Haarhoff made some recommendations, which were that the state should 
claim royalties instead of state engaging in mining activities; that royalties should be 
charged on output, irrespective of the profits and it should be sliding-scale, more or 
less on the yield per ton. The sliding-scale concept of royalties implied by Haarhoff 
opined that it would reduce the mine risk and provide for equitable payment to the 
government at all times. 
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As at 1932, gold mines were subjected to payment of lease consideration. This 
concept was meant to be compensation to the State for the right to mine its minerals 
because initially only these rights (applicable only to precious stones and metals) 
were vested in the State in terms of mineral laws which was not inclusive of land 
ownership. The Union government at that time used a complex sliding-scale fiscal 
instrument to collect excess profits and additional tax revenues from gold mines. This 
formula provided for the adjustment of profits in such a way that it encouraged the 
mining of lower-grade ore “by increasing realized profits artificially and therefore, 
lower taxable excess profit” (Cawood, 1999). However, different mines had their own 
unique sliding-scale formulas for profit and lease consideration. In order to provide a 
permanent and consistent regime which would support mining of low-grade ore, the 
Corbett commission of 1936 was set up. This sliding-scale formula nature of the lease 
consideration constituted the cornerstone of the country’s current royalty policy. 
 
Although, there was the Holloway commission of 1946, whose recommendations 
aimed at optimizing balance between government receipts and company returns as it 
suggested that profit taxes were better than those that entered the cost equation 
because of their smaller impact on the pay-limit, it was the Margo Commission of 
1987 that had more impact on the formulation of the current royalty policy. This 
commission was the first to mention mineral royalties (Severance tax). The 
commission assessed the likely success of the use of Severance tax as an alternative 
method of charging mineral royalties, stating that it should be a compensation to 
present and future generations for loss of their exhaustible resources but did not 
support the imposition of the tax. The commission also maintained the use of 
principles of the sliding-scale gold mining tax formula and recommended that the tax 
and mineral royalty formula be combined into one formula. 
 
In 1991, a new Minerals Act No. 50 of 1991 was enacted and it did not reserve the 
right to mine any minerals to the state but allowed for disposal of state-owned 
mineral rights to private parties. By 1992, the introduction of this new Minerals Act 
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resulted in the repeal of the Precious stones Act No. 73 of 1964 and Mining Rights 
Act No. 20 of 1967 which supported the ‘lease consideration’ concept. Therefore, this 
led to cessation of lease formula payments, removal of automatic vesting in the State 
of the rights to mine precious stones and metals and cancellation of the State sharing 
in mining profits except for profits from State-owned mineral rights and from old 
order mineral rights. However, alongside these developments also arose the issue of 
royalty payment mineral rights owner by mining company. With the existence of 
multiple mineral ownership rights, this also resulted in availability of multiple royalty 
systems to mining investors in South Africa. Problems of inconsistency and 
unfairness arose as regards share of revenue benefits, because the outcome was 
skewed in favour of the party (mining company or State) that had the better 
negotiation skills, and in most cases, mining companies had the upper hand. As stated 
by Bradley (1986) that “…standardization and consistency are interrelated and both 
are desirable”, this fragmented and inequitable situation had to be resolved. Apart 
from its mineral taxation system generating no substantial wealth for the government, 
it was also considered that its mineral development was largely unattractive to 
investments in terms of exploration and mining investments due to the poor 
performance of its nationalized mining sector  (Cawood, 2010). This led to the review 
of South Africa’s macroeconomic policies especially those affecting the mining 
industry.  
 
Part of the reforms led to the release of the Minerals and Mining Policy for South 
Africa in October 1998 by the DMR. The White paper of the Mineral and Mining 
Policy addressed the various issues challenging the minerals industry in order to 
propose ways of tackling them so as to result in a minerals sector that maximally 
benefits the South African people. Amongst other things, the White paper with 
regards to mineral royalties, stipulates that irrespective of whether the mineral rights 
are State or privately-owned, royalties “will be determined by state officials after 
consultation with the registered holder of the mineral rights” (Cawood and Minnitt,  
2001).  
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Furthermore, the government in response to the need for reform of fiscal policies 
(rent capturing instruments) conducted a comparative study against the CIF, in 1999. 
It reduced its corporate tax from 35% to 30% and considered the reduction of its 
STC- 12.5% on distributable earnings, after the realization of its high magnitude. The 
White paper on Mineral policy served as a basis for the enactment of the MPRDA 
2002.  
 
As mentioned earlier, one of the main objectives of the MPRDA was to vest all 
mineral right ownership in the State (which had been the intention of the government 
from the onset of its policy reforms) and that all South Africans must benefit from her 
vast mineral resources. According to the Minister of Finance (2008), “the benefits of 
our vast mineral resources, some of which are about to be depleted, has historically 
accrued to only a few”. The MPRDA with its provision for State custodianship served 
as a sound basis for the further re-examination of which rent capturing systems 
(mining-specific) to choose. To ensure that the mining industry transcends to the 
benefit of larger sections of South Africans as required by the MPRDA, charging of 
mineral royalties was settled for.  
 
From 2003 to November 2008 when the bill was enacted, four drafts of the Royalty 
bill were released and they underwent extensive consultations and debate amongst all 
relevant stakeholders. In 2003, the first draft of the new royalty bill was released for 
public comments. It was value-based with fixed rates as high as 8%. In the same year 
(2003), Cawood was asked by the National Treasury to make contributions as to 
choosing a suitable base. He submitted in accordance with UNECA study (2004) that 
Net Smelter Return (NSR) base, which is gross sales definition less allowable 
expenditures related to transportation, marketing and value-addition, was desirable, 
because a profit base would require rates to be higher compared to gross sales base. 
The second draft (2006) used fixed rates ranging from 0% to 5% of sales value, and 
made provisions for reduced royalty payments for refined metal products and 
marginal mines. The third draft (2007) was modified to a formula mechanism for 
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calculating the rate and was based on a NSR definition of income. The fourth and 
final draft (2008) was still by a formula “but only after classifying the mineral as 
either refined or unrefined”, thereby justifying the legal text for NSR to include 
allowable deductions (Cawood, 2010). After the final draft, the Minister of Finance 
(2008) stated that “the South African MPRR Bill will make contributions towards 
greater transparency, sustainability and the distribution of benefits to all south 
Africans”. 
 
The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act was finally promulgated in 
November 2008, after many debates and consultations over its provisions. The use of 
this royalty formula instrument only came into force from March 2010. As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, it stipulates dual ad valorem, sliding-scale formula method of 
charging royalties.  This dual sliding-scale formula mechanism imposes no specific 
rate for any minerals, through its definition of value, acknowledges profitability and 
automatically recognizes downstream beneficiation of mineral products as it 
distinguishes between refined and unrefined minerals (Cawood and Minnitt, 2001). 
This implies that the royalty system also aligns with the government’s objective to 
promote local beneficiation of South Africa’s minerals (Portfolio Committee on 
Finance, 2008). The formula provisions for refined minerals allows for reduction of 
royalty rate as beneficiation increases in order to compensate for the higher sales 
value of refined products. A refined mineral resource is as listed in Schedule1 of the 
MPRRA.  
 
This formula royalty system has a lot of other advantages such as provision of 
automatic relief for marginal mines, small mining business and mines in development 
stage; allowance of the State to share in both the upside (windfall) and downside 
(risk) of the mining industry; exemption for sampling. In spite of this, a number of 
objections to its provisions exist especially as regards its beneficiation objectives. The 
general objection is that “the inclusion of beneficiation in the royalty formula may 
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complicate matters without necessarily ensuring beneficiation and that the tax system 
is not necessarily the best way to achieve that” (Resource Investor, 2007).  
 
 
2.3.1 The design of the MPRR regime 
 
In the current era of many expectations and markets of differentiated mineral 
products at various stages of beneficiation, in designing an optimal royalty regime 
that will accommodate this diversity and stand the test of time, flexibility is 
compulsory coupled with standardization and consistency, as recommended by 
Bradley (1986). This places onus on policy makers to consider many complex (often 
contradictory) issues in order to balance the satisfaction of both government and 
company objectives. Up to date, it seems that no perfect, universal best practice 
royalty exists (Cawood, 2010). 
 
As with every regime, the structure of the MPRR comprises of royalty base, royalty 
rate and source. These are discussed below. 
 
Royalty Base 
The MPRRA’s base is gross sales. According to the Act, gross sales is defined as the 
amount received or accrued in an arm’s length transaction during the year of 
assessment, in respect of the transfer of a mineral resource in the condition specified 
in Schedule 1 or 2 of the Act.  
 
Royalty rate 
As mentioned earlier, the design of the formula-based royalty rate was facilitated 
mainly by the principles of the Gold lease and Mr. I. J. Haarhoff’s recommendations 
to the Frames Commission of Inquiry in 1917. The gold lease formula was based on 
profitability (ability to pay). It had a minimum lease rate connected with a profit-
based sliding-scale formula, to guarantee that some payment is guaranteed when 
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profits are not realized and to share in realization of high profits (Cawood, 2001). 
Haarhoff’s recommendation did not supply the commission with a formula, however, 
he stated that the state must impose royalties instead of state involvement; a 
(minimum) royalty be levied on revenue but at the same time recognize profitability 
(making allowance for higher royalties in times of high profitability and vice versa). 
According to (Cawood, 2010), in combining both gold lease formula and Mr. 
Haarhoff’s recommendations, the design of the MPRR formula yielded this: 
 
Y% = minimum rate + allowance for higher royalties in times of high profitability = a 
+ b 
 
Where, 
a = minimum rate 
b = rent premium = 
                       
                                 
 
                             
a + b = maximum rate 
 
b-factor provides for a profit sharing or sliding-scale mechanism between the 
minimum and maximum rates. More details of the design appear in Cawood (1999). 
 
The rationale for the minimum rate also follows the opinion of Otto et al (2006) that a 
minimum royalty should be charged which ensures absolute minimum compensation 
“….for its exploited resources even when the operation was unprofitable”. The choice 
of maximum rate was based on international best practice using CIF drawn from 
mineral royalty systems of top investor-friendly developing countries, which was not 
more than 3% on average. 
 
Standard international practice requires that a royalty rate should acknowledge the 
amount of processing required for each mineral product, which would inform the 
charging of different royalties to different minerals based on their difference in value. 
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With each mineral product requiring its own unique rate, it would be onerous to use a 
fixed-royalty system to specify these rates as it would result in an extensive and 
comprehensive list of mineral products against royalty rates, which must also be 
frequently revised when new minerals become useful and others are replaced by new 
materials.  
 
The MPRRA allows for classification of mineral resources as either refined or 
unrefined, which is stated in Schedule 1 and 2 of the Act. According to the MPRRA, 
the rate is determined by using the appropriate formula after the mineral 
classification. The structure for determination of the royalty rate is in line with the 
above-mentioned standard international requirements for an appropriate royalty 
regime and it erases the need to have extensive lists for each mineral product based 
on their different stages of beneficiation, as its calculation works by varying the rate 
with profitability of the mines for each mineral product transferred. The rate is 
reduced as beneficiation increases so as to compensate for the higher sales value due 
to higher prices received for refined products. The rates for refined and unrefined 
minerals are calculated thus: 
 
Refined rate Y% = 0.5 + (
    
                            
) x 100  
OR Y% = 0.5 + (
 
    
); and 
 
Unrefined rate Y% = 0.5 + (
    
                         
) x 100  
OR Y% = 0.5 + (
 
 
)  
 
Based on structure of Y% = (a + b), 
 
Where,  
 a = acceptable 1% minimum rate (based on precedents); 
52 
 
 b = 
 
 
; 
 X = profitability indicator i.e. (
    
                     
) x 100; 
 F (Factor) = 12.5 and 9.0, which determine maximum rates for refined and 
unrefined minerals respectively; 
 EBIT = Gross sales after adding recoupments under Income tax Act 1962 less 
capital expenditure less operating expenditure   net profit before tax 
definitions. However, EBIT is only earnings attributable to winning and 
recovery of mineral resources up to its saleable state; 
 Aggregate gross sales = Arm’s-length gross sales value; and 
 a + b = maximum rate of 3% initially, but stretched to 5% (refined minerals) 
and 7% (unrefined minerals), in the SA case. 
 
As at 2001,  Cawood (2001) suggested that in order to successfully promote strategy 
for downstream beneficiation of minerals, the state may forfeit its share (b-factor in 
the formula) so as to receive on 1% royalty payment but this became unnecessary 
with the introduction of the provision for separate b-factors unrefined and refined 
minerals. 
 
2.3.2 Beneficiation criteria 
 
Based on evaluations made by Cawood (1999) and Netshipale (2008) against issues 
like equitable share of benefits between State and companies; response to changing 
economic cycles; alliance with global competitive trends and State Mineral policy 
objectives of stable revenue generation, the integrity and feasibility of MPRRA was 
acknowledged as a worthy piece of legislature. However, in light of mineral 
beneficiation policy objectives, further research was necessary.  
 
As observed, the MPRR regime was designed with taking cognizance of the fact that 
mineral beneficiation projects share same risks with primary extraction in terms of 
53 
 
the uniqueness characteristics of the mineral resource, high capital commitment, long 
lead times, geological uncertainty etc. and any appropriate fiscal instruments for this 
aspect must take the above into consideration (Department of Minerals and Energy, 
1998). 
 
The MPRR sliding-scale formula nature, through its definition of revenue and 
separate mechanism which can be applied to profitability arising from sale at any 
stage of mineral production, automatically caters for downstream beneficiation of 
mineral products, which seems to imply that the regime also meets the beneficiation 
criteria. In a later chapter, this would be quantitatively analysed. 
 
 
2.4 CONCLUSION  
 
According to studies by Standish (1992); Davis (1994); Fine and Rustomjee (1996); 
and Hirsh and Hanival (1998), since the early 1920s, resource-based investment 
projects have featured prominently in the South Africa’s industrial and economic 
policies, contributing significantly to her Gross National Product as well as providing 
capital for re-investment and further economic development.  In light of this, South 
Africa’s current drive to use its mineral royalty instruments to promote processing 
(refining) and beneficiation of natural is not a new phenomenon. In summary, this 
chapter explored and reviewed South Africa’s mineral policy in light of mineral 
beneficiation objectives, the evolution of the current mineral royalty regime (as 
specified by the MPRRA), the structure and design of the regime as regards reduced 
royalty rate for refined minerals in order to encourage more miners to establish 
refining facilities.  
 
Therefore, with reference to the country examples previously-mentioned, it can be 
concluded that SADC countries’ and in particular South Africa’s use of fiscal policy 
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instruments to further motivate the establishment of value-addition facilities, is not 
inappropriate. 
 
Chapter three, which specifies the methodology to be used in this research project, 
takes an in-depth look into the mining royalty system with mineral processing 
provisions used by one of the country examples given in chapter one. The approach, 
lessons, successes or failures achieved by this country’s royalty system in 
incentivising the establishment of more beneficiation facilities would be compared 
with and applied to the mineral processing incentives of South Africa’s MPRRA, to 
ascertain if the royalty policy objective of encouraging miners to become refiners 
would be achieved.   
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CHAPTER THREE  
 
METHODOLOGY: APPLICATION OF BRADLEY’S (WESTERN 
AUSTRALIA) MODEL TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
There are two parties – State and industry (developer or producer) – involved in the 
transfer of mineral rights, and a royalty system must be put in place in which 
financial arrangements are acceptable to both. If they are not acceptable to industry, 
the result will be a lack of growth in the mining sector, and invariably economic loss 
to the State. Industry cannot pay royalties where operations do not yield net returns, 
including a return on developers’ capital and a return to developers commensurate 
with the risks they bear. This chapter seeks to assess a country’s royalty system 
having beneficiation incentives in light of its encouragement or not of private sector 
investment in mineral processing ventures, so as to foster the realization of an 
industrialized economy.  
 
In chapter one, a few examples of countries that have custodianship of their minerals 
and use ad valorem and/or hybrid royalty systems with beneficiating incentives were 
discussed. The aim of these examples was primarily to give an overview of whether 
their ad valorem royalty systems possessed any provisions to encourage beneficiation 
and to check if South Africa’s royalty regime can draw any lessons from the success 
or not of their ‘beneficiation incentive’ provisions, if any. As stated in that chapter, 
the constraint of that section (Section 1.2.3), was the lack of access to up-to-date 
detailed information on the royalty regimes of many countries especially as regards 
provisions to facilitate beneficiation (mineral processing and refining), the analysis of 
the regimes and what the impact of regimes have been on investment and operation 
decisions. 
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In chapter two, other country examples with success in using fiscal instruments with 
beneficiation provisions were mentioned (although detailed information could not be 
obtained), which seem to indicate that the current emphasis on processing (refining) 
and beneficiation of natural resources to stimulate economic growth and development 
(within South Africa) is not a new phenomenon. As stated in that chapter, countries 
like the U.S., Canada, Scandinavia, Indonesia, Chile, Sweden and Finland, used 
public policy to instigate industrial strategies which made use of natural resource 
abundance as a basis for economic growth and development in the era of 
globalization (Lederman and Maloney, 2007), by fostering the development of 
industrial or high-technology sectors simultaneously with development of natural 
resource assets. By this, these countries were able to diversify their exports away 
from natural resources so as to realize economic growth as well as evolve from 
primary resource-dependency to becoming knowledge-based economies. 
 
In this chapter, for the purpose of assessing the beneficiation provisions of the royalty 
regimes of the countries mentioned earlier, in order to apply to the South African 
context for the assessment of whether the current South Africa’s royalty system’s 
beneficiation incentive provisions would yield its desired success, the Western 
Australian’s royalty regime example was chosen.  
 
The methodology used in this research would be based on Bradley’s Inquiry into the 
Mineral revenues in Western Australia (WA). His study would be reviewed and his 
recommendations as regards mineral processing would be applied to the South 
African platinum industry, to check its effect in terms of value-added to the financial 
positions of Mining-only and Mining plus Refining projects. 
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3.2 EXPOUNDING ON THE WESTERN AUSTRALIAN’S ROYALTY 
SYSTEM IN LIGHT OF BRADLEY’S WORK AS REGARDS MINERAL 
PROCESSING PROVISIONS 
 
The Western Australian country example was chosen because of the similarity of its 
dependence on strategic commodities just like South Africa such as gold and coal, 
coupled with the fact that its royalty regime has provisions for further processing of 
minerals.  
 
In WA, the mining and petroleum industries are said to contribute to the economy to 
the extent that the value they generate exceeds the production costs they incur. For 
instance, around the turn of the 20
th 
century, the gold industry in WA grew rapidly in 
importance and growth, causing the industry to provide the major source of stimulus 
for its economy in the period before 1920. It is therefore appropriate to regard the 
extra output obtained by employing capital in mining, compared with its alternative 
use, as a contribution of the mining and petroleum industries.  
 
As mentioned in chapter one, mineral royalties in WA have represented one of the 
primary instruments used to extract the industry’s contribution to the economy and 
were and are still claimed based on its ownership of mineral resources. In WA, the 
objective of royalty policy is stated in very general terms, that the development of its 
mineral resources must result in maximal benefits to the people of WA, in the long 
term. The State bears the responsibility for ensuring that resources are well-developed 
so that maximum value will be realized for its citizens, therefore, it expects a return 
as compensation when rights to exploit the resources are transferred to developers. 
The potential magnitude of this return expected by the State from its resources 
depends on the value of the resources. Value can only be appropriated and extracted 
from mineral resources if only they are viewed as capital assets. 
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Royalties were collected initially under either the Mining Act of 1978 or 
alternatively, Agreement Acts that were negotiated for individual projects. After this, 
royalties became payable either under the Mining Regulations of 1981 or various 
State Agreement Acts. This system took into account price fluctuations and grade of 
material. The different rates were also intended to adjust for the change in the value 
as mined ore is processed and value is added (Department of Mines and Petroleum, 
2011). 
 
From 1981 to date, the mineral royalty regime has been reviewed at various times. 
These reviews were carried out so as to evaluate the existing system of mineral 
revenue collection in order to prescribe changes that were needed to be made for the 
State to realize more value from its resources. One of the main reviews whose study 
and recommendations apply to the objective of this research study is the Mineral 
Revenues Inquiry headed by Bradley, in 1986. 
 
In this section, the expounded review of the WA system in light of its mineral 
processing provisions relies largely on the Bradley (1986) Report of the Mineral 
Revenue study carried out. The main aim of this review was to “appraise the existing 
system (as at 1986) of determining and collecting mineral resource (including 
petroleum) revenues and to evaluate and recommend alternative methods if 
appropriate and the appropriate rates or level of charges to maximize the benefits to 
WA from a vigorous mineral resources industry”. The study looked extensively at 
understanding and explaining the arrangements of that time affecting the WA mining 
industry and dealt quite extensively with the further processing of minerals in the 
State, which the government had also consistently sought after.  
 
According to Bradley (1986), the mining industry contributes to the economy through 
the realization of Net resource value and therefore, royalty systems should link 
royalties to this value. This would enable the State to share more equitably in the 
value of its resources over all operations and under varying economic conditions. 
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Contributions which can be attributed to net resource value include but not limited to 
royalties, certain infrastructure provision, additional mineral processing arising as a 
condition of resource tenure. However, before royalty instruments are designed for 
extraction of mineral wealth, it is important for the State to consider the nature of 
resource value. In valuation of mineral resources, its net value at any point in the 
production process is given by the difference between the future revenues which are 
expected when the reserves are recovered and the further costs that must be incurred 
to achieve its recovery. 
 
Valuation of mineral and petroleum resources can be made in three different stages of 
mineral recovery – exploration, development and production. Emphasis on any stage 
of the project is a reminder that the developers have already invested funds to bring 
the project to this point. However, not to go beyond the focal point of this section of 
reviewing Bradley’s work, the production stage – mineral processing stage – would 
be concentrated on. 
 
In practice, royalty systems do not seek nor would be able to entirely appropriate net 
resource value because the State relies on private mining companies to develop its 
mineral resources. Therefore, it should take into consideration the additional 
expenditure that private developers incur in exploration, development and production, 
in order for the mining industry’s long-term growth to be sustained. If the mining 
industry is non-existent because of lack of economic success of its projects, no value 
can accrue to the State.  
 
Furthermore, royalties being based on net resource value are in concept inherently 
variable, because values of mineral products are based on price information generated 
by market transactions, which are commonly cyclical. This implies that realized value 
will be significantly different across time-periods, socio-economic, regulatory 
conditions. Therefore, net resource value should represent the maximum limit to 
which the State can claim PV of income from mining projects and it should be 
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specified with reference to the current situation at the time the State makes a mineral 
title available, in order to reward private companies for finding the minerals.  
 
The results of any State royalty system will be observable from the bottom line on 
company profit statements or the revenue accounts in the State’s books. In 
establishing royalty policy, it should be noted that its acceptability lies in the fact that 
it does not contribute toward reducing realized resource values from their potential 
level, which would lead to distortion of investment decisions or operating plans, and 
thereby negatively impact both State and private developers. 
 
Capital investment itself, which is an input, represents a cost to the mining industry 
and to the economy; therefore, the significance of the net value of reserves can be 
appreciated by considering the other options available to the holder of the resource 
rights. If expected revenue does exceed expected processing cost, it will pay to 
proceed with proposed mineral processing plan.  
 
As at the time of assessment in 1986, WA’s customary royalty system relied on Gross 
value royalties (GVR) with several rates set in relation to the degree to which product 
is processed. GVRs used in WA were calculated in a variety of ways. The first is 
known as specific or unit based royalties and defined as dollars per unit of product. 
The latter is ad valorem, defined as a percentage of revenue. In the case of the first 
type, the resource owner receives either a share of mineral recovered and in the ad 
valorem type, receives a share of revenue realized from the sale of the mineral. The 
ad valorem royalty which claims a percentage of gross revenue has been the favoured 
instrument in WA. 
 
A GVR is a conditional revenue generator for the State because it is not collected 
unless production takes place (specific royalty) or unless the product is sold (ad 
valorem royalty) but less conditional than profit-related net value royalties. GVRs 
represent a more certain return to the State than from a net value royalty. Coupled 
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with the near certainty of revenue collection they provide, they also provide relative 
revenue stability and are relatively easy to administer. The advantage of easy 
administration can be overstated for ad valorem royalties as it makes allowance for 
the value added by processing, which can make calculations complicated. 
 
However, in the opinion of Bradley’s study, it is stated that this system will yield 
economic waste unless royalties are held to nominal values because when levied at 
other than negligible rates they distort investment and production decisions. They 
recommended that a system which combines a ‘basic royalty’ with a ‘net value 
royalty’ should be put in place, which would meet the criteria of avoiding economic 
waste and achieving equity among different projects. In this system, the basic royalty 
would be levied on revenue from the sale of recovered minerals after deduction of 
certain allowed operation costs. The net value royalty would be levied on a base 
which corresponds as closely as is practical to the net realised value of the recovered 
mineral.  
 
In spite of revenue generation from customary cash royalties, the government of WA 
sought to receive additional benefits because of the priority it placed on future 
regional development or industrialization based on further processing. The 
government held that if industrial development was to occur, some key processing 
industries had to established first, perhaps by state initiative. On this belief, the State 
set up the Wundowie charcoal iron industry in the 1940s, which failed to provide the 
thrust needed to realize this industrialization vision and this industry only continued 
in operation with large subsidies. The State learnt from this unfortunate experience 
and no further attempts were made using government ownership as a vehicle of 
industrialization-drive. However, some form of government direction was still 
necessary for this vision to be achieved but it moved on to allow market forces to 
work towards this goal, which resulted in only limited processing of primary products 
and little industrial development. 
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These failed attempts led to another direction whereby they decided to look at using 
public (fiscal) policy to induce the industrialization goal. They began to look at 
departing from the principles that underlie the standardized structure of cash royalty 
payments by making claims on resource value which differed from explicit money 
payment forms. This type of fiscal instrument was referred to as De facto royalties. 
This instrument required developers to make infrastructural provisions which others 
may use in the process of regional settlement; and/or further processing of minerals 
that would not otherwise be undertaken in the state.  
 
The justification of the use of De facto royalties laid in the fact that they could 
provide significant benefits that could not be obtained within a standardized system, 
especially when they displaced customary cash royalties. In WA, De facto royalties 
involving processing commitments received a good deal of attention. The defence of 
these processing agreements, which seemed to appear to provide many benefits, was 
founded on the observation from the success of other countries that pressured 
multinational companies to process within their boundaries. Benefits promised by 
mining and mineral processing include job creation, provision of opportunities for the 
development of domestic technical skills when advanced technology is involved; 
encouragement of the creation of associated industries thereby boosting the 
manufacturing sector; and provide other beneficial side effects or linkages for the 
local economy (Tilton, 1992).  
 
Although the state generally sought to maintain a consistent royalty policy with 
respect to customary cash royalties (GVRs), where de facto royalties were thought to 
be sufficiently important especially when it was felt that net resource value is high 
and that the customary royalties would not secure a fair share for the state, it became 
willing to make exceptions. The government began to call for many mining 
agreements to contain provisions for additional processing if, or when, it becomes 
economically viable. Consequently, the state thought to offset their claim on net 
resource value by providing incentives for the establishment of additional processing 
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facilities through the introduction of reduced royalty levies, else the net returns to the 
developer would be reduced. Alternatively, the State provided that failure to 
undertake additional processing was penalized by a royalty increase. 
 
The State’s willingness to sacrifice royalty income is an indication of the value it 
attached to further processing of minerals. The relinquishment of the State’s royalty 
income in order to induce commitments to further processing meant that it would be 
trading a share of its claim to net resource value for the other benefits it expects to 
receive because the greater the de facto royalty required by the state, the more the 
royalty rate reduction (in order to gain commitment to further processing), thereby 
altering the share of net resource value between the state and the developer and 
reducing its portion of net resource value but total net resource value is unchanged.  
 
With mineral royalties being allowed in the State to be collected either under the 
Mining Act of 1981 or Agreement Acts (negotiated for individual projects), these 
negotiated agreements (Acts) raised the possibility that the State would seek other 
benefits – additional mineral processing- from mineral development. Hence, De facto 
royalties in WA became intimately tied to the system of ratified agreements between 
developers and the State. These obligations to undertake processing became peculiar 
to each project as specific terms under which resource rights will be transferred were 
negotiated between state and developers on a case by case basis, thereby representing 
a departure from the consistent cash royalty system.   
 
More so, these obligations for additional processing imposed additional costs to the 
developer, which had to be deducted in computation of net resource value. It may 
have been more costly to carry out additional processing in WA, thereby reducing the 
net resource value by added increment of processing cost and giving the developer 
reason to do it elsewhere. This led to the State’s royalty incentive for undertaking 
additional processing in the State. By responding to a royalty incentive, 
64 
 
notwithstanding the higher processing cost, the developer might still be able to 
benefit significantly from this investment decision. 
 
In WA, major resource development projects with processing requirements as at that 
time were contingent upon agreements negotiated between the developer and the 
State, for example, Iron ore (Mount Newman) Agreement, Diamond Ashton Joint 
venture Agreement Act and BHP Agreement. Here, another important aspect of 
agreements was examined in light of their use by the State (based on its resource 
ownership) as a mechanism for promoting economic growth and industrial 
development. To achieve this, the royalty claims on these agreements which had de 
facto royalty requirements, were GVR-based but contained provisions like reduced 
royalty rates per level of mineral processing. They were discretionary rather than 
standardized and therefore required a ‘roll your own’ approach.  
 
Inclusive in the charge given to the inquiry carried out by Bradley’s team of 
examining alternative royalty systems and making recommendations in light of the 
circumstances prevailing in WA, was that the Study evaluates the performance of 
royalty systems with respect to economic efficiency. Economic efficiency can be 
equated with neutrality. Thus, the more a royalty system causes developers to change 
investment or operating decisions to that which would not maximize the total value of 
resources to the economy, the less efficient is the royalty system. An ideal system 
should be one that conceives of royalty arrangements which would not distort 
developers’ decisions at all. According to the report, the rationale for economic 
efficiency is that if a project would be undertaken in the absence of any royalty, it 
would still be undertaken, using exactly the same development plan, if a perfectly 
efficient royalty system was put in place. As regards further mineral processing 
requirements, this study therefore sought to assess whether the developer would be 
better or worse off than in the initial situation- without processing requirements- and 
by what amount, if any, that the developer will benefit if it takes up further mineral 
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processing in light of the state’s grant of a royalty concession in exchange for 
processing. 
 
The economic efficiency of any royalty system is a non-issue if the resource owner is 
content with gaining only a negligible share of net resource value, but when the 
owner seeks a greater share of net resource value, the efficiency of the type of royalty 
used becomes important. As stated by Bradley (1986), this is amplified by the 
objective of WA royalty policy of ensuring “economic growth through growth in the 
mineral industry in the long term interests of our State”, which brings important set of 
issues to the fore – “what  features must a royalty system possess if it is to encourage 
growth of the mining industry while at the same time fulfilling its function of 
providing the State with an acceptable return for the mineral rights which have been 
transferred to private developers?”. Although the ideal of a perfectly efficient or non-
distorting royalty is unattainable, the efficiency criterion must be given a high priority 
when choosing among alternative royalty systems. 
 
Royalty paid depends on the combination of rate and base, hence, the good 
performance of any type of royalty performs with respect to maintaining economic 
efficiency is contingent upon this feature-combination. The royalty base of WA’s 
GVR system is quantity of output or value of output and output is only maintained so 
long as a mining operation remains economically viable. Its royalty base diverges 
from net resource value because it takes no account of the cost of mining or of 
processing to the stage where royalty is assessed, which implies that royalty would be 
higher when more processing is done before the point of assessment. Thus, the 
possibility exists that incremental royalty charges can approach and even exceed the 
incremental value of product. When this happens, the efficiency criterion is violated, 
and the royalty system inflicts measurable damage upon the industry. Serious 
efficiency effects are realized in instances where an entire project becomes 
uneconomic with the imposition of a royalty or where the royalty causes production 
to be altered in a significant manner. When the result is that an entire operation is 
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threatened or major changes are made in production plans, the cost to the economy 
becomes highly visible in that not only will company’s net returns and State royalties 
decline from previous expectations, but there will also be a loss of employment and 
possibly a significant decline in regional growth prospects. 
 
3.2.1 The Mineral Processing Provisions of the WA Royalty System 
 
As mentioned earlier, mineral revenues in WA are derived chiefly from ad valorem 
royalties. However, the system represented a departure from using a single ad 
valorem rate but several rates were applied depending upon the level of processing 
which was deemed to have been completed because of the fact that different minerals 
receive different amounts of processing before product value can be established 
through arm’s length sale. With each stage of processing the value of the product is 
enhanced by varying amounts. In concept, the base for the ad valorem royalties was 
on minehead (also known as ex-mine) value, although minerals are rarely sold at the 
minehead.  
 
The fixing of the ex-mine value as the ad valorem royalty base and scheduling of 
royalty rates according to level of processing was supported by the statement made by 
the Minister for Mines (1981), “…the examination of royalties set by iron ore and 
other development agreements indicated that a return to the State amounting to in the 
order of 10% of the value of production ex-mine offered a basis for a consistent and 
logical approach to the setting of royalty levels. Royalties would be applied to 
minerals in the form in which they are generally sold which, depending on the nature 
of the mineral, may be as a bulk material subjected to limited treatment; or as a 
mineral concentrate; or in a metallic, highly processed or finished product form. 
Royalties should be set for each particular mineral to apply across the industry, rather 
than on a mine-to-mine basis”. 
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If a single rate is applied at the point of first sale, then the greater the amount of 
processing, the higher the royalty collected. This implies that processing would be 
penalized and royalty appropriates a larger share of minehead value than was 
intended. Also, the amount of processing varies among minerals and between mines 
producing the same mineral. Therefore, obtaining a uniform share of minehead value 
across sectors of mining and across individual mines which was the objective of the 
State, presented a problem. Furthermore, with reference to a standard of share of 
minehead value, an ad valorem system with a single rate was considered as being 
extremely inequitable. 
 
Two methods were used for standardising royalty rates on a minehead basis so as to 
ensure that further mineral processing was not penalised, with increased royalty 
payments as processing increased. One method was based on netback calculation, 
where the arm’s length price and processing cost information were used to deduce 
minehead value of a commodity. The rationale of the netback calculation was that the 
value added to the mineral processing is equal to the costs incurred, which are 
inclusive of a return on all invested capital. Minehead value is therefore, the residual 
calculated by subtracting processing costs from the value established at point of sale. 
The alternative method was to specify a schedule of rates corresponding to different 
levels of processing, with the rates becoming progressively lower as the royalty base 
(product value) is increased by further processing. The constraint of this method, 
however, was that only a limited number of broad processing categories could be 
specified and mining operations would be classified without analysis of their 
particular processing costs, thus, it would only be possible to account in a very rough 
way for the value added by various processing operations. The rationale for the 
scheduling of rates was that the rate applied to the value of any product should be 
reduced so as to compensate for the value added to that product by processing. 
Eventually, the schedule was based on the same net back calculations as used in the 
alternative approach.  
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In WA, most metallic mineral royalties were assessed on the value realized when the 
products were sold with the rates being specified according to the category of 
processing deemed to have been completed. The guiding concept of this royalty 
system is that royalty rates are to be set with reference to the schedule shown in the 
Table below: 
 
Table 3.2-1: Principles of Western Australian ad valorem Royalty System 
 
Value 
Royalty 
Rate 
Unit Cost 
(Value 
Added) 
by stage 
Postulated 
unit value
2 
Implied 
Unit cost
3 
In Situ V0     
   C1   
Ex-Mine V1 0.10  ¼V4  
   C2  
 
  ⁄ V4 
C&S
1 
V2 0.075  ⅓V4  
   C3  ⅙V4 
Concentrate  V3 0.050  ½V4  
   C4  ½V4 
Metal  V4 0.025  V4  
Source: Bradley (1986) 
 
Where, 
1 =  Crushed and screened natural product; 
2 =  The value by stage of processing such that royalty collection is invariant with 
respect to stage of processing expressed as a share of final product value; 
3 = cost (or value added) by stage of processing required to yield postulated value, 
expressed as a share of final product value; 
Vi =  Unit value of mineral or mineral product according to the stage of processing; 
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V4 = Unit value of material which has passed through the refining stage. In principle, 
refined product is subject to a 2.5% ad valorem royalty; 
Ci = Unit cost of each stage of processing ≈ the value added, thus, C1 is the unit cost 
of mining. 
 
As indicated in Table 3.2-1, royalty rates slide downscale with successive stages of 
downstream processing to compensate for the increase in value of the product. The 
objective was to approximate the royalties that would be collected if a standard rate 
was applied to ex-mine value for all commodities. However, this objective could only 
be achieved with the royalty rates shown only when for any final product price the set 
of processing costs followed the unique pattern stated in the table and hence a unique 
set of product values by the stage of processing.  
 
3.2.2 Analysis from the Developer’s point of view 
 
Based on evaluations carried out by the Inquiry using the schedule of rates above, 
variations in value added to financial position of projects or operations through 
downstream processing were assessed between operations within a particular branch 
of mining as well as between different branches of mining, based on processing costs 
and product value (price).  
 
In the study, the effect of royalty system was applied to two different greenfields 
projects within the same industry having different processing costs – first producer 
with lower processing costs, second producer with higher processing costs. With 
assessment, it was observed that the royalty per unit of final product would be the 
same for each producer but this amount would never represent the same share of ex-
mine value for two operations. The lower cost producer would have more value 
added to his returns than the higher cost producer.  
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The effect of this royalty system was also applied to plausible greenfields nickel and 
bauxite-alumina operations. Applying to the nickel operation, it was seen that for 
values of the level that would be required to justify a new venture, the royalty 
calculated at 2.5% of metal value would be less but not greatly less, than that 
calculated at 10% of minehead value, because of the low processing costs. For 
alumina, values in the range needed to justify a new venture, the royalty calculated as 
2.5% of alumina value would be more, but not greatly more, than that calculated as 
10% of ex-mine bauxite value due to higher processing costs. Also, applying this 
evaluation to the iron ore industry, it appeared that the iron ore industry paid a 
significantly higher royalty per unit of final product than it would if royalty was 
assessed as 10% of minehead value. 
 
Not only does processing cost affect the decision to add-on processing facilities, price 
also plays a key role in whether a royalty rate of a given royalty system will cause 
serious distortions or not. Prices for mineral commodities are very difficult to predict, 
particularly in the long term and not determinable in most cases by the State or 
developers. Since price is not in the control of State and developer, in order for a 
royalty instrument that demands processing commitments, but also offers reduced 
royalty rate incentives to be efficient, control should be focused on either the rates 
applicable or the amount of processing costs incurred. At any given time, the 
corresponding share of net resource value depends on each operation’s mining and 
processing costs so as price falls, the State’s share of resource value represented by 
10% of minehead value continually increases, thereby reducing that which accrues to 
the developer. For the evaluation carried out on the two projects within the same 
industry, given cost information of these projects and the royalty system’s schedule 
of rates, it appeared that the projects would not proceed unless expected prices 
supported benefit-cost ratios in the range of 1.1, 1.3 and 1.5. These results showed 
that if the existing system were applied as envisaged in principle, it would indeed 
distort the developer’s investment decisions. 
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Additionally, with analysis carried out by the Inquiry of several real-time case 
studies, it became apparent that with the royalty system’s provisions for price and 
processing costs, some sectors of the industry felt that they were bearing a 
disproportionate share of the royalty burden, thus, each mining operation required 
specific adjustments, emphasizing the limitations of the system. In order for equity 
and non-distortion to investment decisions to occur, these limitations further 
necessitated the review process, so that the royalty system would take into 
consideration downturn in economic conditions and price volatility characteristics of 
the mining industry which when they occur, generate special pleading for royalty 
relief from existing mines that are on the margin of profitability. 
 
The study also observed that the costs associated with a secondary processing 
operation are significantly increased when that operation happens to include a 
transportation component, although, it was the nature of (WA) GVRs that no 
allowance was made for the cost of recovery and delivery of different minerals for 
processing. This had to be addressed so that new royalty procedures would possibly 
make approximate allowance for transportation costs as well as differing processing 
costs. This again was supported by the Minister for Mines (1981) saying that “…the 
actual level of royalty set for a particular mineral had and would need to continue to 
take into account factors such as nature of the mining operation, difficulty of 
separation of mineral from the ore, profitability, remoteness of the mines, 
contributions to infrastructure, etc.”  
 
Nevertheless, in evaluating the WA royalty system existent at the time, it was in 
Bradley’s opinion that since the State was conveying to the developer title to 
resources in the ground, the royalty base should relate to the value of the resources in 
the ground. He held that since the developer’s mining operation adds value to these 
resources just as do subsequent processing operations, therefore, value added through 
mining should not be part of the royalty base but the transportation component could 
be deducted. 
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3.2.3 Conclusion of Bradley’s study 
 
In summary, the evaluation of the WA system showed that in light of the State’s 
objective of equity in share of net value claimable across all minerals and mines, the 
inherent limitations of this system were evident. This was indicated in that when a 
standard set of royalty rates (scaled according to degree of downstream processing) 
was applied, there were substantial variations in the effective gross royalty at the 
minehead especially when the processing costs and prices differ from the unique set 
of relationships shown in the table above. The system could only yield this uniform 
return, under very special circumstances. Also in light of this schedule of rates, with 
variations in value added for projects of different minerals depending on differences 
in the market value of the products, it was observed that nickel and base metal 
projects, for example, would not go ahead if prices were at low levels, since they 
could not generate enough net income to pay the royalty. Even at medium price 
levels, the share of net resource value claimed by royalty might be enough to 
discourage such projects.  
 
Therefore, according to Bradley’s study, from the producer’s perspective, if price is 
typically higher than the unique value implied in the table, but processing costs and 
royalty rates remain as in the table, there would be some significant value-add and it 
will be to the developer’s advantage to have the downstream royalty assessment. If 
price is typically lower, the reverse will be true. Furthermore, if processing costs vary 
from those prescribed in the schedule, the reduced royalty rate for processed minerals 
would be a disincentive. The crux of the matter was not that some value might not be 
added to the profitability of these operations with adding-on mineral processing 
facilities but that whether the amount of value added was significant enough for such 
investment decision to be taken. 
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3.3 APPLYING BRADLEY’S WORK TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
CONTEXT  
 
The application of Bradley’s model to South Africa is for the purpose of carrying out 
a similar economic analysis (done by Bradley’s team as stated in the previous section) 
for comparing the value addition costs with the difference in royalty amount when the 
lower royalty rate for refined minerals is applied to the larger base due to a higher 
price.  
 
This section which aims at applying Bradley’s work on the WA royalty system to the 
MPRRA, borrows from the model drawn up by Cawood (2011) which is based on his 
interpretation of Bradley’s approach. 
 
As stated in Table 3.2-1 in the previous section, the WA royalty system on which 
Bradley’s approach is based specifies that royalty rates are scaled downward with 
successive stages of processing until the refined stage is achieved and gives the cost 
required per stage of processing required to bring each material to the specified share 
of final refined product.  
 
In the Figure 3.3-1 below, the study carried out by Bradley is depicted. It shows the 
situation where royalties are assessed at the unit value (or unit prices) for refined 
stage and at ex-mine (unrefined) stage with a low royalty rate for refined minerals 
being charged at 2.5% and a high rate of 10% being charged to ex-mine value.  
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Figure 3.3-1:  Relationship between royalty rates and value-added. Adapted from 
Bradley (1986) 
 
It is observed that there is a negative relationship between the royalty rate and unit 
price as the policy objective is realized when the unrefined rate shifts down to the 
refined rate. In the figure above, the area shaded and named ‘A’ represents the royalty 
saving which accrues to the mine for taking up a processing operation. Various value-
addition costs are added to move the product from ex-mine stage to other stages of 
refinement, up to the final refined stage. Of this Area A, value added to a mine’s 
profitability is given as the difference between the price received for final product and 
the total cost required to bring production to this desired state of mineral processing. 
As the costs increase, the value-added portion reduces. Based on the system’s 
assumptions for the value-addition costs needed to take product to next stage of 
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processing which are expressed as a share of final product, Bradley concluded that 
investment in value-addition can only be justified when the difference in unit price 
less value-addition cost is greater than the additional costs incurred in refined 
production. In other words, he specified that since the value of concentrate is 50% of 
price for refined metal and additional cost is required to take concentrate to refined 
metal stage, if the amount of value-added is not significantly greater than this cost, it 
would not be worth it to invest in bringing on a refining facility.  
 
After looking at Bradley’s conclusions on WA royalty system’s processing 
provisions, deductions can be made for application to the SA context, but before this 
can be done the similarities and differences between the unique features of the SA 
and WA royalty regimes must be understood. A similar feature between the royalty 
systems of WA and SA is the royalty base. The MPRRA’s base is gross sales and it is 
not significantly different from the GVR base of WA, which does not allow for 
deduction of value-addition or transportation expenditure. However, one of the main 
differences between the two systems is that the MPRRA allows for royalty rate to be 
determined via a dual formula system – after a mineral resource has been classified as 
either refined or unrefined, unlike the WA system which has fixed royalty rates per 
each stage of processing. The MPRRA’s structure for determination of the royalty 
rate erases the need to have extensive lists for each mineral product based on their 
different stages of beneficiation or refinement, as its calculation works by varying the 
royalty rate with profitability (as expressed by EBIT) of the mines for each mineral 
product transferred. The rate is reduced as beneficiation increases so as to compensate 
for the higher sales value due to higher prices received for refined products. The rates 
for refined and unrefined minerals are calculated thus: 
 
Refined rate Y% = 0.5 + (
    
                            
) x 100  
OR Y% = 0.5 + (
 
    
); and 
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Unrefined rate Y% = 0.5 + (
    
                         
) x 100  
OR Y% = 0.5 + (
 
 
)  
 
From the formula above, the maximum royalty rates payable at maximum 
profitability (100%) are 5% and 7% for refined and unrefined minerals respectively. 
The reduced royalty rate of 5% is as a reward for additional costs on value addition.   
 
Apart from the difference in structure of royalty rate specifications of the two 
systems, another main difference between the WA and SA royalty system is that 
unlike the WA where there is no minimum royalty for both miners and refiners to 
start payment from, the SA system does require that both unrefined and refined 
production pay at least a 0.5% in cases of no profitability. In the model created by 
Cawood (2011) for the application of Bradley’s approach to the SA context, he was 
able to overcome and factor these highlighted differences between the SA and WA 
regimes in light of profitability (EBIT) and minimum royalty level components. The 
Figure 3.3-2 below depicts his work of varying royalty rate with price, like Bradley’s 
work. 
 
Figure 3.3-2: Relationship between royalty rates and sales price. Adapted from 
Cawood (2011) 
B B 
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The price index in Figure 3.3-2 represents sales price for final product (either 
unrefined or refined final product), which is used as a proxy for gross revenue and it 
consists of different proportions of production costs plus EBIT (profit). For example, 
at price index of 100, it means that the proportion of production costs is equal to sales 
price received, implying that no profit was made. This explains why the royalty rate 
of 0.5% is still paid by the producer at price index 100. Furthermore in Figure 3.3-2, 
it should be noted that the reduction in price indices represents cases in which the 
lower the price index, the lower the proportion of production costs in relation to sales 
price is, and inversely, the higher the EBIT portion.  Hitherto, at each level of price 
index, the royalty rate that the producer would pay is specified. 
 
Further work carried out by Cawood (2011) is shown in the Tables 3.3-1 to 3.3-3 and 
Figures 3.3-3 to 3.3-5. In Tables 3.3-1 to 3.3-3, price received for refined product 
(indexed at 100%) expressed as a combination of cost of concentrate plus cost of 
refinement plus EBIT, different proportions of refinement costs (as a percentage sales 
price) as well as different proportions of cost of concentrates plus target EBIT margin 
(as a percentage sales price), were stated. In Figures 3.3-3 to 3.3-5, different 
proportions of refinement cost, expressed as 10%, 20% and 30% of price of final 
product were varied against different target EBITs from 0% to 100% plus cost of 
concentrate, in order to determine the various levels of value-added (given as 
difference in price received less concentrate cost plus EBIT plus refining cost) that 
could be obtained. All Tables and Figures below are adapted from Cawood (2011). 
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Table 3.3-1: Results for refinement cost of 10% and amount of value-added 
          Royalty consideration for determining optimal level of beneficiation using a minimum EBIT as 
criterion 
  
       
    
Price: 
Concentrate 
(C+EBIT) 
Price: 
Refined 
product 
(C+Cr+EBIT) 
Cost: 
Refined 
Product 
EBIT Royalty 
Rate 
(Unrefined) 
Royalty 
Rate 
(Refined) 
Desirable 
Royalty 
Rate 
Royalty Value 
Added  
for Cr 
of... 
10 
50 100 60 100 7.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00 40 
71 100 81 60 7.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00 19 
74 100 84 50 6.06% 4.50% 4.50% 4.50 16 
75 100 85 40 4.94% 3.70% 3.70% 3.70 15 
76 100 86 30 3.83% 2.90% 2.90% 2.90 14 
77 100 87 20 2.72% 2.10% 2.10% 2.10 13 
81 100 91 10 1.61% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30 9 
100 100 110 0 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50 -10 
 
Expressed graphically as,
 
Figure 3.3-3: Value-added for refinement cost of 10% 
Value added 
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Table 3.3-2: Results for refinement cost of 20% and amount of value-added 
          Royalty consideration for determining optimal level of beneficiation using a minimum EBIT as 
criterion 
  
       
    
Price: 
Concentrate 
(C+EBIT) 
Price: 
Refined 
product 
(C+Cr+EBIT) 
Cost: 
Refined 
Product 
EBIT Royalty 
Rate 
(Unrefined) 
Royalty 
Rate 
(Refined) 
Desirable 
Royalty 
Rate 
Royalty Value 
Added  
for Cr 
of... 
20 
50 100 70 100 7.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00 30 
71 100 91 60 7.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00 9 
74 100 94 50 6.06% 4.50% 4.50% 4.50 6 
75 100 95 40 4.94% 3.70% 3.70% 3.70 5 
76 100 96 30 3.83% 2.90% 2.90% 2.90 4 
77 100 97 20 2.72% 2.10% 2.10% 2.10 3 
81 100 101 10 1.61% 1.30% 1.61% 1.30 -1 
100 100 120 0 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50 -20 
 
Expressed graphically as,
 
Figure 3.3-4: Value-added for refinement cost of 20% 
Value added 
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Table 3.3-3: Results for refinement cost of 30% and amount of value added 
          Royalty consideration for determining optimal level of beneficiation using a minimum EBIT as 
criterion 
  
       
    
Price: 
Concentrate 
(C+EBIT) 
Price: 
Refined 
product 
(C+Cr+EBIT) 
Cost: 
Refined 
Product 
EBIT Royalty 
Rate 
(Unrefined) 
Royalty 
Rate 
(Refined) 
Desirable 
Royalty 
Rate 
Royalty Value 
Added  
for Cr 
of... 
30 
50 100 80 100 7.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00 20 
71 100 101 60 7.00% 5.00% 7.00% 5.00 -1 
74 100 104 50 6.06% 4.50% 6.06% 4.50 -4 
75 100 105 40 4.94% 3.70% 4.94% 3.70 -5 
76 100 106 30 3.83% 2.90% 3.83% 2.90 -6 
77 100 107 20 2.72% 2.10% 2.72% 2.10 -7 
81 100 111 10 1.61% 1.30% 1.61% 1.30 -11 
100 100 130 0 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50 -30 
 
Expressed graphically as, 
 
Figure 3.3-5: Value-added for refinement cost of 30% 
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From the above, it is observed that significant value is added if refining cost is 10% 
of final price, little value is added when refining cost is 20% of price received but 
negative value is added at refining cost is 30% of price received. It can be drawn that 
if refining costs are above 20% of sales price, adding on refining facility would be of 
detrimental value to the miner. 
 
Furthermore, in terms of varying royalty rate specifications of unrefined and refined 
minerals with price received expressed as a combination of different levels of 
concentrate price plus different targets of profitability plus different level of refining 
costs, it can be observed from figures below that the policy objective of reduced 
royalty for refined minerals would not be beneficial and the use of unrefined royalty 
formula preferred, if proportion of total cost (C + Cr + EBIT) is 90% (and over) of 
price received, when refining cost is 10% of price received (or less).  When refining 
cost is 20% of price received, it can be observed that the policy objective of reduced 
royalty for refined minerals would not be beneficial and the use of unrefined royalty 
formula preferred, if proportion of total cost (C + Cr + EBIT) is 80% (and over) of 
price received. When refining cost is 30% of price received, it can be observed that 
the policy objective of reduced royalty for refined minerals would not be beneficial 
and the use of unrefined royalty formula preferred, if proportion of total cost (C + Cr 
+ EBIT) is less than 70% (and over) of price received.  
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Figure 3.3-6:  Point at which unrefined royalty rate is beneficial, in light of total costs 
and refinement cost of 10% of sales price 
 
 
Figure 3.3-7:  Point at which unrefined royalty rate is beneficial, in light of total costs 
and refinement cost of 20% of sales price  
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Figure 3.3-8:  Point at which unrefined royalty rate is beneficial, in light of total costs 
and refinement cost of 30% of sales price 
 
Comparing SA regime with Bradley’s work on the WA system, the gap available to 
support value-add (Area B depicting royalty savings according to the Cawood model) 
becomes smaller. It also appears quite insignificant when compared to the area A in 
Bradley’s model, as processing costs increase and one moves closer to the 
intersection. Value-added to profitability also reduces as value addition costs go over 
10% of price received, unlike in WA system where this only occurs when costs to 
take concentrate to refined level go over 50% of price received for final product.  
 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, from the initial review of WA system, it was observed that GVRs are 
very inequitable and they also lead to economic inefficiency. Also, as regards de facto 
royalties in the form of processing commitments which were a feature of many of the 
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agreements in WA, from consideration of several case histories, it appeared that the 
significance of these form of royalties was exaggerated and that in practice royalties 
with processing requirements did not greatly afford large gains to the State in 
comparison with revenue from conventional royalties. It was noted that since 
standardization is regarded as a desirable feature of a royalty system and de facto 
royalties were discretionary and required a ‘roll your own’ approach, they could not 
be regarded as preferred instruments of royalty policy. As it appeared, the importance 
of processing obligations was not great enough to warrant their use as a royalty 
instrument.  
 
In conclusion, according to Bradley’s study on the processing provisions of the WA 
system, since the system was not dependent on any profitability component before 
assessment of the royalty payment, if processing cost (e.g. cost needed to take 
concentrate to refined metal) is at most 50% of refined value, the miner-turned-refiner 
would still have significant value added to his project, enough to pay royalty. 
Processing costs over 50% of sales price would yield no significant value added and 
zero motivation for further mineral processing. In SA’s case, according to the model 
by Cawood, if in light of royalty payment, the beneficiation costs (from concentrate 
to final product) was 10% of sales price or less, the value added would be high and 
the miner would be encouraged to become a refiner but as value-addition costs go 
over 10%, the value added diminishes, and from 30% and above, there is no value 
added, therefore, incentive for miners to become refiners is non-existent. From the 
model, it can also be concluded that the small gap between the refined and unrefined 
royalty rates is not sufficiently wide enough to motivate miners who sell raw 
production to become refiners. 
 
Furthermore, in the following chapter, the model developed by Cawood based on 
Bradley’s approach would be applied to real-time data from SA mining operations or 
projects so as to further investigate whether or not the policy intent of motivating 
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mineral producers to add sufficient value to production, so that the sales product meet 
the Royalty Act’s definition for a refined mineral resource, would be achieved.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
 
IMPACT OF MPRRA ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINING INDUSTRY 
AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
From the previous chapters, it has been established that both mineral-rich States and 
mining companies are in the business of mineral development to earn economic 
returns. For the State, economic returns earned serve as compensation for exploiting 
the State’s patrimony and for funding its provision of socio-economic benefits to its 
citizens. For the mining companies, sufficient economic returns are required in order 
to compensate and justify the significant amounts of capital that they have invested in 
the risky mining business, as well as for maximizing shareholders’ wealth, attracting 
investors and sustenance of their market positions. These economic returns have been 
captured over time by States through the use of various mining fiscal instruments, 
which have been listed briefly in chapter one. As highlighted in previous chapters, the 
focus of this report has been on viewing the impact of fiscal (royalty) instruments 
from the perspective of the mining companies, in terms of compensating their 
investment risks as well as assessing the impact of the policy’s mineral beneficiation 
objectives on their business’ profitability. 
 
Mining companies view these fiscal instruments as placing additional cost burdens on 
the substantial amount of costs incurred in mineral recovery, which reduces their 
profit margins to a great extent. Therefore, it has been a major challenge for 
governments to devise appropriate taxation systems that will balance both 
government and company expectations from mineral development (wealth). 
Governments have had to take caution to ensure that the revenue-generation objective 
of the fiscal policy environment they provide also satisfies investors’ objectives. They 
have had to work progressively to see that their policies allow sufficient funds to flow 
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to investors, thereby, preventing investors from leaving their countries for other more 
attractive investor-friendly jurisdictions as well as attracting more investment. The 
progressive creation of favourable mineral investment climates would prevent the 
underdevelopment of their mineral resources.   
 
From the foregoing, a royalty instrument which provides that developers undertaking 
further mineral processing will pay a lower royalty rate than developers that extract 
minerals only, must significantly encourage this investment decision. The magnitude 
of the financial benefit that would be added by this incentive to the developer’s 
profitability must be substantial enough to justify the sizeable amount of invested 
capital and operating costs that would be used-up with adding-on beneficiation 
facilities. 
 
A few examples of mineral-rich countries whose royalty instruments contain 
beneficiation provisions were looked at in chapter one, and in chapter three, the WA 
example was chosen to establish the methodology for assessing whether the 
beneficiation objective of the SA’s new royalty regime will be achieved. This 
methodology was based on the work done by Cawood (2011), which was abstracted 
from Bradley’s conclusions and recommendations as regards the mineral processing 
provisions of WA’s royalty system.  
 
This chapter seeks to briefly highlight the effect that the imposition of the MPRRA 
would have on the South African mining industry and its contribution to the 
economy. The platinum sub-sector is identified as a suitable case study for the 
purpose of assessing if the MPRRA will sufficiently motivate miners to become 
refiners. 
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4.2 THE MPRRA AND SOUTH AFRICAN MINING INDUSTRY 
 
Advancements in urbanization and industrialization have resulted in constantly 
changing economic and technical global trends and concerns such as increasing 
competition for investment funds, increased call for sustainable development, 
diminishing purchasing power of raw mineral producing countries as terms of trade 
for raw mineral exports have reduced as compared with manufactured goods etc. 
With these evolving trends, countries have had to frequently review their mineral 
investment (fiscal) policies and legislations so as to ameliorate these concerns and 
still remain fair and equitable to all affected parties (stakeholders). With the 
momentous contribution that the mining industry makes to the country, South Africa's 
mining fiscal policies have not been left out in these review exercises. These policies 
have been made to continually adapt to changing local and international world 
conditions. Developing fair and equitable policies which address the above concerns 
coupled with the different objectives of both government and companies from 
mineral rent, has proved to be a major challenge and has always called for a great 
deal of wisdom.  
 
As regards royalty policy instruments, when royalties are charged, the claim is made 
on a portion of resource value (Bradley, 1986) and even though mining companies 
are comfortable with paying mineral royalties, they view its impact on the amount of 
net resource value (profitability) accruing to them with scepticism. Mining companies 
want their projects to be able to afford the royalty payments but as they are in 
business to maximize their return, they are more concerned with the returns after 
deduction of royalties.  Therefore, from the developer’s point of view, an inequitable 
royalty policy which jeopardizes a project economically because of the higher pay-
limit can result in the choice of a development plan which differs from the optimal 
one.  The new development plan (encouraging selective mining of higher grade ore 
only) will maximize net returns after royalties to the developer, but will lead to a 
reduction in the net resource value that will be available to be shared between the 
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developer and the State who levied the royalty (Bradley, 1986). With the failure to 
develop resources in the manner that will realize their full net value and reduction in 
the size of net resource value below what it would have been in the absence of the 
royalty, this would lead to an inefficient royalty system which invariably results in a 
loss to the economy. 
 
Although, the idea of a perfectly efficient or non-distorting royalty system is 
unattainable, the development of the MPRRA, took an extensive process of 
consultation and debate so that the efficiency criterion might be addressed 
adequately. The provisions of the royalty regime seem to be workable and fair, while 
at the same time causing only minimal distortions. This implies that royalty payments 
would not cause developers to change investment decisions or operators to alter 
production plans. According to the statistics provided by Statistics South Africa (Stats 
SA), when the new royalty regime was built into the financial data of previous years, 
it was found that the mineral sector would become even more important to the 
national economy, with a close to 8% rise in mining’s contribution to company taxes.  
 
 
Figure 4.2-1:  Impact of the new royalty on mining taxes. Source: Stats SA in 
Cawood (2011) 
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From the Figure 4.2-1, with the new royalty regime for unrefined minerals being 
fabricated into the historical data-set, as regards contribution to State revenue, it can 
be observed that the gap between the chain and broken lines shows that refiners 
contribute lesser than miners to fiscus. Also, this gap shows that when minerals are 
not beneficiated to the levels stipulated in the Royalty Act, the producer would be 
penalized (Cawood, 2011). However, in light of the work carried out by Cawood, 
from the miner’s perspective, this ‘penalty’ would only be worth avoiding by adding 
on beneficiation facilities, if its beneficiation cost is less than or equal to 10% of sales 
price, or slightly over 10%. See Figures 4.2-2 and 4.2-3: 
 
 
Figure 4.2- 2: Value-added for refinement cost of 10%. Adapted from Cawood (2011) 
 
Value added 
91 
 
 
Figure 4.2- 3: Value-added for refinement cost of 20%. Adapted from Cawood (2011) 
 
As mentioned in chapter three, based on the work carried out by Cawood (2011), the 
gap between the refined and unrefined royalty rates is not sufficiently wide enough to 
encourage miners who sell raw production to become refiners. 
 
Furthermore, from the view of all South African mineral producers, the new SA 
mining royalty, which became effective from March 2010, has been pointed to as 
adding a significant additional cost to the mining sector (PWC, 2010). Figure 4.2-2 
below was used to substantiate this and to determine the potential impact of the 
royalty regime on the profitability of mining companies, by comparing the actual 
profitability of mining companies (solid line) with the results obtained when the 
royalty regime using the unrefined royalty formula, was factored into the cash flow of 
past years (broken line). The gap showed that the new royalty regime would have a 
downward effect on profitability of about 2% (Cawood, 2011).  
 
Value added 
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Figure 4.2- 4:  Potential impact of the Royalty Act on mining industry profitability. 
Source: Stats SA in Cawood (2011) 
 
 
4.3 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE USE OF PLATINUM INDUSTRY 
 
The total amount of revenue and de facto (job creation, infrastructure, mineral 
processing, and foreign exchange earnings) benefits collected by the government 
from mining operations as well as the amount of capital employed in mining indicate 
the importance of the industry in the economy. 
 
As widely known, South Africa is well-endowed with an abundance of mineral 
resources which accounted for a significant proportion of both world production and 
reserves and the mineral resources remain the cornerstone of the South African 
economy. As at 2010, the South African mining sector contributed about 9.6% to 
total GDP, 15.3% to South Africa's total export revenue (Topf, 2012) and accounts 
for 18% (9% direct) of investment (Baxter, 2011). See Table 4.3-1: 
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Source: PWC (2010) 
 
From the Table 4.3-1, it is apparent that the mining industry is a major contributor to 
South Africa’s wealth. In terms of government revenue, the total tax contribution 
survey carried out by PWC in 2010, showed the noteworthy contribution that the 
mining industry contributes to the fiscus. For determination of the order of 
importance of fiscal contributions made by mining companies to State revenue, a cash 
flow analysis of the government’s share of rents was carried out by Cawood and 
Minnitt in 2001. It was found that the Corporate Income Tax stood as the most 
important contributor, the second most important minerals tax instrument was the 
Mineral royalty (even though royalty payments to the State were not mandatory in 
South Africa as at that time). The remainder of the host country’s share of mineral 
rent was made up of minor taxes, fees and other levies that have ‘nuisance’ value 
(Cawood and Minnitt, 2001). As at 2010, on average, it was observed that mining 
companies contributed an amount equivalent to 9.45% (2009: 8.1%) of their turnover 
to government of which corporate income tax make up about 79% (2009: 48%) of all 
Table 4.3- 1: Mining sector's contribution to the South African economy 
 Year  2010  Year 2009 
% of GDP 5% 6% 
% of total corporation tax 
income to SARS 
8% 13% 
Number of people employed in 
industry 
503,000 488,000 
Average monthly earnings in 
industry 
R12,618 R12,035 
Average monthly earnings 
across all industries 
R11,825 R11,020 
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taxes and contributions borne by them (PWC, 2010). Also, according to the Chamber 
of Mines of South Africa, in 2009, the industry contributed between 10% and 20% of 
direct corporate tax receipts (together worth R10.5-billion). 
 
Historically, gold lay as the biggest revenue-generating commodity in SA but from 
2005, coal and platinum group metals (PGMs) overtook gold’s position. In 2010, 
PGMs retained the top spot as the biggest revenue generator, followed by coal, which 
was as a result of better price recovery for PGMs.  
 
 
Figure 4.3-1:  Percentage mining revenue per commodity as at June 2010. Source: 
Stats SA in PWC (2010) 
 
In Figures 4.3-1 and 4.3-2, according to PWC (2010), the relative breakdown of 
mining revenues, excluding other non-metallic ores for the 12 months to June 2010, 
is as follows:  
•  PGMs: R64.9 billion (2009: R68.9 billion)  
•  Coal: R60.3 billion (2009: R68.6 billion)  
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•  Gold: R48.8 billion (2009: R47.9 billion)  
•  Iron ore: R31.6 billion (2009: R27.6 billion) 
• Other metallic minerals (including manganese, copper and nickel): R28.0 
billion (2009: R29.1 billion) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3-2: Annual mining revenue to June 2010. Source: Stats SA in PWC (2010) 
 
As mentioned previously, the MPRRA came into force in March 2010, but in 2009, 
Stats SA carried out an exercise whereby the new royalty regime was built into the 
2009 mining industry financial data. This exercise was done to determine which 
mining sub-sector would contribute the most to the collection of mineral royalties, 
assuming the MPRRA was in force as at that year. It was observed that coal would 
have been the biggest contributor (28%), followed by PGMs (25%), manganese 
(11%). See Figure 4.3-3 below: 
96 
 
 
Figure 4.3-3: Royalty Contribution per commodity. Source: Stats SA (2009) in 
Cawood (2011) 
 
However, for the purpose of this paper which mainly focuses on the beneficiation 
(refining) provision of SA’s royalty regime, the second highest contributor to the 
royalty pool – PGMs – was settled for instead of coal. This is due to the fact that 
Platinum (PGMs) is termed a dual schedule material (i.e. it can be either processed to 
refined condition of 99.9% purity and above or unrefined conditions of less than 
99.9%) unlike coal which is classified as an unrefined mineral resource according to 
the specifications of the Schedules in the MPRRA.  
 
4.3.1 Brief overview of PGMs 
 
Platinum group metals (PGMs) are valuable assets due to the scarcity of their 
availability, functionalities and high economic value. They are used for various 
luxury, fashion and industrial purposes such as – alloying agents for various metal 
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products including fine wires, production of white gold, non-corrosive laboratory 
containers, medical instruments, jewellery, dental equipment, electrical contacts, and 
thermocouples, catalytic converters for the automotive industry. (Precious Metal 
Investment.com, 2006). They are also all equally attractive investment vehicles 
because of the speculative profit opportunities they afford (Gold Trends Bullion 
Exchange, 2009). Also, in times of global economic uncertainty, they are considered 
as ‘storers’ of value that represent attractive means of investment security. The ever-
increasing demand for each of the PGMs varies widely. The members of the PGM 
family include (but not exhaustive) – platinum, rhodium, palladium – and some of its 
by products are gold, copper, nickel, cobalt. 
 
South Africa possesses a vast and competitive Platinum resource base, as South 
Africa is known to hold the biggest platinum deposits in the world, having its main 
platinum field in the Bushveld Igneous Complex.  
 
Mining of PGMs is carried out through conventional underground or open-pit 
operations, in various stages- extraction, grinding, gravity-based separation, flotation 
concentration, smelting and refining. As stated by Mudd and Glaister (2009), “the ore 
grade for PGM mineralization is similar to gold, at grams per tonne (g/t), but the 
processing is more analogous to base metals (at percent)”. 
 
In the mining stage, a grinding and milling process results in a liquid mix from which 
a concentrate is extracted, dried through the flotation concentration stage, smelted 
into PGM-rich matte as well as separated from other by-products. The final refining 
stage uses standard electrolyte techniques followed by separation and purification to 
produce refined PGMs (Stillwater Palladium, 2008).  
 
The substantial amount of process stages involved in recovery of PGMs indicates that 
large amounts of capital is required to fund PGM mining projects. This therefore 
informs the thorough analysis of the impact of the MPRRA on profitability, to 
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ascertain if it would be worthwhile to invest more capital to move production to 
refining stage. 
 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, the mining industry was shown as a very significant contributor to 
South Africa’s wealth. It was also indicated that with the imposition of the MPRRA, 
the industry would add yet more substantial value to the economy over and above the 
government’s receipts from income and other taxes from mining companies. 
Furthermore, the PGM sector, which comprises of the metals of the future – platinum, 
rhodium, and palladium, was identified as the biggest contributor to government 
revenue in terms of taxes and other contributions, and second biggest contributor in 
terms of the collection of mineral royalties. 
 
Therefore, the PGM sector was established as the focus of the economic analysis of 
this project, not only because of its significant position in order of contribution to 
government receipts but most importantly, because of its dual state of either unrefined 
(concentrate) or refined product. However, in this chapter, it was also demonstrated 
that miners are not likely to become refiners when refinement costs are more than 
20% of the total sales price. 
  
In the next chapter, real-time data of beneficiation cost (as percentages of sales price) 
and profitability ratios of a platinum company would be used to ascertain whether on 
addition of further mineral processing expenditures, the amount of value added to 
miners is sufficient enough to inspire their upgrade to becoming refiners. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF PLATINUM CASE STUDY  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapters, it was established that mineral-rich countries using their 
mineral fiscal policies to motivate the set-up of value-addition facilities, is 
appropriate. Therefore, South Africa’s use of the MPRRA to support its beneficiation 
strategy is based on a sound principle. 
 
In chapter four, it was shown that the South African mining industry contributes 
substantially to the South African economy and with the imposition of the MPRRA, 
its importance to the economy would be yet greater. Furthermore, in that chapter after 
analysis of which mining sub-sectors would contribute the highest amounts of 
revenue to the government in terms of the MPRRA, coal and PGM sectors were 
identified as first and second, respectively.  
 
However, for the purpose of this project’s assessment of MPRRA’s refining 
objectives, the PGM sector was settled for. This is based on the fact that PGMs can 
be termed as dual schedule materials. This means that PGMs can be processed either 
to refined condition of 99.9% purity and above or unrefined conditions of less than 
99.9%) unlike coal which is classified as an unrefined mineral resource according to 
the specifications of the Schedules in the MPRRA.  
 
Having established the PGM sector as the focus of the econometric analysis of this 
project, this chapter proceeds to apply the methodology of this report to real-time data 
of beneficiation cost (as percentages of sales price) and profitability ratios from a 
platinum company. This analysis was carried out so as to ascertain whether on 
addition of further mineral processing expenditures, the amount of value added to 
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financial position of miners is sufficient enough to inspire their upgrade to becoming 
refiners.  
 
The platinum company used was Anglo American Platinum Limited, hereinafter 
called “Amplats”. This company was chosen because of its dominant position in the 
platinum mining industry, the quality of mining and refining operations it carries out, 
and it reports adequate information in sufficient detail.  
 
 
5.2 OVERVIEW OF THE OPERATIONS OF ANGLO AMERICAN 
PLATINUM LIMITED  
 
Anglo American Platinum Limited (formerly known as Anglo Platinum Limited) 
stands in the number one position among the world’s primary producers of platinum 
(PGM). In 2009, its market share of global newly mined platinum was about 40% 
(Amplats, 2010). Amplats is a global mining company which possesses South 
African roots and owns a significant PGM asset base in the South African Bushveld 
Igneous Complex. It owns and operates various mines and concentrators, as well as 
three Smelters, a Base Metals Refinery and a Precious Metals Refinery in South 
Africa. On some of its operations, it is engaged in several joint ventures with 
companies like Anooraq Resources Corporation, Aquarius Platinum Limited. 
 
It extracts PGMs from Plat reef, Merensky and UG2 reefs. As stated by Jacobs 
(2006), its process route is as follows: 
a. Ore from mining operations is transferred to its concentrators, where it is 
crushed, milled and separated by sulphide flotation, so that the base metals 
sulphides and associated platinum group (PGM) content are concentrated; 
b. Concentrate is transported to any of the three smelters for drying and smelting 
in electric furnaces, for the production of furnace matte;  
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c. Furnace matte from electric furnaces is sent to the Anglo Converting Process 
(ACP) at Waterval Smelter Complex for removal of excess iron sulphide; and  
d. The resultant converter matte product is bottom cast, slow-cooled, crushed and 
sent to the Magnetic Concentration Plant (MCP) at the Rustenburg Base Metals 
Refinery (RBMR). Here, the remaining part consisting magnetic PGM is 
removed and sent to Precious Metals Refinery (PMR). At the PMR, the PGMs 
are separated and refined to produce pure metals, while the remaining material 
is treated at the RBMR for the recovery of by-products – nickel, copper and 
cobalt. The PMR currently produces platinum at better than 99.99% pure. 
 
 
5.3 DATA USED  
 
Due to the fact that Amplats has both mining and refining operations unlike almost all 
other platinum companies in South Africa, it is suitable for the assessment required in 
this report. The data used in this report is based on publicly available information – 
mainly Amplats annual reports (2010, 2008 and 2007). The company’s capacity to 
provide quality information is hereby well acknowledged.  
 
Additional data on metal in concentrate prices received at Kroondal and Marikana 
mines were taken from Aquarius annual reports. As mentioned earlier, Aquarius is 
one of the companies in joint venture agreement with Amplats. Aquarius entered into 
Pooling and Sharing Agreements – (P&SA1) and (P&SA2) – with Amplats for 
mining operations at Kroondal and Marikana Mines, respectively. The Kroondal 
(P&SA1) agreement was instituted in 2003, while the Marikana (P&SA2) was 
instituted in 2005. The companies combine their assets for joint exploration of 
resources and use of infrastructure so that the resulting production Amplats’ and 
financial outcomes are split on a 50:50 basis (Aquarius Platinum Limited, 2006). 
Amplats smelts, refines and markets its share of the metal in concentrate which are 
produced at these two mines. 
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5.3.1  General Assumptions 
 
 This project’s analysis aimed at checking the impact of imputing the MPRR 
regime into historical financial data of years before the Act came into force i.e. 
from 2009 backwards, so as to postulate future behaviour of the industry. 
However, even though the Act became effective from March 2010, financial 
data of 2010 was added in this analysis because it was not clearly stated in the 
2010 annual reports if royalty payments had already been factored into quoted 
figures;  
 
 According to Cawood (2010), “EBIT is defined in the Act as gross sales after 
adding recoupments under the Income Tax Act (ITA) minus capital expenditure 
minus operating expenditure…EBIT closely resembles net profit and/or profit 
before tax definitions….inclusions into capital for purpose of the royalty 
calculation are the usual 100% mining capital expensing rule….”. Capital 
expenditure is included so as to have the effect of reducing royalty payable;  
 
However, in calculating EBIT for this analysis in progressive sections, the 
Capital expenditures (Capex) in the ‘Base case’ were excluded, due to the fact 
that information concerning initial project capital which could have been 
redeemed was not accessible as at time of analysis. Also, based on the work 
done by Cawood (2011), in terms of obtaining proportion of refinement costs of 
the Sales price received for refined product, the effect of only operational costs 
on EBIT (for royalty calculation) seemed to suffice, as any additional costs – 
Capex – would only amplify the situation (proportion of refining costs); and 
 
 Another general assumption is that the analysis carried out in this report 
supposes that with all things being equal, a producer (miner) can decide on 
becoming a refiner or not, with reference to the results and findings of this 
research. It also supposes that the producer is not risk-averse and that the global 
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economic factors and market dynamics remain the same as in the years used for 
the assessment in this report. 
 
 
5.4 GROUP ANALYSIS – REFINED PGM PRODUCTION 
 
5.4.1  Discussions 
 
Table 5.4-1: Group Analysis- Refined PGM production (Base case) 
 
Source: See Appendix 1A 
 
In the Table 5.4-1,   
 Gross revenue used was as taken from Amplats annual reports;  
Units 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Gross revenue R 39 356 000 000           46 961 000 000           51 118 000 000       36 947 000 000           46 352 000 000           
Mining costs R 12 983 000 000           16 125 000 000           20 243 000 000       19 543 000 000           19 919 000 000           
Purchased metals R 3 947 000 000             5 539 000 000             8 999 000 000         6 689 000 000             9 215 000 000             
Smelting costs R 1 238 000 000             1 314 000 000             1 625 000 000         1 881 000 000             1 846 000 000             
Treatment and Refining costs R 915 000 000                1 047 000 000             1 151 000 000         1 460 000 000             1 467 000 000             
EBIT before Royalty R 20 273 000 000           22 936 000 000           19 100 000 000       7 374 000 000             13 905 000 000           
EBIT/Revenue before
Royalty % 51.51% 48.84% 37.36% 19.96% 30.00%
Refined Royalty Rate % 4.62                             4.41                             3.49                         2.10                             2.90                             
Royalty paid R 1 818 620 000             2 069 685 000             1 783 590 000         774 655 000                1 344 160 000             
EBIT after Royalty R 18 454 380 000           20 866 315 000           17 316 410 000       6 599 345 000             12 560 840 000           
EBIT/Revenue after
Royalty % 46.89% 44.43% 33.88% 17.86% 27.10%
ANGLO AMERICAN PLATINUM (Group analysis- Refined PGM) Base case
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 Operating costs that were attributed to refined PGM and deducted from gross 
revenue to give ‘EBIT before royalty’ include: mining costs, purchased metals, 
smelting costs and treatment and refining costs; and 
 For the purpose of calculating proportion (or percentage) of refinement cost of 
sales price received for refined product based on the work done by Cawood 
(2011), the costs used which were directly attributed to the refining operation 
include purchased metals, smelting costs and treatment and refining costs. 
 
5.4.2 Data processing and analysis 
 
Table 5.4-2:  Calculations for EBIT, EBIT/Revenue (Profitability) before and after 
royalty, and royalty payment for Refined PGM production 
 
Source: See Appendix 1B 
 
For the purpose of detailed analysis, the calculations in this table were split-up and 
grouped as EBIT before and after royalty payment; and Profitability before and after 
royalty payment.  
 
 
 
(R) Units 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EBIT before Royalty (Refined) R 20 273 000 000           22 936 000 000           19 100 000 000       7 374 000 000             13 905 000 000           
EBIT/Revenue before 
Royalty (Refined) % 51.51% 48.84% 37.36% 19.96% 30.00%
Refined Royalty Rate % 4.62                             4.41                             3.49                         2.10                             2.90                             
Royalty paid (Refined) R 1 818 620 000             2 069 685 000             1 783 590 000         774 655 000                1 344 160 000             
EBIT after Royalty (Refined) R 18 454 380 000           20 866 315 000           17 316 410 000       6 599 345 000             12 560 840 000           
EBIT/Revenue after
Royalty (Refined) % 46.89% 44.43% 33.88% 17.86% 27.10%
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5.4.2.1 EBIT and Profitability before and after royalty analysis  
 
 
Table 5.4- 3: EBIT before and after royalty payment for Refined PGM production 
 
 
Expressed graphically as, 
 
Figure 5.4-1: EBIT before and after royalty payment for Refined PGM production 
 
Table 5.4-4:  EBIT/Revenue (Profitability) before and after royalty payment for 
Refined PGM production 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EBIT (Refined) before royalty - 
EBIT (Refined) after royalty R 1 818 620 000             2 069 685 000             1 783 590 000         774 655 000                1 344 160 000             
 -
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Expressed graphically as, 
 
Figure 5.4-2: Profitability before and after royalty payment for Refined PGM 
production 
 
Comments: 
Under the MPRRA, the calculation of the royalty rate is achieved based on varying 
profitability levels of the mines for each mineral product transferred. As observed 
from the results above, the magnitude of royalty rate (which reduced EBITs) flowed 
in tandem with the high or low magnitude of profits received in that year. In years 
2006 to 2008, which had good profits, the royalty rates were high, but in year 2009 
with depressed profit, the royalty rate was very low. In the Figures 5.4-1 and 5.4-2, it 
can also be observed that the gap between EBITs before and after the royalty 
payments, as well as the gap between profitability before and after the royalty 
payments, was greater in the good profit years but decreasingly diminished with 
movements into the year with bad profit. 
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5.5 GROUP ANALYSIS – UNREFINED PGM PRODUCTION 
 
5.5.1  Discussions 
 
Table 5.5-1: Group Analysis – Unrefined PGM production (Base case) 
 
Source: See Appendix 2A 
 
In the Table 5.5-1, 
 Total metal in concentrate production (recovered metal ounces) used, was 
calculated based on information given on Tonnes milled, Average Head grade 
stated in the Amplats annual reports and assumed recovery value of 98%, as the 
exact values of “Anglo Platinum Limited’s standard smelting and refining 
recoveries” could not be accessed;  
Units 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Tonnes milled t 43 792 000                  41 563 000                  42 611 000              43 114 000                  42 242 000                  
Head grade g/t 3.81                             3.63                             3.36                         3.31                             3.23                             
recovery 98% 98% 98% 98% 98%
Recovered metal g 163 510 570                147 856 216                140 309 501            139 853 193                133 712 827                
Metal in concentrate 
(Recovered metal) oz 5 257 000                    4 753 699                    4 511 066                4 496 396                    4 298 978                    
Prices received (sheet3) R/oz 7 114                           9 200                           12 863                     6 211                           8 689                           
Gross revenue R 37 398 297 039           43 734 035 155           58 025 846 332       27 927 113 530           37 353 818 298           
Mining costs R 12 983 000 000           16 125 000 000           20 243 000 000       19 543 000 000           19 919 000 000           
EBIT before Royalty R 24 415 297 039           27 609 035 155           37 782 846 332       8 384 113 530             17 434 818 298           
EBIT/Revenue before
Royalty % 65.28% 63.13% 65.11% 30.02% 46.67%
Unrefined Royalty Rate % 7.00                             7.00                             7.00                         3.84                             5.69                             
Royalty paid R 2 617 880 793             3 061 382 461             4 061 809 243         1 071 203 738             2 123 971 125             
EBIT after Royalty R 21 797 416 247           24 547 652 694           33 721 037 088       7 312 909 792             15 310 847 174           
EBIT/Revenue after
Royalty % 58.28% 56.13% 58.11% 26.19% 40.99%
ANGLO AMERICAN PLATINUM (Group analysis- Unrefined PGM) Base case
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 Prices for metal in concentrate that was used were drawn from calculated 
averages of prices received from Kroondal and Marikana mines, which are in 
JV agreements with Amplats. The prices received for metal in concentrate from 
these two mines, were calculated using a ‘base case’ approach as opposed to the 
“prices received per PGM ounce” stated in Aquarius annual reports (2010, 
2009, 2007 and 2006). In the base case approach, each mine’s attributable 
revenue for each mine per year was divided by its attributable metal in 
concentrate production per year, see Appendix 2B. This assumption was used 
knowing that Aquarius and Anglo are in joint venture operations at these two 
mines and Aquarius might not sell concentrates to Amplats at market (fair 
value) price;  
 Operating costs that were attributed to mining and deducted from gross revenue 
to give ‘EBIT before royalty’ include mining costs only; and 
 For the purpose of calculating proportion of mining costs of price received for 
refined product based on the work done by Cawood (2011), ‘mining costs’ only 
was used as being directly attributed to the mining operation. 
 
5.5.2  Data processing and analysis 
 
Table 5.5-2:  Calculations for EBIT, EBIT/Revenue (Profitability) before and after 
royalty, and royalty payment for Unrefined PGM production 
 
Source: See Appendix 2C 
(U) Units 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EBIT before Royalty (Unrefined) R 24 415 297 039           27 609 035 155           37 782 846 332       8 384 113 530             17 434 818 298           
EBIT/Revenue before
Royalty (Unrefined) % 65.28% 63.13% 65.11% 30.02% 46.67%
Unrefined Royalty Rate % 7.00                             7.00                             7.00                         3.84                             5.69                             
Royalty paid (Unrefined) R 2 617 880 793             3 061 382 461             4 061 809 243         1 071 203 738             2 123 971 125             
EBIT after Royalty (Unrefined) R 21 797 416 247           24 547 652 694           33 721 037 088       7 312 909 792             15 310 847 174           
EBIT/Revenue after
Royalty (Unrefined) % 58.28% 56.13% 58.11% 26.19% 40.99%
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For the purpose of detailed analysis, the calculations in this table were split-up and 
grouped as EBIT before and after royalty payment; and Profitability before and after 
royalty payment. 
 
5.5.2.1 EBIT and Profitability before and after royalty analysis 
 
Table 5.5-3: EBIT before and after royalty payment for Unrefined PGM production 
 
 
Expressed graphically as, 
 
Figure 5.5-1: EBIT before and after royalty payment for Unrefined PGM production 
 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EBIT (Unrefined) Before Royalty - 
EBIT (Unrefined) after Royalty R 2 617 880 793             3 061 382 461             4 061 809 243         1 071 203 738             2 123 971 125             
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Table 5.5-4: EBIT/Revenue (Profitability) before and after royalty payment for 
Unrefined PGM production 
 
 
Expressed graphically as, 
 
Figure 5.5-2: Profitability before and after royalty payment for Unrefined PGM 
production 
 
Comments: 
As mentioned earlier, under the MPRRA, the calculation of the royalty rate is 
achieved based on varying profitability levels of the mines for each mineral product 
transferred. As observed from the results above, the magnitude of royalty rate (which 
reduced EBITs) varied in accordance with high or low magnitude of profits received 
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Profitability (Unefined) before royalty 
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in that year. In years 2006 to 2008, which had very good profits, the maximum 
royalty rate for unrefined minerals of 7% was charged in those years, but in year 2009 
with very depressed profit, the royalty rate was very low. The year 2010, in which 
profit improved greatly as compared with 2009 results, a high royalty rate was 
charged. In the Figures 5.5-1 and 5.5-2, it can also be observed that the gap between 
EBITs before and after the royalty payments, as well as the gap between Profitability 
before and after the royalty payments, was greater in the good profit years but 
decreasingly diminished with movements into the year with bad profit. 
 
 
5.6 THE CASE FOR REFINEMENT: COMPARISON BETWEEN REFINED 
AND UNREFINED PGM PRODUCTION 
 
5.6.1 Data processing and analysis 
 
Table 5.6-1:  Comparing EBITs, Profitability and royalty savings for Refined and 
Unrefined PGM production 
 
Source: See Appendix 3 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EBIT before Royalty: (U) - (R) R 4 142 297 039             4 673 035 155             18 682 846 332       1 010 113 530             3 529 818 298             
Profitability before Royalty: 
(U) - (R) % 13.77% 14.29% 27.75% 10.06% 16.68%
Royalty payment savings: 
(U) - (R) R 799 260 793                991 697 461                2 278 219 243         296 548 738                779 811 125                
EBIT after Royalty: (U) - (R) R 3 343 036 247             3 681 337 694             16 404 627 088       713 564 792                2 750 007 174             
Profitability after Royalty: 
(U) - (R) % 11.39% 11.70% 24.24% 8.32% 13.89%
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The comparative (Unrefined vs. Refined PGM production) calculations in this table 
are split-up and grouped for the purpose of detailed evaluation as “Before Royalty”, 
“After Royalty”, and “Royalty savings” analysis.  
  
5.6.2 “Before Royalty” analysis – EBIT and Profitability before royalty 
 
 
Figure 5.6-1: EBIT before royalty for both Refined and Unrefined PGM production 
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Figure 5.6-2: EBIT/Revenue (Profitability) before royalty for both Refined and 
Unrefined PGM production 
 
For 2010: 
 EBIT before royalty 
Refined:  R 13,905,000,000 
Unrefined:  R 17,434,818,298 
Difference: 
 
 Profitability before royalty 
Refined:  30.00% 
Unrefined: 46.67% 
Difference:  
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EBIT before Royalty: (U) - (R) R 3 529 818 298             
Profitability before Royalty: 
(U) - (R) % 16.68%
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Comments: 
From observing the differences in EBITs and Profitability before royalty 
payments, it can be drawn that in this year, even though the company made 
significant profits on sale of refined products, it would have been more 
profitable for the company to sell concentrates as opposed to refined products. 
 
For 2009: 
 EBIT before royalty 
Refined:  R 7,374,000,000 
Unrefined:  R 8,384,113,530 
Difference:  
 
 Profitability before royalty 
Refined:  19.96% 
Unrefined: 30.02% 
Difference:  
 
Comments: 
From observing the differences in EBITs and Profitability before royalty 
payments, it can be drawn that in this year, even though the company made 
significant profits on sale of refined products, it would have been more 
profitable for the company to sell concentrates as opposed to refined products. 
 
For 2008: 
 EBIT before royalty 
Refined:  R 19,100,000,000 
Unrefined:  R 37,782,846,332 
Difference:  
 
EBIT before Royalty: (U) - (R) R 1 010 113 530             
Profitability before Royalty: 
(U) - (R) % 10.06%
EBIT before Royalty: (U) - (R) R 18 682 846 332           
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 Profitability before royalty 
Refined:  37.36% 
Unrefined: 65.11% 
Difference:  
 
Comments: 
From observing the differences in EBITs and Profitability before royalty 
payments, it can be drawn that in this year, even though the company made 
significant profits on sale of refined products, it would have been more 
profitable for the company to sell concentrates as opposed to refined products. 
 
For 2007: 
 EBIT before royalty 
Refined:  R 22,936,000,000 
Unrefined:  R 27,609,035,155 
Difference:  
 
 Profitability before royalty 
Refined:  48.84% 
Unrefined: 63.13% 
Difference:  
 
Comments: 
From observing the differences in EBITs and Profitability before royalty 
payments, it can be drawn that in this year, even though the company made 
significant profits on sale of refined products, it would have been more 
profitable for the company to sell concentrates as opposed to refined products. 
 
Profitability before Royalty: 
(U) - (R) % 27.75%
EBIT before Royalty: (U) - (R) R 4 673 035 155             
Profitability before Royalty: 
(U) - (R) % 14.29%
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For 2006: 
 EBIT before royalty 
Refined:  R 20,273,000,000 
Unrefined:  R 24,415,297,039 
Difference:  
 
 Profitability before royalty 
Refined:  51.51% 
Unrefined: 65.28% 
Difference:  
 
Comments: 
From observing the differences in EBITs and Profitability before and after 
royalty payments, it can be drawn that in this year, even though the company 
made significant profits on sale of refined products, it would have been more 
profitable for the company to sell concentrates as opposed to refined products. 
 
5.6.3 “After Royalty” Analysis 
 
5.6.3.1 EBIT after royalty analysis 
 
Table 5.6- 2:  Difference between EBIT after royalty of Refined and Unrefined PGM 
production 
 
 
Expressed graphically as, 
EBIT before Royalty: (U) - (R) R 4 142 297 039             
Profitability before Royalty: 
(U) - (R) % 13.77%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EBIT after Royalty: (U) - (R) R 3 343 036 247             3 681 337 694             16 404 627 088       713 564 792                2 750 007 174             
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Figure 5.6-3: EBIT after royalty for both Refined and Unrefined PGM production 
 
Comments: 
In the years from 2006 to 2010, even after royalty payments, the EBIT after royalty 
payments (Unrefined) was on the average largely greater than EBIT after royalty 
payments (refined). This indicates that even with the incentive provisions of the 
MPRRA, it was more profitable for the company to sell only concentrates.  
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5.6.3.2 Profitability after royalty Analysis 
 
Figure 5.6-4:  Profitability after royalty for both Refined and Unrefined PGM 
production 
 
 
Figure 5.6-5:  Profitability before and after royalty for both Refined and Unrefined 
PGM production 
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For 2010: 
 Profitability after royalty 
Refined:  27.10% 
Unrefined: 40.99% 
Difference: 
 
Comments: 
As observed, when comparing the profitability after royalty payments of both 
refined and unrefined, it can be drawn that in this year, even after royalty 
payments, it is more profitable for the company to sell concentrates as opposed 
to refined products.  
 
Figure 5.6-5 shows the effect of royalty payment on profitability (refined) and 
profitability (unrefined)’, being represented as the difference between 
profitability before and after royalty payment. Comparing the behaviour of both 
production plans, it however suggests that unrefined production pays a higher 
penalty for royalty payment. This is indicated by profitability difference for 
unrefined production, which was 5.69% as compared to that of refined 
production, which was 2.90%. 
 
For 2009: 
 Profitability after Royalty 
Refined:  17.86% 
Unrefined: 26.19% 
Difference: 
 
  
 
Profitability after Royalty: 
(U) - (R) % 13.89%
Profitability after Royalty: 
(U) - (R) % 8.32%
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 Comments: 
 As observed, when comparing the profitability after royalty payments of both 
refined and unrefined, it can be drawn that in this year, even after royalty 
payments, it is more profitable for the company to sell concentrates as opposed 
to refined products.  
 
Figure 5.6-5 shows the effect of royalty payment on profitability (refined) and 
profitability (unrefined), being represented as the difference between 
profitability before and after royalty payment. Comparing the behaviour of both 
production plans, it however suggests that unrefined production pays a higher 
penalty for royalty payment. This is indicated by profitability difference for 
unrefined production, which was 3.84% as compared to that of refined 
production, which was 2.10%. 
 
For 2008: 
 Profitability after Royalty 
Refined:  33.88% 
Unrefined: 58.11% 
Difference: 
 
Comments: 
As observed, when comparing the profitability after royalty payments of both 
refined and unrefined, it can be drawn that in this year, even after royalty 
payments, it is more profitable for the company to sell concentrates as opposed 
to refined products.  
 
Figure 5.6-5 shows the effect of royalty payment on profitability (refined) and 
profitability (unrefined), being represented as the difference between 
profitability before and after royalty payment. Comparing the behaviour of both 
Profitability after Royalty: 
(U) - (R) % 24.24%
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production plans, it however suggests that unrefined production pays a higher 
penalty for royalty payment. This is indicated by profitability difference for 
unrefined production, which was 7.00% as compared to that of refined 
production, which was 3.49%. 
 
For 2007: 
 Profitability after Royalty 
Refined:  44.43% 
Unrefined: 56.13% 
Difference: 
 
Comments: 
As observed, when comparing the profitability after royalty payments of both 
refined and unrefined, it can be drawn that in this year, even after royalty 
payments, it is more profitable for the company to sell concentrates as opposed 
to refined products.  
 
Figure 5.6-5 shows the effect of royalty payment on profitability (refined) and 
profitability (unrefined), being represented as the difference between 
profitability before and after royalty payment. Comparing the behaviour of both 
production plans, it however suggests that unrefined production pays a higher 
penalty for royalty payment. This is indicated by profitability difference for 
unrefined production, which was 7.00% as compared to that of refined 
production, which was 4.41%. 
 
For 2006: 
 Profitability after Royalty 
Refined:  46.89% 
Unrefined: 58.28% 
Profitability after Royalty: 
(U) - (R) % 11.70%
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Difference: 
 
Comments: 
As observed, when comparing the profitability after royalty payments of both 
refined and unrefined, it can be drawn that in this year, even after royalty 
payments, it is more profitable for the company to sell concentrates as opposed 
to refined products.  
 
Figure 5.6-5 shows the effect of royalty payment on profitability (refined) and 
profitability (unrefined), being represented as the difference between 
profitability before and after royalty payment. Comparing the behaviour of both 
production plans, it however suggests that unrefined production pays a higher 
penalty for royalty payment. This is indicated by profitability difference for 
unrefined production, which was 7.00% as compared to that of refined 
production, which was 4.62%. 
  
Profitability after Royalty: 
(U) - (R) % 11.39%
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5.6.4 Royalty savings analysis, Value added or not 
 
 
Figure 5.6-6: Royalty payments for both Refined and Unrefined PGM production 
 
 
Figure 5.6-7:  Effect of smelting and refining capex on area depicting royalty 
payment savings 
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For 2010: 
 Royalty paid 
Refined:  R 1,344,160,000 
Unrefined: R 2,123,971,125 
Difference: 
 
  Comments: 
  From the above, based on the beneficiation incentives provided in the MPRRA, 
there is a significant amount that would have accrued if refining took place in 
that year. However, this result was obtained because smelting and refining (S & 
R) capex for that year was not factored in. The S & R capex for 2010: 
  
 
On addition of S & R capex to refinement cost, the royalty payment savings of 
R779,811,125 is wiped out, as the savings can only cater for about half of the 
capex requirement for that year. Therefore, it can be drawn that in this year, on 
application of royalty formula for refined products, it was a disincentive with 
no value added. As shown in Figure 5.6-7, the S & R capex falls outside the 
royalty payment savings area (S). 
 
For 2009: 
 Royalty paid 
Refined:  R 774,655,000 
Unrefined: R 1,071,203,738 
Difference: 
 
  
 
Royalty payment savings: 
(U) - (R) R 779 811 125                
Capex for Smelting and Refining R 1 502 000 000             
Royalty payment savings: 
(U) - (R) R 296 548 738                
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 Comments: 
  From the above, based on the beneficiation incentive provided in the MPRRA, 
there is a significant amount that would have accrued if refining took place in 
that year. However, this result was obtained because S & R capex for that year 
was not factored in. The S & R capex for 2009: 
  
 
 On addition of S & R capex to refinement cost, the royalty payment savings of 
R296,548,738 is wiped out, as the savings cannot cater for any significant 
proportion of the capex requirement for that year. Therefore, it can be drawn 
that in this year, on application of royalty formula for refined products, it was a 
disincentive with no value added. As shown in Figure 5.6-7, the S & R capex 
falls outside the royalty payment savings area (S). 
 
For 2008: 
 Royalty paid 
Refined:  R 1,783,590,000 
Unrefined: R 4,061,809,243 
Difference: 
 
  Comments: 
  From the above, based on the beneficiation incentive provided in the MPRRA, 
there is a very significant amount that would have accrued if refining took place 
in that year. However, this result was obtained because S & R capex for that 
year was not factored in. The S & R capex for 2008: 
   
 
  On addition of S & R capex to refinement cost, the royalty payment savings of 
R2,278,219,243 is wiped out, although, it can be noted that the savings catered 
Capex for Smelting and Refining R 2 194 000 000             
Royalty payment savings: 
(U) - (R) R 2 278 219 243             
Capex for Smelting and Refining R 2 504 000 000             
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for a very significant proportion of the capex requirement for that year. 
Therefore, it can be drawn that in this year, on application of royalty formula 
for refined products, it was a disincentive with not much value added. As 
shown in Figure 5.6-7, the S & R capex falls slightly outside the royalty 
payment savings area (S). 
 
For 2007: 
 Royalty paid 
Refined:  R 2,069,685,000 
Unrefined: R 3,061,382,461 
Difference: 
 
  Comments: 
  From the above, based on the beneficiation incentive provided in the MPRRA, 
there is a very significant amount that would have accrued if refining was taken 
on in that year. However, this result was obtained because S & R capex for that 
year was not factored in. The S & R capex for 2007: 
  
 
On addition of S & R capex to refinement cost, the royalty payment savings of 
R991,697,461 caters for all the capex requirement for that year, leaving a credit 
balance of R131,697,461. Therefore, it can be drawn that in this year, on 
application of royalty formula for refined products, it was an incentive with 
significant value added. As shown in Figure 5.6-7, the S & R capex falls within 
the royalty payment savings area (S). 
 
For 2006: 
 Royalty paid 
Refined:  R 1,818,620,000 
Royalty payment savings: 
(U) - (R) R 991 697 461                
Capex for Smelting and Refining R 860 000 000                
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Unrefined: R 2,617,880,793 
Difference: 
 
  Comments: 
 From the above, based on the beneficiation incentive provided in the MPRRA, 
there is a significant amount that would have accrued if refining was taken on 
in that year. However, this result was obtained because S & R capex for that 
year was not factored in. The S & R capex for 2006: 
  
 
 On addition of S & R capex to refinement cost, the royalty payment savings of 
R799,260,793 caters for all the capex requirements for that year, leaving a 
credit balance of R310,260,793. Therefore, it can be drawn that in this year, on 
application of royalty formula for refined products, it was an incentive with 
significant value added. As shown in Figure 5.6-7, the S & R capex falls well 
within the royalty payment savings area (S). 
 
5.6.5 Effect of conservative S & R capital expenditure on royalty savings, value 
added or not 
 
In section 5.6.4, the effect of S & R capex on the royalty savings that accrued to the 
miner-turned-refiner was based on actual data obtained from the Anglo annual 
reports. However, in this section, another scenario is portrayed in which the 
substantial capital costs expensed in years 2008, 2009 and 2010 were reduced and the 
same capex value was used for those years. This scenario analysis was carried out to 
ascertain what the effect would be on royalty savings (incurred when refined royalty 
assessment is done instead of unrefined assessment), if the producer decided to be 
conservative on its S & R capital expenditure. The capex value used for years 2008 to 
Royalty payment savings: 
(U) - (R) R 799 260 793                
Capex for Smelting and Refining R 489 000 000                
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2010, was obtained by averaging the actual capex values for years 2006, 2007, 2009 
and 2010, which gave a value of R1,261,250,000. See Table 5.6-3 below. 
 
Table 5.6- 3:  Average S & R capex value made constant in years 2008, 2009 and 
2010  
 
 
The effect of the above on royalty savings is expressed graphically as, 
 
 
Figure 5.6- 8:  Effect of conservative smelting and refining capex on royalty payment 
savings 
 
From Figure 5.6-8, it can be observed that in years 2006, 2007 and 2008, the S & R 
capex fell within the royalty savings area S. This implies that in years 2006 to 2008, 
significant value would have been added to the miner-turned-refiner’s financial 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Capex for Smelting and Refining R 489 000 000                860 000 000                1 261 250 000         1 261 250 000             1 261 250 000             
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position, provided this producer had moderately incurred S & R capital costs. 
However, for years 2009 and 2010 even with conservative capital expenditure, capex 
fell outside the royalty savings area. This implied that even with moderate capital 
expensing, the MPRR regime’s reduced royalty rate for refined production would not 
have been an incentive in years 2009 and 2010 for the miner-turned-refiner. From this 
analysis, it can be suggested that if the producer has control on its cost of production, 
the MPRR regime’s beneficiation incentive would encourage miners to become 
refiners in good profit years but would be a disincentive in bad profit years. 
 
 
5.7 DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS OF PROPORTION OF 
REFINEMENT COST OF SALES PRICE  
 
Table 5.7- 1:  Calculation – Proportions of concentrate and refinement costs, of sales 
price 
 
Source: See Appendix 4A 
  
Cost ratio 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Cm R 12 983 000 000           16 125 000 000           20 243 000 000       19 543 000 000           19 919 000 000           
Cr R 6 100 000 000             7 900 000 000             11 775 000 000       10 030 000 000           12 528 000 000           
Total cost (Ct) R 19 083 000 000           24 025 000 000           32 018 000 000       29 573 000 000           32 447 000 000           
Percentage of Cm of Ct % 68% 67% 63% 66% 61%
Percentage of Cr of Ct % 33% 33% 37% 34% 39%
Proportion of costs of 
Sales Price
Gross Revenue as a proxy of 
Sales Price R 39 356 000 000           46 961 000 000           51 118 000 000       36 947 000 000           46 352 000 000           
Percentage of Cm of Gross Revenue 
(Sales price) % 33% 34% 40% 53% 43%
percentage of Cr of Gross Revenue 
(Sales price) % 15% 17% 23% 27% 27%
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Table 5.7-2: Proportion of refinement cost of sales price 
 
Source: See Appendix 4B 
 
In Tables 5.7-1 and 5.7-2 above, gross revenue was used as a proxy for sales price 
due to the fact that adequate information as regards unit sales price and total volume 
of PGM sold (which generated the gross revenue) could not be obtained as at the time 
of carrying out this analysis. Also, total refinement cost (Cr) was also used as a proxy 
for unit cost price of refinement because of lack of sufficient supporting information. 
Thus, since the gross revenue and total refinement cost both have a common 
denominator – volume, this supported the use of these proxy values to ascertain 
proportion of sales price that can be attributed to refinement cost. 
 
The analysis carried out in this section is based on the model drawn up by Cawood 
(2011) which is based on his interpretation of Bradley’s approach. In chapter three, 
observations drawn from Figures 3.3-3, 3.3-4 and 3.3-5 (Cawood’s model) indicated 
that significant value is added if refining cost is 10% of final sales price, little value is 
added if refining cost is 20% final sales price and no value is added if refining cost is 
30% of sales price received. Hence, it was concluded that if refining costs are above 
20% of sales price, adding on refining facility would be of detrimental value to the 
miner. 
 
Cost ratio 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Cm R 12 983 000 000           16 125 000 000           20 243 000 000       19 543 000 000           19 919 000 000           
Cr R 6 100 000 000             7 900 000 000             11 775 000 000       10 030 000 000           12 528 000 000           
Total cost (Ct) R 19 083 000 000           24 025 000 000           32 018 000 000       29 573 000 000           32 447 000 000           
Proportion of costs of 
Sales Price
Gross Revenue as a proxy Sales 
Price R 39 356 000 000           46 961 000 000           51 118 000 000       36 947 000 000           46 352 000 000           
percentage of Cr of Gross Revenue 
(Sales price) % 15% 17% 23% 27% 27%
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From the econometric analysis carried out in this section (see Table 5.7-2), it was 
found that in 2006 and 2007, refinement costs were 15% and 17% of sales price, 
respectively. Based on conclusions stated in the previous paragraph, it can be drawn 
that in those years, with the incentive provisions of the MPRRA some amount of 
value would have been added to a miner that took on refining processes. However, 
from 2008 to 2010, based on the values given of proportion of refinement costs, 
which were all above 20% but less than 30%, little value would have been added to 
the miner-turned-refiner. 
 
These results – Total refinement costs (Cr) – were based on refinement operating 
costs only, with no S & R capex included. When S & R capex was included for all the 
years as seen in Table 5.7-3, it can be observed that the proportion of refinement costs 
of sales price increased above the values presented initially. With these new values 
for refinement costs, it can be observed that value is still added in the years 2006 and 
2007, although not substantial in size and little or no value is added in the years 2008 
to 2010.  
 
Table 5.7- 3: Effect of S & R capex on proportion of refinement cost of sales price 
 
Source: See Appendix 4C 
 
Cost ratio 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Purchased metals R 3 947 000 000             5 539 000 000             8 999 000 000         6 689 000 000             9 215 000 000             
Smelting costs R 1 238 000 000             1 314 000 000             1 625 000 000         1 881 000 000             1 846 000 000             
Treatment and Refining costs R 915 000 000                1 047 000 000             1 151 000 000         1 460 000 000             1 467 000 000             
S & R Capex R 489 000 000                860 000 000                2 504 000 000         2 194 000 000             1 502 000 000             
Cr R 6 589 000 000             8 760 000 000             14 279 000 000       12 224 000 000           14 030 000 000           
Proportion of costs of 
Sales Price
Gross Revenue as a proxy Sales 
Price R 39 356 000 000           46 961 000 000           51 118 000 000       36 947 000 000           46 352 000 000           
Percentage of Cr of Gross Revenue 
(Sales price) % 17% 19% 28% 33% 30%
132 
 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, after establishing the PGM sector as the focus for the econometric 
analysis of this project, the biggest global player in this sector – Anglo American 
Platinum Limited was the South African platinum mining company chosen for data-
use, processing and analysis. Its EBITs, profitability ratios and beneficiation costs (as 
percentages of sales price) data were evaluated and the methodology (conclusions 
from Bradley and Cawood’s models) in chapter three was applied to these data.  
 
In conclusion, from the results obtained in the tables above coupled with the 
observations from the sections on analysis of royalty savings and proportion of 
refinement cost of sales price, on an above-average assessment, it can be concluded 
that if the MPRRA’s reduced rate provision for refined products is the only incentive 
given to motivate miners to become refiners, this is not substantial enough. 
Therefore, the fiscal policy objectives of the MPRRA to foster mineral beneficiation 
by allowing for reduced royalty rate for refined minerals, viewing from the 
perspective of a representative mining company, would not be achieved. 
 
The next chapter is a summary of all findings in this report and statement of the 
conclusions drawn that answer the question raised in this report, which sought to find 
out if the new South African mineral royalty formulae, would encourage many more 
mining companies to become refiners of minerals, thereby satisfying the South 
African government’s beneficiation (industrial) and economic objectives. Some 
recommendations will be given, which proposes areas of further research needed to 
ensure that the beneficiation objective of the MPRR regime would be realized. 
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CHAPTER SIX  
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
All through history, it has been observed that the growth of many towns and states 
world-wide has originated from the minerals industry. This sector has contributed 
greatly to the economic growth, employment opportunities, further mineral 
development, provision of requisite infrastructure as well as other spin-off benefits to 
the economy of host jurisdictions. This report took a general look at mineral fiscal 
policies used to generate funds needed by the government to provide the above-
mentioned benefits to its citizens. Also, to incentivise the mining companies, it was 
settled that governments must ensure that the mineral operating, fiscal and regulatory 
environment of their jurisdictions is stable and efficient. This would allow for the 
attraction of more direct investment from mining companies as well as increase tax 
revenue collected from mining companies (PWC, 2010). 
 
Narrowing down to the South African context, its policy-makers have borne the 
stability and efficiency principles in mind when revising and designing their fiscal 
and regulatory policies. With South Africa seeking to use the new MPRRA as a way 
of ensuring that the mineral sector facilitates the diversification of her economy by 
encouraging the existence of more refining facilities from extractive ones, its design 
was not left out of incorporating the above principles.  After extensive discussions 
and consultations, the structure – royalty base and rate, was made to achieve an 
equitable balance, as much as possible.  
 
The main focus of this research project was to assess whether the new South African 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty regime’s provision of beneficiation 
(refining) incentive would facilitate further mineral development by encouraging 
mining companies to move-up the value-chain to become refiners.  
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A South African platinum company within the PGM sector was used for the project’s 
assessment so as to answer its problem question. The PGM sector was settled for 
because its contribution was to a large extent the backbone of government revenues 
of the recent boom, as at 2010 (PWC, 2010). 
 
The next section comprises of the summary of all information obtained in order to 
answer the problem question of this research report. 
 
 
6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
6.1.1 Chapter one: Background, Literature Review and Aims of 
 Research 
 
This chapter supported the fact that host governments of mineral-rich economies have 
rightful claim to benefit from mining activities. It showed that they have used fiscal 
instruments over time to extract a fair share of mineral wealth, which is then used to 
fund social-economic responsibilities as well as to facilitate or discourage various 
kinds of private sector decisions.  
 
In this chapter, it was shown that it was justified to apply discriminatory taxation to 
the mineral sector as different from all sectors of the economy, because of the unique 
characteristics of minerals. The history that governed the evolution of mining fiscal 
systems was covered, indicating that mineral-rich developing countries had been 
revising their fiscal systems to capture greater share in mineral wealth and also as a 
form of development strategy for the encouragement of beneficiation and 
establishment of economic linkages from mineral development. The different types of 
mining taxation systems in existence were mentioned with particular emphasis on the 
use of mineral royalties. Mineral royalty was defined as being a just and necessary 
compensatory charge for state-owned resources, which can be used up for the 
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realization of increased economic growth and development of mineral-rich 
jurisdictions. The five (5) broad categories of royalties were also explained briefly.   
Sweden and Finland were indicated as country examples who understood that mineral 
resource dependence could not guarantee sustained and long-term growth and 
development of their jurisdictions, and hitherto, used their policies (including fiscal 
systems for capturing of mineral wealth) as a basis for creation of other alternative 
sources of exports and industrialization. The mineral royalty policy (systems) of some 
other countries – Ghana, Mongolia, NWT (Canada) and Western Australia – that 
have custodianship of minerals and whose royalty systems are similar to South 
Africa’s ad valorem/hybrid royalty type, were also examined. They were assessed to 
ascertain if their systems had provisions for further mineral beneficiation, and if so, 
what success or failure stories could South Africa’s MPRRA draw from them. 
However, the constraint of this section, was the lack of access to up-to-date detailed 
information on the royalty regimes of many countries especially as regards provisions 
to facilitate beneficiation, the analysis of the regimes and what the impact of regimes 
have been on investment and operations.  
 
It was identified that Ghana has an ad valorem, profitability dependent, sliding-scale 
system. It is similar to South Africa’s MPRR regime because it places no specific 
royalty rate on minerals and its profitability dependence. However, it is dissimilar in 
that it has no beneficiation provisions. According to Akabzaa (2009), the Mining 
Code governing Ghana’s royalty regime “lacks specific provisions that encourage 
mining companies to foster backward and forward linkages between mining and other 
sectors of the local economy, which could spur broader national economic 
development”. The incentives for investment in beneficiation facilities lie in taking 
advantage of the industrial free zone facility to produce beneficiated products and 
other industrial sector policies (Mine Ghana Investment, 2010). Mongolia introduced 
a new surtax royalty which became applicable from January 1, 2011.  The new surtax 
royalty is close to South Africa’s MPRR regime because it includes provisions to 
encourage mining companies to engage in value-added activities, as the rates vary 
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depending on the type of minerals, their market prices and their degree of processing 
and are not charged on any minerals below a certain threshold market price per 
mineral type. However, because it was at a fledgling state as at the time of this report, 
it was difficult to test if many mining companies have been encouraged to engage in 
value-addition activities through its provisions. Northwest Territories (Canada) has a 
sliding-scale profit-based royalty regime with mineral processing incentives inclusive 
and Western Australia has both unit-based and ad valorem royalty systems. WA’s ad 
valorem system is profitability dependent and charges lower royalties on value-added 
mineral products so as to encourage local processing. 
 
Furthermore, as regards the South African context, it was stated in this chapter that 
the collection of mineral royalties (which constituted the second most important 
source of income for SA), had been in existence since 1878. It also mentioned that the 
main purpose of the current Royalty Act and stated that it was initially to come into 
force by 2009 but eventually came into force in 2010.  The MPRRA stipulates an ad 
valorem, sliding-scale formula method of charging royalties, which places no specific 
rate for any minerals, acknowledges profitability and automatically recognizes 
downstream beneficiation of mineral products as it distinguishes between refined and 
unrefined minerals. The formula provisions for refined minerals allows for reduction 
of royalty rate as beneficiation increases in order to compensate for the higher sales 
value of refined products. 
 
From this chapter, it was drawn that it is just and necessary for mineral-rich States, as 
owners of the minerals, to use mineral fiscal instruments (especially royalties) to 
charge compensatory fee for the exploitation of their non-renewable scarce resources 
as well as strategies to promote further mineral processing within their jurisdictions. 
Also from the country examples, it can also be drawn that, generally, the effects of 
changes to taxation, and other policies that impact on market conditions hardly affect 
immediate investments or shut down existing operations but could negatively deter 
future investments in new projects (Fraser Institute, 2011). 
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6.1.2 Chapter two: The South African Context: Mineral Fiscal Policy 
   Issues  
 
This chapter identified that the investment unattractiveness of a jurisdiction which 
could be attributed to the fact that many other mineral-rich developing regions or 
countries offered more favourable investment conditions, led such countries to make 
over-generous revisions to their mineral fiscal and regulatory policies. The member 
countries of the SADC were not left out in carrying out such reforms. It was stated 
that with the State being the sovereign owner of its mineral resources, charging of 
mineral royalties by the State is justified as long as they do not distort investment 
decisions. 
 
In accordance to the purpose of the report, the South African mineral and mining 
policy frameworks and their objectives were reviewed. The history that led to the 
reform of South Africa’s macroeconomic policies, especially those affecting the 
mining industry – the Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa (which was 
released in October 1998), Beneficiation Strategy (which was launched in 2009), 
MPRDA 2002 – was expounded.  The purpose of these policy reforms was to enable 
the mining industry to address the problems and opportunities confronting it 
especially in the light of increased competition in commodity markets and for 
investment attractiveness from other mineral-rich countries. Knowing that the mineral 
policy of the country outlines the national objectives that the country seeks to achieve 
from its mining sector, one of the main themes of the Mineral and Mining Policy was 
‘Business climate and mineral development’. This theme addressed seven topics 
relevant to the climate for mining business and mineral development including 
amongst other issues – ownership of mineral rights; mineral fiscal instruments 
(including royalties); mineral beneficiation. 
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This chapter focused on the mineral beneficiation intent of these policy frameworks, 
which showed that the South African government was very keen on promoting the 
facilitation of not only primary extraction but the establishment of secondary and 
tertiary mineral-based industries aimed at adding maximum value to raw materials. 
They opined that companies involved in mineral development could also be involved 
in downstream minerals beneficiation. Therefore, the government moved that the 
beneficiation objectives of its policy framework could be achieved using the mining 
taxation policy to encourage value-addition to raw materials (mineral beneficiation). 
To facilitate this drive, the mining taxation policy would provide efficient supply-side 
incentives such as lower royalty rates for projects that include beneficiation. This led 
to the birth of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act (MPRRA) which 
provided a reduced royalty rate for refined minerals.  
 
This chapter further broadly stated the history of how South Africa’s current royalty 
regime – Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act 2008, evolved. The design of 
the MPRR regime was also expounded basing its structure on the combination of 
principles of the Gold lease, Mr. I. J. Haarhoff’s recommendations to the Frames 
Commission of Inquiry in 1917 and comparative study against the CIF (1999). The 
various advantages of the formula-based royalty system were mentioned especially its 
provisions for facilitating mineral beneficiation, which is in line with standard 
international practice requirements in which different royalty rates be  charged for 
different minerals based on their difference in value. This allowed for the 
acknowledgement of the amount of processing required for each mineral product. The 
chapter ended by acknowledging the integrity and feasibility of MPRRA as a worthy 
piece of legislature but that the success of its mineral beneficiation policy provisions 
needed further quantitative analysis and verification. 
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6.1.3 Chapter three: Methodology – Application of Bradley’s (Western 
  Australia) model to the South African context  
 
This chapter specified the methodology that was used in this research project. The 
methodology was derived from the conclusions drawn after carrying out research into 
the mining royalty system of the country examples given in chapter one, whose 
mineral fiscal instruments have mineral processing provisions. For the purpose of 
applying the methodology to the South African context, the Western Australian 
example was selected because of its dependence on similar strategic commodities like 
South Africa, coupled with the fact that its royalty regime has provisions for further 
processing of minerals. This assessment was carried out for application to the South 
African context, so as to postulate whether the current South African royalty system’s 
beneficiation incentive provisions would yield its desired success of encouraging 
private sector investment in mineral processing ventures, or not. 
 
In this chapter, WA’s royalty system was expounded on and assessed in light of 
Bradley’s work as regards mineral processing provisions. It was identified that the 
system of collection of royalties in WA was either under the Mining Regulations of 
1981 or various State agreement Acts. Its mineral royalty regime had undergone 
revision at various times. One of the main reviews whose study and recommendations 
related to the objective of this research report is the Mineral Revenues Inquiry of 
1986, headed by Bradley. This review was used and extensively looked into so as to 
give an understanding and explanation of the WA mineral royalty arrangements, its 
royalty structure (design) and its mineral processing objectives and requirements, 
which was in operation at that time.  It was highlighted that the mining industry 
contributed royalties to the WA economy through the realization of net resource 
value. It was specified also that, in spite of revenue generation from cash royalties, 
the government of Western Australia still sought to receive additional benefits – 
further processing of minerals, infrastructural provisions – from mineral 
development, because of the priority it placed on future regional development and 
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industrialization. This led them to look at using public (fiscal) policy to induce the 
industrialization goal. This type of fiscal instrument was referred to as De facto 
royalties. The incentive provided in the state’s De facto royalty system to encourage 
the establishment of additional processing facilities was the introduction of reduced 
royalty levies for processed mineral products. 
 
The charge given to the inquiry carried out by Bradley’s team was to examine the 
performance of royalty systems with respect to economic efficiency. The royalty 
systems were deemed to be economically efficient if they took into consideration the 
additional expenditure that private developers incurred for their operations and 
ensured that they did not contribute toward reducing realized resource values from 
their potential level, or cause distortion of investment decisions or operating plans.  
As regards further mineral processing requirements, the Bradley inquiry assessed 
whether the developer that takes up further mineral processing based on the State’s 
grant of a royalty concession in exchange for processing would be better or worse off 
than in the initial situation – without processing requirements – and by what amount, 
if any. The structure, principles and methods for applying the Western Australian ad 
valorem royalty system as well as its mineral processing provisions were detailed. 
The Inquiry gave an analysis of the effect of the mineral processing provisions from 
the developer’s point of view. It showed that in order for a royalty instrument that 
demands processing commitments, but also offers reduced royalty rate incentives to 
be efficient, if the sales price received by the developer exceeds specified processing 
cost, it will be advantageous to proceed with proposed mineral processing plan. 
Alternatively, if processing costs varied from those prescribed in the schedule listed 
in the regime, the reduced royalty rate for processed minerals would be a 
disincentive. Therefore, based on the system’s assumptions for the costs needed to 
take product to next stage of processing which are expressed as a share of final 
product, Bradley concluded that investment in value-addition could only be justified 
when the difference in unit price less value-addition cost is greater than the additional 
costs incurred in refining the production. This meant that since the cost to take 
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concentrate to refined metal was about 50% of price for refine metal, if the amount of 
value-added was not significantly greater than this cost, it would not have been a 
worthy venture to invest in bringing-on a refining facility. 
 
The final section of this chapter, applied Bradley’s conclusions on the WA royalty 
system to the MPRRA, using the model created by Cawood (2011). This model 
which varied royalty rate with sales price was based on Cawood’s interpretation of 
Bradley’s approach after the careful understanding of the similarities and differences 
between the unique features of the SA and WA royalty regimes was established. The 
work carried out by Cawood (2011) showed sales price received for refined product 
(indexed at 100%), as a combination of cost of concentrate plus cost of refinement 
plus EBIT margin. Proportions of refinement cost, expressed as 10%, 20% and 30% 
of price of final product were varied against different target EBITs from 0% to 100%, 
in order to determine the various levels of value that would be added to profitability. 
Comparing SA regime with Bradley’s work on the WA system, it was concluded that 
the royalty savings gap available to support the value-add appears quite insignificant 
when compared to that of Bradley’s model. Also, substantial value would only be 
added to a developer’s profitability if processing costs are less than or equal to 10% 
of sales price received,  unlike in WA system where this only occurs when costs to 
take concentrate to refined level is less than or equal to 50% of price received for 
final product.  
 
6.1.4 Chapter four: Impact of MPRRA on the South African mining 
industry and its contribution to South African 
economy 
 
This chapter showed that governments have to design their fiscal policy environment 
in ways that balance their revenue-generation objective with allowing sufficient funds 
to flow to investors as well so that mining companies’ investment decisions are not 
distorted. Therefore, the MPRR instrument which provides that developers 
142 
 
undertaking further mineral processing will pay a lower royalty rate than developers 
that extract minerals only, must significantly encourage this investment decision.  
 
Furthermore, this chapter highlighted the effect that the imposition of the MPRRA 
would have on the South African mining industry and its contribution to the 
economy. It was indicated that the South African mining sector is a very significant 
contributor to government earnings. With the imposition of the MPRRA, this would 
ensure that the sector would play a greater part in contributing to the national 
economy of South Africa. However, the impact of the new SA mining royalty on all 
South African mineral producers is that it will add a significant additional cost to the 
mining sector, thereby, reducing their profit margins. It was also shown that based on 
the provisions of the Act, refiners would contribute lesser than miners to fiscus. This 
implies the penalty that miners would pay for not beneficiating their products to 
specified levels, but in the light of the work carried out by Cawood, this ‘penalty’ 
would only be worth avoiding by adding on beneficiation facilities, if their 
beneficiation costs are less than or equal to 10% of Sales price, or slightly over 10%. 
 
 Also, later in this chapter, the PGM industry was specified as sector on which the 
assessment of this research project was to be carried out. This was based on the fact 
that in 2010, PGMs were tagged as the biggest revenue generator, but in terms 
collection of mineral royalties, it was the second biggest contributor, coupled with 
PGMs being termed as dual-schedule materials according to the specifications in the 
MPRRA.  
 
A brief overview was given as regards the unique features of this sector and its 
recovery processes that inform the substantial amount of capital needed required to 
fund PGM mining projects. 
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6.1.5 Chapter five: Results and Analysis of Platinum case study 
 
This chapter proceeded to apply the methodology of this report to actual data of 
refining costs and profitability ratios from a platinum company. This analysis was 
carried out so as to ascertain whether on addition of further mineral processing 
expenditures, the amount of value added to financial position of miners is sufficient 
enough to inspire their upgrade to becoming refiners. 
 
Data used for this analysis was taken mainly from the South African platinum mining 
company – Anglo American Platinum Limited, because of its unique position in the 
mining industry and because it carries out both quality mining and refining 
operations. Additional data was also taken from Aquarius, which is one of the 
companies in joint venture agreement with Anglo American Platinum. 
 
From analysis carried out, it was observed that: 
1. The magnitude of royalty rate (which reduced EBITs) varied in tandem with the 
high or low magnitude of profits received in each year. This is in line with the 
provisions of the MPRRA, which stipulates that the royalty rate (for either 
unrefined or refined product) is calculated by varying it with profitability of the 
mine. For example, for refined production which had good profits in 2006 to 
2008, the royalty rates were high, but in year 2009 with depressed profit, the 
royalty rate was very low;  
2. The gap between EBITs before and after the royalty payments (for both 
unrefined and refined production), as well as the gap between profitability 
before and after the royalty payments, was greater in the good profit years but 
decreasingly diminished with movements into years with depressed profits; 
3. In comparing the performance of refined and unrefined PGM production, from 
the differences in EBITs and profitability before royalty payments, it can be 
drawn that on average from all the years analysed that even though the 
company made significant profits on the sale of refined products, it would have 
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been more profitable for the company to sell concentrates as opposed to refined 
products; 
4. For ‘after royalty’ analysis, the EBIT after royalty payments (unrefined) was on 
the average largely greater than EBIT after royalty payments (refined). This 
indicated that even with the incentive provisions of the MPRRA, it was more 
profitable for the company to sell only concentrates; 
5. In comparing the behaviour of both production plans, the effect of royalty 
payment on profitability (refined) and profitability (unrefined), being 
represented as the difference between profitability before and after royalty 
payment, however, suggests that unrefined production pays a higher penalty for 
royalty payment than refinement; 
6. Based on the beneficiation incentives provided in the MPRRA, there is a 
significant amount of royalty savings that would have accrued if refining took 
place in each year. However, this result was obtained because smelting and 
refining capex were not factored into the cost calculations. With the addition of 
S & R capex, it was observed that in most of the years except 2006 & 2007, the 
royalty payment savings were wiped out;  
7. In the scenario analysis carried out to determine what the effect of ‘controlled’ 
production cost expenditure would be on royalty savings, it was observed that 
in good profit years, in terms of value added from royalty savings, the producer 
that is assessed based on refined royalty payment would have some value 
accrued to its financial position. The reverse is the case for years with bad 
profits; and 
8. Based on conclusions from Cawood’s model (methodology used), with the 
refinement costs (without S & R capex) spanning from 15% to above 20% but 
less than 30% of sales price, little value or no valued is added to the miner-
turned-refiner. However, on addition of capex to refinement costs, the 
proportion of refinement costs of sales price increased above the initial values 
presented, thereby making the value-addition case worse off. 
 
145 
 
6.2 CONCLUSION   
 
The main purpose of this report was to give the answer to the question of whether the 
policy intent of motivating mineral producers to become refiners would be achieved, 
based on value-added or not to the financial positions of mining-only and mining plus 
refining projects. 
 
Nevertheless, in order to support the answer to the question of this report based on 
experiences from the country examples used in this project, the impact of the 
beneficiation incentives of their royalty regimes on refining investment could not be 
determined due to information constraints. In spite of this, another useful lesson that 
could be drawn is the importance of considering how changes in policies that 
influence the investment climate impacts on investment flow in general.  
 
The introduction of a royalty could have dramatic or little or no effect on a country’s 
investment climate, depending on the circumstances and the nature of the royalty 
(Otto et al, 2006). For example, for Ghana which began charging a fixed mineral 
royalty rate of 5% so as to increase government’s take from the mining industry, 
according to various comments and analysis carried out, it was posited that the new 
royalty rate was not investor-friendly. The Economist magazine (2010) stated that 
“the immediate cause of the increase in royalties is a budget deficit of almost 10% of 
GDP…..mining firms, predictably, are unenthusiastic and say a new royalty regime 
could deter future investment and in some cases, violate existing agreements…”. 
Also, in Newmont’s 64-page socio-economic impact report, it was stated that “…an 
increase in royalty payments, for example, effectively acts to decrease the life of the 
mine (and therefore its benefits)….” (Smith-Asante, 2011). Furthermore, according to 
Fraser Institute 2010/2011 rating of Taxation (royalty inclusive) regime’s 
encouragement of investment, comparing the four countries to one another, NWT’s 
regime, Mongolia, WA and Ghana came 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
 and 4
th
 respectively. In terms of 
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Taxation regime not being deterrent to (current) investment, Ghana, NWT, WA, 
Mongolia came 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
 and 4
th
 respectively. See Table 6.2-1 below: 
 
Table 6.2-1:  Taxation regime (includes personal, corporate, payroll, capital, and 
other taxes, and complexity of tax compliance) in terms of 
encouragement of mining investment 
Country/Rating 1 2 3 4 5 
NWT 14% 59% 22% 5% 0% 
WA 9% 44% 28% 17% 2% 
Ghana 7% 63% 22% 7% 0% 
Mongolia  11% 22% 44% 17% 6% 
Source: (Fraser Institute, 2011) 
 
Where, 
1: Encourages Investment 
2: Not a Deterrent to investment 
3: Mild Deterrent  
4: Strong Deterrent 
5: Would not pursue investment due to this factor 
 
Looking at the percentages, it can be deduced that mineral royalty payments in these 
countries were not considered as factors that greatly deterred current investment, but 
they would not significantly encourage future inflow of investment either. From the 
above, it can be concluded that the imposition of the MPRRA is in line with global 
trends and it would not necessarily deter investments because it provides for equitable 
sharing of economic benefits between State and mining companies, in any economic 
cycle (Netshipale, 2008). 
 
From the econometric analysis, it can be drawn that in both good and bad years, 
before and after the application of the royalty formula, it was more advantageous to 
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the miner to produce concentrates and not refined products. Even in the case whereby 
significant royalty savings were obtained on the application of the royalty formula for 
refined products as opposed to that of unrefined products, these savings were 
eradicated on addition of on-going refinement capex. This indicated that the MPRR 
for refined products was a disincentive because value was destroyed as the miner-
turned-refiner’s profitability decreased the more. Also looking at the comparison of 
Cawood’s model with the proportion that refining cost make up of sales price which 
ranged from 15% to about 30%+ (with or without S & R capex factored in), it 
indicated that little or no value was added to the miner-turned-refiner’s profitability. 
 
In conclusion, based on the findings of this project, the answer to the fundamental 
question posed in chapter one is that the new South African mineral royalty regime is 
unlikely to encourage miners to become refiners. 
 
 
6.3 RECOMMENDATION 
 
In this report, the equitability and efficiency characteristics of the MPRRA was 
briefly proven as being sound. However, its beneficiation provisions appeared to be 
incapable of leading to the realization of the mineral beneficiation objective of the SA 
government. It was also the opinion of Rocha (2011), that the new royalty Act’s 
beneficiation incentive on a general note would not necessarily encourage miners to 
become refiners because the Act came in to force after most companies had 
established their refining subsidiaries, for example, Impala Platinum Limited and 
Amplats.  
 
However, it is recommended that this initiative should not be discarded off but further 
studies: 
1. can apply the econometric analysis undertaken in this project to other 
commodity sectors like manganese, iron ore, so as to ascertain if the conclusion 
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of this project is platinum industry-specific or it applies to the entire mining 
industry; 
2. can apply the MPRRA’s beneficiation provisions to refining subsidiaries, so as 
to ascertain if this policy incentive would encourage the refining subsidiaries to 
move-up to other different stages of beneficiation; 
3. can simulate the MPRRA’s beneficiation provisions to the circumstances of 
other mineral-rich developing countries that do not refine their minerals at 
present and carry out the type of econometric analysis done in this project to 
ascertain whether their miners would be encouraged to become refiners;  
4. can assess different ways to ensure that the MPRRA regime would better 
facilitate the miner-turned-refiner to realise sufficiently more profits than the 
miner-only, on addition of refining facilities and processes. This is proposed 
especially in light of the fact that extractive companies which also have refining 
subsidiaries have not and are currently still not boasting of the realisation of 
significant profits. This is due to the highly capital-intensive nature of refining 
processes coupled with the low prices being received for their products (for 
example, PGMs). With these issues, many producers have sought and are still 
seeking ways to control their production costs but the achievement of such 
conservativeness seems to be hindered by many factors which are unique to 
their individual operations.  More so, producers becoming conservative on 
capital expenditure may also equate to reduced development and expansion of 
their operations. Therefore, in order for the SA government  to achieve its 
beneficiation policy objectives, its fiscal instruments should take into 
consideration the above-mentioned unfavourable conditions which the refined 
minerals market is susceptible to, couple with the knowledge that producers are 
price-takers which hardly have any control over the prices received.  
In pursuit of this, it can incentivise mining companies on their cost-side by 
looking into adjusting the parameters and improving the design of the MPRR 
regime so that as much as possible it becomes more favourable to the addition 
of beneficiation capital costs (refinement costs in general), in all economic 
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cycles.  Incorporating incentives for refinement capital costs may allow the 
reduced royalty rate provisions for refined minerals to significantly add value 
and encourage miners to become refiners. It is suggested that this could be 
achieved either by reducing the maximum rate; or manipulating the F-factor of 
12.5 (which determines the maximum rate for refined rate); or manipulating the 
royalty base to allow for deduction of some costs (marketing, transport, other 
operating and/or capital) attributed to refining.  
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Appendix 1A 
ANGLO AMERICAN PLATINUM (Group analysis- Refined PGM) Base case 
  Units 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Gross revenue R            39 356 000 000             46 961 000 000         51 118 000 000             36 947 000 000             46 352 000 000  
Mining costs R            12 983 000 000             16 125 000 000         20 243 000 000             19 543 000 000             19 919 000 000  
Purchased metals R              3 947 000 000               5 539 000 000           8 999 000 000               6 689 000 000               9 215 000 000  
Smelting costs R              1 238 000 000               1 314 000 000           1 625 000 000               1 881 000 000               1 846 000 000  
Treatment and 
Refining costs R                 915 000 000               1 047 000 000           1 151 000 000               1 460 000 000               1 467 000 000  
EBIT before Royalty R            20 273 000 000             22 936 000 000         19 100 000 000               7 374 000 000             13 905 000 000  
EBIT/Revenue before 
Royalty % 51.51% 48.84% 37.36% 19.96% 30.00% 
Refined Royalty Rate %                              4.62                               4.41                           3.49                               2.10                               2.90  
Royalty paid R              1 818 620 000               2 069 685 000           1 783 590 000                  774 655 000               1 344 160 000  
EBIT after Royalty R            18 454 380 000             20 866 315 000         17 316 410 000               6 599 345 000             12 560 840 000  
EBIT/Revenue after 
Royalty % 46.89% 44.43% 33.88% 17.86% 27.10% 
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Appendix 1B 
(R) Units 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
EBIT before Royalty 
(Refined) R            20 273 000 000             22 936 000 000         19 100 000 000               7 374 000 000             13 905 000 000  
EBIT/Revenue before  
Royalty (Refined) % 51.51% 48.84% 37.36% 19.96% 30.00% 
Refined Royalty Rate  %                              4.62                               4.41                           3.49                               2.10                               2.90  
Royalty paid 
(Refined) R              1 818 620 000               2 069 685 000           1 783 590 000                  774 655 000               1 344 160 000  
EBIT after Royalty 
(Refined) R            18 454 380 000             20 866 315 000         17 316 410 000               6 599 345 000             12 560 840 000  
EBIT/Revenue after 
Royalty (Refined) % 46.89% 44.43% 33.88% 17.86% 27.10% 
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Appendix 2A 
ANGLO AMERICAN PLATINUM (Group analysis- Unrefined PGM) Base case 
  Units 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Tonnes milled t                   43 792 000                    41 563 000                42 611 000                    43 114 000                    42 242 000  
Head grade g/t                              3.81                               3.63                           3.36                               3.31                               3.23  
recovery   98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 
Recovered metal g                 163 510 570                  147 856 216              140 309 501                  139 853 193                  133 712 827  
Metal in concentrate  
(Recovered metal) oz                     5 257 000                      4 753 699                  4 511 066                      4 496 396                      4 298 978  
Prices received (sheet3) R/oz                            7 114                             9 200                       12 863                             6 211                             8 689  
Gross revenue R            37 398 297 039             43 734 035 155         58 025 846 332             27 927 113 530             37 353 818 298  
Mining costs R            12 983 000 000             16 125 000 000         20 243 000 000             19 543 000 000             19 919 000 000  
EBIT before Royalty R            24 415 297 039             27 609 035 155         37 782 846 332               8 384 113 530             17 434 818 298  
EBIT/Revenue before 
Royalty % 65.28% 63.13% 65.11% 30.02% 46.67% 
Unrefined Royalty Rate %                              7.00                               7.00                           7.00                               3.84                               5.69  
Royalty paid R              2 617 880 793               3 061 382 461           4 061 809 243               1 071 203 738               2 123 971 125  
EBIT after Royalty R            21 797 416 247             24 547 652 694         33 721 037 088               7 312 909 792             15 310 847 174  
EBIT/Revenue after 
Royalty % 58.28% 56.13% 58.11% 26.19% 40.99% 
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Appendix 2B 
Using Aquarius Concentrate prices based on averages from Kroondal and Marikana mines 
  
       
       Kroondal 
          2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
Attributable PGM  
production - in concentrate oz           204 285                211 039          195 558           219 674          219 722  
Revenue - attributable $    230 000 000         146 000 000   347 000 000    279 500 000   214 300 000  
Price received $/oz               1 126                       692              1 774               1 272              1 290  
R/$ exchange rate R/$                 7.58                      9.03                7.23                 7.18                6.37  
Price received R/oz               8 534                    6 247            12 829               9 135              8 219  
cost per PGM produced R/oz               5 769                    5 174              4 241               3 069              2 565  
       Marikana 
          2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
Attributable PGM  
production - in concentrate oz             67 709                  78 969            62 791             66 187            56 617  
Revenue - attributable $      79 000 000           54 000 000   112 000 000      85 400 000     53 400 000  
Price received $/oz               1 167                       684              1 784               1 290                 943  
R/$ exchange rate R/$                      8                           9                     7                      7                     6  
Price received R/oz               8 844                    6 175            12 896               9 264              6 008  
cost per PGM produced R/oz               7 133                    6 677              7 575               5 219              4 980  
       Average price of 2mines R/oz 8689 6211 12863 9200 7114 
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Appendix 2C 
(U) Units 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
EBIT before Royalty 
(Unrefined) R            24 415 297 039             27 609 035 155         37 782 846 332               8 384 113 530             17 434 818 298  
EBIT/Revenue before 
Royalty (Unrefined) % 65.28% 63.13% 65.11% 30.02% 46.67% 
Unrefined Royalty 
Rate %                              7.00                               7.00                           7.00                               3.84                               5.69  
Royalty paid 
(Unrefined) R              2 617 880 793               3 061 382 461           4 061 809 243               1 071 203 738               2 123 971 125  
EBIT after Royalty 
(Unrefined) R            21 797 416 247             24 547 652 694         33 721 037 088               7 312 909 792             15 310 847 174  
EBIT/Revenue after 
Royalty (Unrefined) % 58.28% 56.13% 58.11% 26.19% 40.99% 
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Appendix 3 
    2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
EBIT before Royalty: (U) - (R) R              4 142 297 039               4 673 035 155         18 682 846 332               1 010 113 530               3 529 818 298  
Profitability before Royalty:  
(U) - (R) % 13.77% 14.29% 27.75% 10.06% 16.68% 
Royalty payment savings:  
(U) - (R) R                 799 260 793                  991 697 461           2 278 219 243                  296 548 738                  779 811 125  
EBIT after Royalty: (U) - (R) R              3 343 036 247               3 681 337 694         16 404 627 088                  713 564 792               2 750 007 174  
Profitability after Royalty:  
(U) - (R) % 11.39% 11.70% 24.24% 8.32% 13.89% 
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Appendix 4A 
Cost ratio   2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Cm R            12 983 000 000             16 125 000 000         20 243 000 000             19 543 000 000             19 919 000 000  
Cr R              6 100 000 000               7 900 000 000         11 775 000 000             10 030 000 000             12 528 000 000  
Total cost (Ct) R            19 083 000 000             24 025 000 000         32 018 000 000             29 573 000 000             32 447 000 000  
Percentage of Cm of Ct % 68% 67% 63% 66% 61% 
Percentage of Cr of Ct % 33% 33% 37% 34% 39% 
Proportion of costs of  
Sales Price             
Gross Revenue as a proxy 
of  
Sales Price R            39 356 000 000             46 961 000 000         51 118 000 000             36 947 000 000             46 352 000 000  
Percentage of Cm of Gross 
Revenue  
(Sales price) % 33% 34% 40% 53% 43% 
percentage of Cr of Gross 
Revenue  
(Sales price) % 15% 17% 23% 27% 27% 
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Appendix 4B 
Cost ratio   2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Cm R            12 983 000 000             16 125 000 000         20 243 000 000             19 543 000 000             19 919 000 000  
Cr R              6 100 000 000               7 900 000 000         11 775 000 000             10 030 000 000             12 528 000 000  
Total cost (Ct) R            19 083 000 000             24 025 000 000         32 018 000 000             29 573 000 000             32 447 000 000  
Proportion of costs of  
Sales Price             
Gross Revenue as a proxy 
Sales  
Price R            39 356 000 000             46 961 000 000         51 118 000 000             36 947 000 000             46 352 000 000  
percentage of Cr of Gross 
Revenue  
(Sales price) % 15% 17% 23% 27% 27% 
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Appendix 4C 
Cost ratio   2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Purchased metals R              3 947 000 000               5 539 000 000           8 999 000 000               6 689 000 000               9 215 000 000  
Smelting costs R              1 238 000 000               1 314 000 000           1 625 000 000               1 881 000 000               1 846 000 000  
Treatment and Refining costs R                 915 000 000               1 047 000 000           1 151 000 000               1 460 000 000               1 467 000 000  
S & R Capex  R                 489 000 000                  860 000 000           2 504 000 000               2 194 000 000               1 502 000 000  
Cr R              6 589 000 000               8 760 000 000         14 279 000 000             12 224 000 000             14 030 000 000  
Proportion of costs of  
Sales Price             
Gross Revenue as a proxy Sales  
Price R            39 356 000 000             46 961 000 000         51 118 000 000             36 947 000 000             46 352 000 000  
Percentage of Cr of Gross Revenue  
(Sales price) % 17% 19% 28% 33% 30% 
 
